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Cap´ıtulo 1
Introduccio´n
1.1. Justificacio´n de la Unidad Tema´tica de la
Tesis
Desde la aparicio´n de la primera tarjeta de cre´dito en los an˜os 50 (se-
guido por las tarjetas de de´bito), el llamado dinero pla´stico ha sido aceptado
mundialmente como un me´todo de pago en el cual el pagador debe presentar
f´ısicamente la tarjeta y firmar un recibo de pago como evidencia de pago. El
nacimiento y la expansio´n de Internet ha ayudado al desarrollo de sistemas de
comercio electro´nico que permiten pago en-l´ınea con tarjetas de cre´dito y/o
de´bito. Como consecuencia, el pago electro´nico se convirtio´ en un tema impor-
tante del comercio electro´nico y su seguridad no so´lo hara´ que las actividades de
compra sean ma´s convenientes y flexibles de ejecutar sino que habilitara´ nuevas
oportunidades de negocio [8].
La aparicio´n de las redes mo´viles e inala´mbricas hizo posible la extensio´n
del comercio electro´nico a un nuevo uso y a´rea de investigacio´n: el comercio
electro´nico mo´vil (que incluye el pago mo´vil). Esta nueva a´rea de aplicacio´n
trajo consigo la necesidad de realizar esfuerzos para asegurar el pago mo´vil.
La observacio´n en la tendencia de crecimiento del comercio electro´nico
mo´vil y la aparicio´n de situaciones en las cuales este tipo de comercio no es
posible debido a restricciones de conectividad presente en alguna de las enti-
dades que forman parte del sistema de pago electro´nico mo´vil, representan el
punto de partida de esta tesis doctoral. As´ı, este trabajo se enfoca en el reto
que representan las restricciones de comunicacio´n en el disen˜o de los futuros
sistemas de pago electro´nico mo´vil a fin de ampliar el espectro de posibilidades
del comercio electro´nico mo´vil en el mundo real.
Un ana´lisis de la evolucio´n del comercio electro´nico mo´vil muestra los es-
fuerzos realizados en sus inicios para adaptar los sistemas de pago electro´nico
existentes para redes fijas a las especificaciones de las redes inala´mbricas lo que
permitio´ un impulso importante para el m-comercio y aprovechar los esfuerzos
realizados para el e-comercio [20, 24, 23]. Sin embargo, dado que la tecnolog´ıa
inala´mbrica permitio´ el surgimiento de nuevos modelos de comercio, se hizo ne-
cesario disen˜ar nuevos sistemas de pago´ mo´vil capaces de explotar estos nuevos
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modelos a fin de aumentar las posibilidades de pago a los usuarios desde sus
dispositivos mo´viles.
La mayor´ıa de los sistemas de pago mo´vil existentes en la literatura esta´n
basados en escenarios de donde las entidades se pueden comunicar entre s´ı de
manera directa(llamado Modelo de Conectividad Completa, ver figura 1.1) y
no admiten modelos de negocio donde las restricciones de comunicacio´n directa
entre entidades del sistema no es un impedimento para realizar las transaccio-
nes comerciales. Es por ello que los futuros sistemas de pago mo´vil deber´ıan
considerar aquellas situaciones en las cuales la comunicacio´n directa entre dos
entidades del sistema no es posible (de manera temporal o permanente) ba´sica-
mente por la imposibilidad de una de las entidades de conectarse a Internet. Sin
embargo, este tipo de restriccio´n no debe impedir que la transaccio´n comercial
se lleve a cabo con niveles de seguridad similares a aquellas situaciones en las
cuales todas las entidades del sistema de pueden comunicar entre s´ı de manera
directa.
Figura 1.1: Modelo de Conectividad Completa (izquierda) y Modelo Centrado
en el Comercio (derecha).
Diversos escenarios de conectividad restringida podr´ıan ser definidos (ba-
sado en la interaccio´n de las 3 entidades que conforman un sistema de pago:
cliente, comercio y pasarela de pago) pero los de mayor intere´s, desde el punto
de vista pra´ctico, son los que se describen a continuacio´n [4]:
1. Modelo Centrado en el Comercio: En este modelo (ver Figura 1.1), el
cliente C so´lo se puede conectar con el comercio M a trave´s de un enlace
de corto alcance o mediano alcance (como Infrarrojo, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth
o NFC1). En otras palabras, el cliente no podra´ conectarse de manera
directa con su banco (llamado Emisor E) y tendra´ que hacerlo a trave´s
del vendedor y la pasarela de pago PP.
Este escenario permite desarrollar sistemas de pago en l´ınea donde el usua-
rio puede realizar compras seguras desde un dispositivo mo´vil sin necesidad
de estar conectado a Internet, lo que se traduce en un ahorro para el usua-
rio ya que no tiene que pagar ningu´n coste de conexio´n a Internet.
1Near Field Communication (NFC) es una tecnolog´ıa de comunicacio´n inala´mbrica, de
corto alcance y alta frecuencia, que permite el intercambio de datos entre dispositivos a menos
de 10cm
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2. Modelo Centrado en el Cliente: A diferencia del modelo anterior, en este
escenario (ver figura 1.2) el comercioM no puede conectarse con su banco
(llamado Adquiriente A) mientras que el cliente C, utiliza su dispositivo
mo´vil para comunicarse con su banco a trave´s de Internet y un enlace de
corto alcance para comunicarse con el comercioM (de manera similar que
en el Modelo Centrado en el Comercio).
Los sistemas de pago basados en este modelo permiten que el comercio
pueda vender sus productos y/o servicios de manera segura au´n cuando
no cuente con la infraestructura necesaria para comunicarse de manera di-
recta con su banco. La comunicacio´n entre el comercio M y el adquiriente
A se hara´ a trave´s del cliente C, quien requerira´ mayor poder computacio-
nal para ejecutar todas las operaciones necesarias para la autorizacio´n del
pago.
3. Modelo Centrado en la Pasarela de Pago: En este modelo, mostrado en la
Figura 1.2, no existe comunicacio´n directa entre el cliente C y el comercio
M por lo que se debe hacer a trave´s de la pasarela de pago PP quien
actu´a como intermediario entre ambas entidades. Esta situacio´n introduce
algunas desventajas que se mencionan a continuacio´n:
La restriccio´n de comunicacio´n que introduce este modelo, aumenta
el nu´mero de mensajes que se intercambian entre C y M a fin de
lograr la autorizacio´n del pago.
Tanto el cliente como el comercio deben tener la capacidad de conec-
tarse a Internet para poder comunicarse con PP.
Pese a que C yM pueden estar f´ısicamente cerca, no podr´ıan utilizar
un enlace de corto alcance para comunicarse, dada la restriccio´n de
comunicacio´n establecida por el modelo.
Estas desventajas deben ser consideradas a la hora de disen˜ar sistemas de
pago electro´nico basados en este modelo.
Figura 1.2: Modelo Centrado en el Cliente (izquierda) y Modelo Centrado en la
Pasarela de Pago (derecha).
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Por lo expuesto antes, esta tesis pretende solventar la carencia actual en el
mundo cient´ıfico de investigaciones previas que contemplen el problema de pago
en l´ınea desde dispositivos mo´viles y en escenarios de conectividad restringida,
a trave´s del disen˜o y desarrollo de protocolos de pago que preserven el bajo
poder computacional requerido por los dispositivos mo´viles y que se ajusten a
escenarios con restricciones de comunicacio´n (donde dos de las entidades que
los conforman no pueden intercambiar informacio´n de manera directa y deben
hacerlo a trave´s de otra entidad). Asimismo, los protocolos que resulten del
desarrollo de esta tesis doctoral deben ser aplicables a otros tipos de redes como
es el caso de las redes de automo´viles ad-hoc (con las siglas en ingle´s VANETs,
de Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks) en donde existen servicios que demandan el
pago en l´ınea [19].
En este punto conviene sen˜alar que que los nodos (veh´ıculos) que forman
las redes VANETs tienen instalado un dispositivo llamado OBU (Onboard Unit)
que permite la comunicacio´n entre el veh´ıculo y la infraestructura de carretera.
Por otra parte, las capacidades de comunicacio´n de la OBU pueden ser utilizadas
por la AU (Application Unit) que podr´ıa estar integrada a la OBU de manera
permanente o podr´ıa ser una dispositivo portable (como un PDA, tele´fono mo´vil
o dispositivo de juego) que puede ser dina´micamente acoplado o desacoplado de
la OBU [5]. De esta forma, los protocolos disen˜ados en el contexto de esta
tesis doctoral pueden ser usados en las redes VANETs a trave´s del uso de un
dispositivo portable como AU.
Los protocolos que surjan del desarrollo de esta tesis doctoral, deben ofrecer
los mismos niveles de seguridad que aquellos disen˜ados para escenarios sin res-
tricciones de conectividad. Es por ello que los protocolos que se proponen en esta
tesis deben satisfacer las siguientes propiedades de seguridad de la transaccio´n
[22, 1]:
Autenticacio´n de las Entidades: cada entidad del sistema debe poder
autenticar a la entidad que intenta comunicarse con ella.
Privacidad de la Transaccio´n: cada entidad involucrada debe ser capaz
de asegurar que los mensajes son revelados al destinatario previsto y no a
una entidad no autorizada.
Integridad de la Transaccio´n: cada entidad involucrada puede asegurar
que los mensajes recibidos no son alterados durante la transmisio´n.
No-repudio de Transacciones: cada entidad involucrada no puede ne-
gar las transacciones que ella ha ejecutado.
1.2. Resumen de la tesis
La aparicio´n de las redes mo´viles e inala´mbricas hizo posible la extensio´n
del comercio electro´nico a un nuevo uso y a´rea de investigacio´n: el comercio
electro´nico mo´vil (llamado m-comercio y que incluye el pago mo´vil) que se refie-
re a cualquier transaccio´n de comercio electro´nico realizada desde un dispositivo
mo´vil y usando redes inala´mbricas. Los sistemas de pago mo´viles existentes en
la literatura, en su mayor´ıa, esta´n basados en escenarios de conectividad com-
pleta donde las entidades se pueden comunicar entre s´ı de manera directa pero
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no admiten modelos de negocio donde las restricciones de comunicacio´n directa
entre entidades del sistema no es un impedimento para realizar las transaccio-
nes comerciales. Es por ello que se requieren de sistemas de pago mo´vil que
consideren aquellas situaciones en las cuales la comunicacio´n directa entre dos
entidades del sistema no es posible (de manera temporal o permanente) ba´sica-
mente por la imposibilidad de una de las entidades de conectarse a Internet. Con
el objetivo de solventar la carencia actual en el mundo cient´ıfico de investiga-
ciones previas que contemplen el problema de pago en l´ınea desde dispositivos
mo´viles y en escenarios de conectividad restringida, en esta tesis se desarro-
llan un conjunto de protocolos de pago seguro (que utilicen tanto criptograf´ıa
sime´trica como criptograf´ıa asime´trica no-tradicional) que preservan el bajo po-
der computacional requerido por los dispositivos mo´viles, ajustarse a escenarios
con restricciones de comunicacio´n (donde dos de las entidades que los confor-
man no pueden intercambiar informacio´n de manera directa y deben hacerlo a
trave´s de otra entidad) y ofrecer los mismos niveles de seguridad que aquellos
disen˜ados para escenarios de conectividad completa. Los protocolos propuestos
son aplicables a otros tipos de redes, como es el caso de las redes de automo´viles
ad-hoc (con las siglas en ingle´s VANETs, de Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks) en
donde existan servicios que demandan el pago en l´ınea y escenarios con restric-
ciones de comunicacio´n. Por otra parte, la implementacio´n, en un lenguaje de
programacio´n multiplataforma, realizada de los protocolos disen˜ados demuestra
que el rendimiento de los mismos es adecuado para dispositivos con capacidad
computacional reducida.
1.3. Objetivos de la Tesis
A fin de responder a las necesidades presentadas anteriormente, se hace
necesario disponer de protocolos de pago para dispositivos mo´viles que contem-
plen aquellos escenarios en los cuales dos de las entidades del modelo operacional
aunque no se puedan comunicar de manera directa pero que puedan mantenerse
los mismos niveles de seguridad de aquellos protocolos disen˜ados para escenarios
donde las entidades se pueden comunicar con otras sin restricciones.
La presente tesis tiene por objetivo principal, desarrollar protocolos de
pago seguros para escenarios de conectividad restringida que preser-
ven el bajo poder computacional requerido por los dispositivos mo´vi-
les y que estimulen el desarrollo de aplicaciones que respondan a las
nuevas realidades y exigencias del comercio mo´vil (m-comercio).
A fin de alcanzar el objetivo principal expuesto anteriormente, se propo-
nen un conjunto de objetivos parciales que se analizan en profundidad a conti-
nuacio´n:
1. Estudio de la evolucio´n del Pago Electro´nico desde dispositivos
mo´viles
La revisio´n del estado del arte de los sistemas de pago electro´nico des-
de dispositivos mo´viles, constituye un aspecto importante en el desarrollo
de esta tesis ya que permite estudiar la evolucio´n de los sistemas de pa-
go mo´viles existentes en la literatura y su adecuacio´n a escenarios con
restricciones de conectividad.
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Adicionalmente, el estudio anterior permitira´ determinar las bondades y
deficiencias de cada una de las propuestas de los sistemas de pago electro´ni-
co desde dispositivos mo´viles ma´s relevantes y que debera´n ser tomadas
en consideracio´n para el disen˜o de los protocolos que se proponen en esta
tesis doctoral.
2. Disen˜o de Protocolos de Pago Seguros para escenarios de conec-
tividad restringida
Partiendo del ana´lisis de los nuevos modelos operacionales que detallan:
a) las entidades que los conforman y sus relaciones, b) las te´cnicas crip-
togra´ficas recomendadas para asegurar la comunicacio´n entre las entida-
des, c) los me´todos de autenticacio´n a utilizar en el presente y en el futuro,
y d) la infraestructura de hardware de cada entidad y las restricciones de
comunicacio´n; se establecen las especificaciones de los protocolos de pago
a disen˜ar para cada uno de los escenarios de conectividad restringida pre-
sentados en la parte introductoria de este documento.
Los protocolos disen˜ados deben garantizar que requieren de bajo poder
computacional para su ejecucio´n en las entidades que integran el modelo
operacional (especialmente en aquellas que utilicen dispositivos mo´viles
con limitaciones) y ofrecer equivalentes niveles de seguridad que los pro-
tocolos de pago disen˜ados para escenarios de comunicacio´n completa. El
u´ltimo aspecto sera´ clave para generar la confianza suficiente que estimule
la creacio´n de aplicaciones (en el mundo real) que utilicen los protocolos
disen˜ados en esta tesis doctoral y ayudar a disminuir el escepticismo que
pueda existir en la actualidad respecto a la aplicabilidad de los mismos.
3. Implementacio´n y Evaluacio´n de los Protocolos de Pago disen˜a-
dos
A fin de validar la factibilidad de los protocolos de pago disen˜ados en
esta tesis doctoral, se ha desarrollado un sistema de pago mo´vil basado
en los protocolos propuestos. Este sistema de pago debe ser codificado en
un lenguaje de programacio´n multiplataforma que permita, sin realizar
cambios, ejecutarlo en diversos sistemas operativos.
La implementacio´n del sistema de pago permitira´ evaluar el rendimiento
de los protocolos disen˜ados (ma´s alla´ del ana´lisis teo´rico realizado durante
la fase de disen˜o) a fin de demostrar que los mismos son adecuados para
redes mo´viles inala´mbricas. Por otra parte, la implementacio´n convierte
la propuesta teo´rica de esta tesis en una propuesta aplicable al mundo real.
4. Aplicacio´n de los Protocolos a otros entornos con restricciones
de comunicacio´n
Finalmente, reviste de importancia demostrar las posibilidades de apli-
cabilidad de los protocolos disen˜ados en el marco de esta tesis a otros
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ambientes distintos para los cuales fueron creados pero donde se presen-
ten situaciones similares de conectividad restringida.
Las redes VANETs representan un a´rea emergente de investigacio´n en la
que existen escenarios de conectividad restringida donde se requieren apli-
caciones seguras, especialmente en el campo de pago electro´nico [19]. Esto
representa una posibilidad cierta de aplicar los protocolos desarrollados a
este tipo de redes, demostrando que el disen˜o de los mismos es flexible y
con posibilidades de adaptabilidad a diversos entornos con caracter´ısticas
similares.
Cap´ıtulo 2
Resultados Obtenidos
2.1. Discusio´n de los Resultados Obtenidos
A lo largo del proceso de investigacio´n que envuelve el desarrollo de la Te-
sis, se han logrado aportes que han sido validados por la comunidad cient´ıfica
internacional a trave´s de la evaluacio´n de art´ıculos enviados a congresos y/o
revistas internacionales de reconocido prestigio. Cada publicacio´n y sus apor-
tes se describen brevemente en los siguientes pa´rrafos y se an˜aden de manera
completa en los anexos de este documento.
El art´ıculo titulado “Payment in a Kiosk Centric Model with Mo-
bile and Low Computational Power Devices”, publicado en el libro del
memorias de la conferencia internacional Computational Science and Its
Applications, ICCSA 2006 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Fac-
tor de Impacto (ISI): 0.402) [15], tiene por objetivo disen˜ar un protocolo
seguro de pago (de ahora en adelante referido como KCMS, de Kiosk Centric
Model con criptograf´ıa sime´trica) para un escenario donde el cliente no puede
comunicarse de manera directa con el emisor (modelo centrado en el comercio)
debido a la ausencia de acceso a Internet en su dispositivo mo´vil. El protocolo
utiliza operaciones de clave sime´trica, que requieren bajo poder computacional,
y una conexio´n de corto o mediano alcance (como Bluetooth, Infrarojo o Wi-Fi)
entre el cliente y el comercio.
Los resultados obtenidos demuestran que se pueden realizar pagos de mane-
ra segura au´n cuando el cliente no pueda comunicarse en forma directa con su
banco, dada la restriccio´n del cliente de conectarse a Internet desde su dispo-
sitivo mo´vil y la imposibilidad de implementar otros tipos de mecanismos de
comunicacio´n (como SMS, tele´fono, etc.). Estos supone que el cliente debe uti-
lizar al comercio como intermediario para lograr comunicarse con el emisor.
Por otra parte, el ana´lisis cuantitativo del rendimiento del protocolo KCMS
muestra que pese a la restriccio´n de comunicacio´n mencionada anteriormente,
las transacciones de pago se pueden realizar con un rendimiento aceptable.
A pesar de las ventajas que ofrecen las operaciones de clave sime´trica para
las redes inala´mbricas (comprobado en la publicacio´n anterior), el manejo de las
claves es complejo debido a que la clave secreta compartida debe ser acordada
por las entidades y cualquier participante debe mantener n nu´mero de claves
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secretas (una por cada entidad con quien se establece una comunicacio´n).
Precisamente, la criptograf´ıa asime´trica surgio´ con el objetivo de evitar por
completo el problema del intercambio de claves de los sistemas de cifrado sime´tri-
cos. Sin embargo, este tipo de criptograf´ıa requiere alto poder computacional y
el uso de certificados para evitar el conocido problema de autenticacio´n donde
un impostor podr´ıa suplantar a un usuario con una clave pu´blica va´lida pero
incorrecta (porque la clave no pertenece al usuario [3]).
El certificado de clave pu´blica debe ser verificado frente una Autoridad
Certificadora (CA), lo que causa intercambios adicionales de informacio´n du-
rante una transaccio´n. Lo anterior constituye un problema para esquemas con
restricciones de conectividad donde una entidad no puede comunicarse con la
CA para verificar el certificado. En consecuencia, se requiere el uso de esque-
mas de firma digital no-tradicionales aplicables a escenarios con este tipo de
restricciones de comunicacio´n.
Los esquemas de firma digital con recuperacio´n de mensaje usando claves
pu´blicas auto-certificadas [7, 3] proporcionan esquemas de cifrado y autentica-
cio´n que integran los mecanismos de cifrado y firma, lo que permite que so´lo al
receptor especificado, verificar y recuperar el mensaje original. La autenticacio´n
de la clave pu´blica puede ser lograda impl´ıcitamente con la verificacio´n de la
firma, sin el uso de un certificado emitido por una CA. Adicionalmente, dado
que las claves pu´blicas son calculadas tanto por el usuario como por la autoridad
del sistema (llamada SA y la encargada de generar los para´metros del sistema
en la fase de inicializacio´n del sistema), se reduce los requisitos computacionales
y en consecuencia, se pueden utilizar en dispositivos mo´viles.
En el art´ıculo titulado“Anonymous payment in a Kiosk centric mo-
del using digital signature scheme with message recovery and low
computational power devices”, publicado en la revista Journal of Theo-
retical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research (CORE Quality
Rating: C) [21], se propone un protocolo de pago ano´nimo (referido de ahora
en adelante como KCMA, de Kiosk Centric Model con criptograf´ıa asime´trica
no tradicional) para el mismo escenario de conectividad restringida utilizado en
el art´ıculo anterior, con la diferencia (y que constituye el aporte del art´ıculo)
que por primera vez se utiliza un esquema de firma digital con recuperacio´n de
mensaje usando claves pu´blicas autocertificadas en un protocolo de pago. Esto
permitio´ demostrar que se pueden usar operaciones de clave asime´tricas en es-
cenarios con restricciones d e comunicacio´n sin necesidad de comunicacio´n con
una autoridad certificadora (CA) para verificar la validez de un certificado.
Una vez que se disen˜aron los dos protocolos (usando dos te´cnicas criptogra´fi-
cas diferentes, de acuerdo a los objetivos de esta tesis doctoral) para el escenario
de conectividad restringida centrado en el comercio, correspondio´ hacer los mis-
mo pero el escenario centrado en el cliente. En este sentido, se publico´ en el
libro de memorias del evento 18th International Workshop on Databa-
se and Expert Systems Application, DEXA 2007 (Factor de Impacto
(Citeseer): 0.27) el art´ıculo titulado “Anonymous Account-Based Mobile
Payment Protocol for a Restricted Connectivity Scenario [9]. En este
art´ıculo se propone un protocolo de pago ano´nimo (referido de ahora en adelante
como CCMS, de Client Centric Model con criptograf´ıa sime´trica) para un siste-
ma de pago basado en el escenario centrado en el cliente, utilizando operaciones
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de clave sime´trica que requieren bajo poder computacional. Por otra parte, el
cliente se convierte en un intermediario para permitir la comunicacio´n entre el
comercio y su banco (adquiriente, en ingle´s Acquirer) de manera segura.
Los resultados demuestran que el comercio puede vender bienes y/o servi-
cios de manera segura incluso sin poderse comunicar de manera directa con su
banco. Por otra parte, el funcionamiento de este protocolo supone un aumento
entre el intercambio de mensajes entre las entidades que lo conforman y mayor
poder de co´mputo con respecto al protocolo KCMS.
El art´ıculo titulado “Anonymous Payment in a Client Centric Mo-
del for Digital Ecosystems”, publicado en el libro de memorias de la confe-
rencia IEEE International Conference on Digital Ecosystems and Tech-
nologies, IEEE-DEST 2007 (CORE Quality Rating: C) [12], propone un
protocolo de pago ano´nimo para sistemas de pago basados en el modelo cen-
trado en el cliente (referido de ahora en adelante como CCMA), utilizando un
esquema de firma digital con recuperacio´n de mensaje usando claves pu´blicas
autocertificadas a un protocolo de pago. Como resultado, el trabajo demuestra
que el vendedor puede vender sus productos de manera segura au´n cuando no
pueda comunicarse directamente con su banco para validar el pago realizado
por el cliente. Por otra parte, el hecho de que debe esperar a que la aprobacio´n
del pago sea reenviada por el Cliente no supone un riesgo para el vendedor ya
que e´ste no entregara´ los bienes comprados hasta que reciba la autorizacio´n de
pago.
Culminado el disen˜o de los dos protocolos (usando dos te´cnicas criptogra´fi-
cas diferentes) para el escenario de conectividad restringida centrado en el clien-
te, se elaboro´ el art´ıculo titulado “A Secure Payment Protocol for Res-
tricted Connectivity Scenarios in M-Commerce ”, que fue aceptado para
ser publicado en el libro de memorias de la conferencia internacional 8th Inter-
national Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies,
EC-Web’07, (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, CORE Quality Ra-
ting: B, Factor de Impacto (ISI): 0.402, Factor de Impacto (Citeseer):
0.29) [10]. El principal aporte de este art´ıculo es la propuesta de un protocolo
de pago seguro que funciona en dos escenarios de conectividad restringida (tan-
to para el modelo centrado en el cliente como para el modelo centrado en el
vendedor), utilizando el esquema de firma digital con recuperacio´n de mensaje
usando claves pu´blicas autocertificadas. De esta forma, independientemente del
escenario en donde ocurra el pago mo´vil, el usuario lo podra´ realizar desde su
dispositivo mo´vil de manera segura. Dado que el protocolo funciona tanto para
un escenario donde el cliente puede hacer uso de Internet como para donde no
lo tiene disponible, el dispositivo mo´vil del cliente debe tener la capacidad de
poder conectarse a Internet au´n cuando el escenario donde ocurra el pago no
permita su uso.
En los art´ıculos publicados previamente, los protocolos propuestos fueron
evaluados a fin de mostrar que pese a las limitaciones de comunicacio´n que
imponen los modelos operaciones utilizados para sus disen˜os, son capaces de
realizar transacciones con rendimientos similares a la de protocolos de pago
existentes ([2, 16, 18]). Sin embargo, tal cual sucede con otros protocolos de
pago existentes en la literatura, sin una implementacio´n concreta es imposible
asegurar que los protocolos disen˜ados ofrecen ventajas sobre otros y que pueden
ser utilizados en aplicaciones del mundo real.
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En virtud de lo expuesto antes, se realizo´ el art´ıculo titulado “Implemen-
tation and performance evaluation of a payment protocol for vehi-
cular ad hoc networks”, publicado en la revista Electronic Commerce
Research (Springer, CORE Quality Rating: A, Factor de Impacto
(JCR): 0.552) [13]. Este art´ıculo propone una versio´n mejorada (tomando en
consideracio´n los comentarios realizados por los revisores de la primera versio´n
que fue presentada en ICSSA 2006) del protocolo KCMS que incluye la pro-
teccio´n de la identidad real del cliente (a trave´s de una te´cnica de anonimato).
El objetivo principal de este art´ıculo es demostrar que el protocolo KCMS pue-
de ser ejecutado en dispositivos mo´viles de diferentes capacidades para realizar
transacciones de pago en l´ınea, con rendimientos adecuados para redes ina-
la´mbricas y redes VANETs. Para ello, se implemento´ el protocolo KCMS en
JAVA ME para el cliente (tanto para un tele´fono mo´vil -Nokia TM N95- y para
un PDA -PalmTM T|X-) y JAVA SE para las otras entidades que forman parte
del protocolo de pago.
Los resultados emp´ıricos obtenidos de la evaluacio´n de rendimiento de la
implementacio´n del protocolo KCMS demostraron que una transaccio´n de pago
puede ser completada con un promedio de 6.84 segundos utilizando un dis-
positivo Nokia TM N95 y 5.66 segundos usando un dispositivo PalmTM T|X.
Por otra parte, el taman˜o del programa que contiene la implementacio´n del pro-
tocolo y que se utiliza en el cliente es pequen˜o lo que permite que pueda ser
usado en dispositivos con capacidades de almacenamiento reducidas. En el caso
del dispositivo Nokia, se requieren 68 kilobytes para almacenar el programa
mientras que 123 kilobytes para ser almacenado en el dispositivo Palm Pilot.
Una vez que se disen˜aron todos los protocolos para los escenarios restrin-
gidos descritos al principio en pa´rrafos anteriores, se hizo necesario demostrar
la posibilidad de aplicabilidad de los protocolos disen˜ados en esta tesis a otros
ambientes distintos para los cuales fueron creados pero donde se presenten situa-
ciones de conectividad restringida. En tal sentido, las redes VANETs representan
un a´rea emergente de investigacio´n en la que existen escenarios de conectividad
restringida y donde se requieren aplicaciones seguras, especialmente en el campo
de pago electro´nico [19]. Lo anterior evidencia la posibilidad cierta de aplicar
los protocolos desarrollados a las redes VANETs, demostrando as´ı que el disen˜o
de los mismos es flexible y tiene posibilidades de crecer en el tiempo.
El art´ıculo titulado “A secure vehicle-to-roadside communication
payment protocol in vehicular ad hoc networks”, publicado en la re-
vista Computer Communications (Elsevier, Factor de Impacto (JCR):
0.933) [11], tiene por objetivo demostrar que el protocolo KCMA puede ser uti-
lizado para pagos seguros en l´ınea en escenarios restringidos veh´ıculo-a-carretera
en VANETs, utilizando un enlace de corto alcance y sin revelar informacio´n pri-
vada.
Los resultados permiten demostrar la viabilidad de aplicacio´n del protoco-
lo KCMA a aquellos escenarios en VANETs en los cuales existen restricciones
de conectividad. Adema´s, se demostro´ que el protocolo es resistente a los ata-
ques de repeticio´n y suplantacio´n. De esta forma, se contribuye a expandir las
posibilidades de pago en-l´ınea en VANETs.
En el contexto de la investigacio´n de VANETs, se hac´ıa necesario investigar
los posibles ataques que podr´ıan comprometer la seguridad de este tipo de redes
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y su incidencia en los protocolos de pago disen˜ados en el contexto de esta tesis.
As´ı, surge el art´ıculo titulado “Security attacks and solutions for vehicu-
lar ad hoc networks”, publicado en la revista IET Communications (IET
Research Journals, Factor de Impacto (JCR): 0.751) [14]. El objetivo de este
art´ıculo discutir las principales amenazas y ataques que pueden ser explotados
en VANETs y presentar las soluciones de seguridad correspondientes que pueden
ser implementadas para frustrar esos ataques.
A trave´s de los resultados de la investigacio´n se identificaron problemas de
seguridad en los siguiente aspectos: anonimato, manejo de claves, privacidad,
localizacio´n y reputacio´n. Por otra parte, se identificaron las correspondientes
soluciones de seguridad reportados recientemente en la literatura.
Este art´ıculo obtuvo el premio IET Premium Award for Communica-
tions 2011 que se otorga a los mejores art´ıculos publicados durante el per´ıodo
2009-2010. Dicho premio se entregara´ el pro´ximo 9 de noviembre del presente
an˜o en el evento: 2011 IET Ambition and Achievement Awards Ceremony.
Cap´ıtulo 3
Indicios de Calidad
3.1. Indicios de Calidad de las Publicaciones
El trabajo de investigacio´n presentado en esta tesis doctoral ha sido va-
lidado internacionalmente en diferentes revistas y conferencias de seguridad y
comercio electro´nico donde los expertos han proporcionado sus valiosos comen-
tarios y reflexiones que han permitido mejorar nuestras investigaciones. Las
publicaciones realizadas durante el desarrollo de la tesis en revistas arbitradas y
conferencias internacionales en las Tablas 3.1 y 3.2. En ambas tablas, se muestra
informacio´n de los indicios de calidad de cada una de ellas.
An˜o T´ıtulo del Art´ıculo Revista Indicios de Calidad
2006 Anonymous payment in a Kiosk
centric model using digital signa-
ture scheme with message recovery
and low computational power de-
vices [21]
Journal of Theoretical and
Applied Electronic Commerce
Research CORE Quality Rating: C
2010 Implementation and performance Electronic Commerce CORE Quality Rating: A
evaluation of a payment protocol Research SCImago Ranking Q1 (SJR): 0.04
for vehicular ad hoc networks [13] Factor de Impacto (JCR): 0.552
2008 A secure vehicle-to-roadside
communication payment protocol
in vehicular ad hoc networks [11]
Computer Communications Factor de Impacto (JCR): 0.933
2010 Security attacks and solutions for
IET Communications
Factor de Impacto (JCR): 0.751
vehicular ad hoc networks [14] Premio: IET Premium Award
for Communications 2011
Tabla 3.1: Indicios de Calidad de las Publicaciones realizadas en Revistas Arbi-
tradas durante el desarrollo de la Tesis Doctoral.
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An˜o T´ıtulo del Art´ıculo Revista Indicios de Calidad
2006 Payment in a Kiosk Centric Model
with Mobile and Low Computatio-
nal Power Devices [15]
Computational Science and
Its Applications Factor de Impacto (ISI): 0.402
2007 Anonymous Account-Based Mobi-
le Payment Protocol for a Res-
tricted Connectivity Scenario [9]
18th International Workshop
on Database and Expert Sys-
tems Application
Factor de Impacto (Citeseer): 0.27
2007 Anonymous Payment in a Client
Centric Model for Digital Ecosys-
tems [12]
IEEE International Confe-
rence on Digital Ecosystems
and Technologies
CORE Quality Rating: C
2007 A Secure Payment Protocol for 8th International Conference CORE Quality Rating: B
Restricted Connectivity Scenarios on Electronic Commerce and Factor de Impacto (ISI): 0.402
in M-Commerce [10] Web Technologies Factor de Impacto (Citeseer): 0.29
Tabla 3.2: Indicios de Calidad de las Publicaciones realizadas en Conferencias
Internacionales durante el desarrollo de la Tesis Doctoral.
Cap´ıtulo 4
Conclusiones
4.1. Conclusiones Finales
En el marco de esta tesis doctoral, fueron propuestos un conjunto de pro-
tocolos de pago, basados en cuenta (Account-based, en ingle´s), adecuados para
los escenarios de conectividad restringida presentados en la parte introductoria
de este documento y que funcionan eficientemente en ambientes inala´mbricos.
Para cada escenario, se disen˜aron dos protocolos: uno que utiliza operaciones de
criptograf´ıa sime´trica en todas las entidades y otro que emplea operaciones de
criptograf´ıa a sime´trica no tradicional.
Los protocolos disen˜ados demostraron la posibilidad cierta de realizar tran-
sacciones de pago seguras en ambientes con restricciones de comunicacio´n (donde
una entidad no se puede comunicar de manera directa con otra), ofreciendo los
mismos niveles de seguridad que aquellos basados en los escenarios de conec-
tividad completa . Para superar dicha restriccio´n sin el uso de intermediarios
externos (que podr´ıan incorporar nuevos elementos de seguridad), se utiliza
cualquier entidad del protocolo como intermediario para permitir el env´ıo de
mensajes entre las dos entidades que no puedan comunicarse entre s´ı de manera
directa debido a restricciones de comunicacio´n.
El ana´lisis comparativo de rendimiento realizado a los protocolos propuestos
en esta tesis, centrado particularmente en el nu´mero de operaciones criptogra´fi-
cas realizadas por cada entidad involucrada en cada protocolo, permitio´ conocer
las ventajas y desventajas de los protocolos propuestos con respecto a otros pro-
tocolos de pago existentes en la literatura (SET [18], 3KP1 [2], KSL [17] y LMPP
[6]).
El ana´lisis del nu´mero de operaciones criptogra´ficas realizadas por cada
entidad involucrada (ver tabla 4.1), muestra que los protocolos KCMS (Kiosk
Centric Model, con criptograf´ıa sime´trica) y PCMS (Payment Gateway Cen-
tric Model, con criptograf´ıa sime´trica), a pesar de haber sido disen˜ado para
escenarios con diferentes restricciones de conectividad, en ambos casos el clien-
te ejecuta en mismo nu´mero de operaciones criptogra´ficas. Sin embargo, en el
caso del protocolo CCMS (Client Centric Model, con criptograf´ıa sime´trica), el
1El protocolo 3KP es usado en nuestra comparacio´n ya que es el u´nico de la familia iKP
que proporciona el mismo nivel de seguridad que el protocolo SET.
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cliente ejecuta un nu´mero mayor de operaciones criptogra´ficas debido a que esta
entidad es la encargada de permitir el intercambio de mensajes entre el comercio
y la pasarela de pago (debido a las restricciones impuestas por el escenario para
el cual fue disen˜ado este protocolo). En consecuencia, los requisitos computacio-
nales del protocolos CCMS son mayores con respecto a los protocolos KCMS y
PCMS.
Por otra parte, los protocolos disen˜ados KCMS, CCMS y PCMS tienen
rendimientos y servicios de seguridad similares a los protocolos SET, 3KP, KSL
y LMPP pese a las restricciones de comunicacio´n impuestas por los modelos
operacionales para los cuales fueron disen˜ados.
En cuanto a los protocolos KCMA (Kiosk Centric Model, con criptograf´ıa
asime´trica no tradicional) y CCMA (Client Centric Model, con criptograf´ıa
asime´trica no tradicional), el cliente ejecuta en mismo nu´mero de operaciones
criptogra´ficas. Sin embargo, en el caso del protocolo CCMA, el cliente ejecuta
un nu´mero mayor de operaciones criptogra´ficas debido a que esta entidad actu´a
como intermediario entre el comercio y la pasarela de pago para el intercam-
bio de mensajes. En consecuencia, los requisitos computacionales del protocolos
CCMA son mayores con respecto a los protocolos KCMA y PCMA (Payment
Gateway Centric Model, con criptograf´ıa asime´trica no tradicional).
Pese a que en algunos casos los protocolos KCMA, CCMA y PCMA rea-
lizan un nu´mero mayor de operaciones criptogra´ficas que otros protocolos (que
utilizan criptograf´ıa asime´trica) existentes en la literatura (como SET y 3KP),
los requisitos computacionales son similares o menores debido a que las claves
pu´blicas son calculadas entre la autoridad del sistema y el usuario. Esto permite
comprender que la criptograf´ıa asime´trica no tradicional es una alternativa cierta
para ser utilizada en dispositivos mo´viles ya que permite evitar los problemas
de rendimiento.
La implementacio´n realizada al protocolo KCMS, permite asegurar que los
protocolos disen˜ados ofrecen ventajas sobre otros existentes en la literatura y
que pueden ser utilizados en aplicaciones comerciales. Adema´s, el uso de un
tele´fono mo´vil y una PDA como dispositivos del lado del cliente en las im-
plementaciones, demostro´ que los protocolos propuestos pueden ser ejecutados
en dispositivos mo´viles de diferentes capacidades y con rendimientos adecua-
dos para redes inala´mbricas. Adicionalmente, el taman˜o relativamente pequen˜o
de la aplicacio´n de pago permite que sea instalada en dispositivos mo´viles con
capacidades limitadas de almacenamiento como los tele´fonos mo´viles.
Finalmente, la aplicacio´n de los protocolos KCMS y KCMA a las redes
VANETs (cuyos nodos poseen suficiente suficiente poder computacional pero
que pueden utilizar dispositivos mo´viles de bajo poder computacional para co-
municarse), donde existen escenarios de conectividad restringida que requieren
aplicaciones de pago seguras, demostro´ que el disen˜o de los protocolos es flexible
y puede ser adaptado a diversos entornos con caracter´ısticas similares.
Esta tesis doctoral deja abierta la posibilidad del desarrollar en el futuro,
nuevas investigaciones que permitan avanzar en el campo de los protocolos pa-
ra escenarios de conectividad restringida. Entre las investigaciones futuras se
pueden mencionar las siguientes:
Estudio de las curvas el´ıpticas como te´cnica criptogra´fica para los proto-
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colos propuestos en esta tesis doctoral y su impacto en el rendimiento y
requisitos computacionales de los mismos.
Desarrollo de una lo´gica formal para analizar la propiedad de responsabili-
dad (en ingle´s, Accountability) de protocolos para escenarios de conectivi-
dad restringida. Esta lo´gica formal debe ser capaz de analizar los mensajes
cifrados con criptograf´ıa sime´trica como con criptograf´ıa asime´trica (in-
cluyendo la no tradicional).
Redisen˜o de los protocolos propuestos para permitir que los mensajes pue-
dan ir desde un veh´ıculo (cliente) hasta el equipo al borde de la carretera
(el comercio o la pasarela de pago), pasando por varios veh´ıculo pero en
un escenario de conectividad restringida.
Nu´mero de
Operaciones Operaciones
Criptogra´ficas Criptogra´ficas
KCMS CCMS PCMS KCMA CCMA PCMA SET iKP KSL LMPP
Cifrado con
C - - - - - - 1 1 - -
Clave Pu´blica
M - - - - - - 1 - - -
PP - - - - - - 1 - - -
Descifrado con
C - - - - - - - - - -
Clave Pu´blica
M - - - - - - 1 4 - -
PP - - - - - - 2 1 - -
C - - - 2 4 2 1 1 - -
Firma Digital M - - - 3 2 2 3 1 - -
PP - - - 1 1 3 1 1 - -
Verificacio´n de
C - - - - - - - 2 3 -
la Firma Digital
M - - - - - - - 2 2 -
PP - - - - - - - 1 2 -
Cifrado/Descifrado
C 3 5 3 - - - 1 - 4 5
con clave Sime´trica
M 5 4 4 - - - - - 5 6
PP 2 3 3 - - - 1 - 2 -
Funcio´n
C 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 2
Resumen (H)
M 1 1 1 1 1 - 2 4 - 1
PP - 3 - - - - - 1 - -
Funcio´n Resumen
C 2 3 2 - - - - - 2 -
con clave (KH)
M 1 2 1 - - - - 1 2 -
PP - - - - - - - - 1 -
Generacio´n
C 3 4 2 - - - - - 2 -
de Clave
M 4 4 4 - - - - - 1 -
PP 2 2 3 - - - - - 1 -
Autenticacio´n y C - - - 2 2 2 - - - -
recuperacio´n del M - - - 2 1 2 - - - -
mensaje recibido PP - - - 1 1 1 - - - -
Tabla 4.1: Nu´mero de operaciones criptogra´ficas utilizadas por los protocolos
KCMA, CCMA, PCMA, SET [18], iKP [2], KSL [17] y LMPP [6] en el cliente,
el comercio y la pasarela de pago.
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Abstract. In this paper we present a protocol for a mobile payment
system based on a Kiosk Centric Model (proposed by [2]) that employs
symmetric-key operations which require low computational power. Our
protocol is suitable for mobile payment systems where the customer can-
not communicate with the issuer due to the absence of Internet access
with her mobile device and the costs of implementing other mechanisms
of communication between both of them are high. However, our proposal
illustrates how a portable device equipped with a short range link (such
Bluetooth, Infrared or Wi-Fi) and low computational power should be
enough to interact with a vendor machine in order to buy goods in a
secure way.
1 Introduction
The popularity of m-commerce has increased in the last years thanks to advances
in the portable devices and the rapid development of the mobile communication
technologies that have allowed people to use mobile telephones or Personal Dig-
ital Assistant (PDA) to access the Internet (to read email, browse web pages or
purchase information or goods) anywhere and anytime.
Diﬀerent mobile payment systems have been proposed in the last years, but
the one developed by [8] (called 3-D Secure) has become a standard due to its
beneﬁts regarding security and ﬂexibility in the authentication methods. This
schema allows the authentication of the payer (customer) when she makes an on-
line payment using a debit or credit card. The transaction ﬂow for this scheme is
shown in ﬁgure 1 where all the main communications links are protected using
SSL/TLS and the communication between the issuer/consumer is mandatory.
Despite of the ﬂexibility that 3-D Secure gives to the issuer to choose the
authentication method, relationship between payer and issuer is quite strict (al-
though required for Visa’s 3D-Secure scheme) and does not allow the use of
schemes in which the communication among these parties is not possible due to:
1) the impossibility of the client to connect to Internet from the mobile device
 This work was partially supported by ASPECTS-M Project (Reference Models for
Secure Architectures in Mobile Electronic Payments), CICYT-2004.
M. Gavrilova et al. (Eds.): ICCSA 2006, LNCS 3984, pp. 798–807, 2006.
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and 2) the high costs of the infrastructure necessary to implement other mech-
anisms of communication between the client and the issuer. Most of the mobile
payment systems proposed up until now assume the consumer has Internet con-
nectivity through her mobile device, so the restrictions mentioned previously do
not represent an important issue. However, it is quite common that the client
meets situations in which it is not possible to connect to Internet so it becomes
necessary to develop mobile payment systems where the user could use her mo-
bile device as a shopping means, even thought she may not have Internet access.
Fig. 1. 3-D Secure transaction [1]
On the other hand, in spite of the wide range of mobile devices available, they
all have common limitations [6]: 1) poor computational capabilities, 2) limited
storage space and 3) short battery life. These limitations prevent that these
devices execute, in an eﬃcient way, computations that require a lot of resources,
like those of asymmetric cryptography.
Symmetric cryptography (which employs a shared key between two parties)
provides, like asymmetric cryptography, message conﬁdentiality, message in-
tegrity and party authentication, and represents an alternative in the construc-
tion of secure protocols for mobile payment systems, because symmetric-key
operations do not require of a high computational power nor additional com-
munications steps (as happens in protocols based on public-key infraestructure
where the public-key certiﬁcates have to be veriﬁed by a Certiﬁcate Authority).
In this paper, we present a protocol (that supports both credit-card and debit-
card transactions) for a mobile payment system based on a Kiosk Centric Model
(proposed by [2]) which overcomes the limitations mentioned before. Our pro-
posal represents an alternative to the restrictions of mobile payment systems
(including Visas 3-D Secure) as for the connection between the client and issuer.
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Moreover, it uses symmetric-key operations in all engaging parties to reduce
both, the setup cost for payment infrastructure and the transaction cost. An-
other beneﬁt derived of the using of our proposal is a reduction of all parties
computation and communications steps (in comparison with protocols based on
public-key infraestructure) that make it suitable for mobiles devices with low
computational power.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In next section, we survey
related work. Section 3 presents the proposed system. In section 4, we analyze
the scheme proposed. We end with our conclusions in Section 5.
2 Related Work
In recent years, several studies have been conducted to improve the security of
mobile payment systems. Meanwhile, eﬀorts have also been dedicated to unify
concepts and scenarios into frameworks that will be useful to develop new elec-
tronic payment systems. Research conducted by [2] is an example of a study
that uniﬁes many proposed m–commerce usages into a single framework. This
research intended to revise the possible range of mobility scenarios, identifying
the security issues for each connectivity scenario. As a result, ﬁve scenarios were
identiﬁed and analyzed: Disconnected Interaction, Server Centric Case, Client
Centric Case, Full Connectivity and Kiosk Centric Case. The latest has been
considered as the starting point in the design of our proposal.
In [9], payment methods are classiﬁed according to several standards and an-
alyzed to point out their advantages and drawbacks. Besides, the research also
provides a payment process for mobile devices based on pre–payment and ac-
counts. This proposed solutions requirements are low (both on cost and technical
capabilities) and it also has high scalability and security properties. However,
their methods and processes are not suitable for our proposal, as our goal is to
suggest an scheme based on post-payment 1 and symmetric cryptography.
A secure and eﬃcient one-way mobile payment system is proposed in [4].
In their solution the security of the system is based on the intractability of
the discrete logarithm problem and the one-wayness of keyed hash function.
As opposed to their goal (designing a mobile payment system with minimal
complexity using two public key pairs), our solution aims for devising a scheme
that relies on symmetric-key operations instead.
The closest work to ours is [5]. Their work proposed a secure account-based
payment protocol suitable for wireless networks that employs symmetric-key op-
erations which require lower computation at all engaging parties than existing
payment protocols. While this proposal satisﬁes the majority of our require-
ments, we have to reformulate their protocol (from now on, SAMPP) to sat-
isfy the requirements of the scheme that we suggest in this work, where the
customer never establishes any connection with the bank during the payment
transaction.
1 Mobile payment where the consumer receives the content and consumes it before
paying. Credit cards are an example of credit-based payment methods.
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As the payment software (also called wallet software) must be sent to the
customer by the issuer through the vendor, it becomes necessary the use of
techniques to assure that the program received by the client was created and sent
by the issuer, and has not been tampered. In order to obtain the protection of the
payment software in the aspects mentioned before, two diﬀerent proposals related
to the aforementioned techniques will be detailed in te following paragraphs.
The ﬁrst work (proposed by [3]) introduced a new approach to watermarking,
called path based watermarking, that embeds the watermark, with relatively low
cost, in the dynamic branch structure of the program , and shows how error-
correcting and tamper prooﬁng techniques can be used to make path based
watermarks resilient against a wide variety of attacks. The other work, proposed
by [7], describes three techniques for obfuscation of program design: 1) The class
coalescing obfuscation, 2) Class splitting obfuscation, and 3) Type hiding obfus-
cation. The experimental results (applying theses obfuscations to a medium-size
java program) shows that the run-time overhead, in the worst of the case (class
splitting obfuscation), is less than 10% of the total running time of the program.
3 Scheme Proposed
3.1 Notations
– {C, V, P, I, A}: the set of customer, vendor, payment gateway, issuer and
acquirer, respectively.
– IDP : the identity of party P that contains the contact information of P .
– TID: Identity of transaction that includes time and date of the transaction.
– OI: Order information (OI = {TID, h(OI, Price)}) where OI and Price are
order descriptions and its amount.
– TC: The type of card used in the purchase process (TC=Credit, Debit).
– Stt: The status of the transaction (Stt = {Accepted, Rejected}).
– TIDReq : The request fot TID.
– VIDReq : The resquest for IDV .
– {M}X : the message M symmetrically encrypted with the shared key X .
– MAC(X,K): Message Authentication Code of the message X with the key
K.
– h(X): the one-way has function of the message X .
3.2 Operational Model
Generally, operational models for m-commerce found in literature involve transa-
cion between two or more entities. Our operational model is composed of four
entities: 1) Customer : a user who wants to buy information or goods from the
vendor and has a mobile device with low computational power and equipped
with a built-in display, keyboard (not necessarily with a QWERTY layout),
short range link (such Infrared, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth) and capability to execute a
java program, 2) Vendor : a computational entity (a normal web or an intelligent
vending machine) that wants to sell information or goods and with wich the user
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participates in a transaction, 3) Acquirer : the vendor’s ﬁnancial institution, 4)
Issuer : the customer’s ﬁnancial institution, and 5) Payment Gateway: additional
entity that acts as a medium between acquirer/issuer at banking private network
side and customer/vendor at the Internet side for clearing purpose.
Fig. 2. Operational Model
In ﬁgure 2, we specify the links among the ﬁve entities of our scheme. Note that
there is no direct connection involving the customer and the issuer. Moreover,
the connection between the customer/vendor (denoted as the dotted arrow) is
set up through a short range link (like bluetooth, infrared or Wi-Fi). On the
other hand, interaction among the vendor and the payment gateway (depicted
as solid arrow in the scheme) should be reliable and secure against passive and
active attacks. Therefore, the connection is supposed to be established through
a secure wired channel by using a security protocol like SSL/TLS [4]. Note that
the issuer, acquirer and payment gateway operates under the banking private
network so we do not concern about connections security among these entities.
The protocol based in symmetric cryptography proposed by [5] is a starting
point of our protocol. We reformulated this protocol to satisfy the requirements
of that, as stated before, pretends to allow the client to make purchases from its
mobile device without connecting itself to Internet.
3.3 Key Generation Technique
Our scheme handles three diﬀerent sets of shared keys used for encrypt a message
symmetrically. Each one is generated oﬀ-line in the entity that will store them.
The ﬁrst set VPSecj , j = 1, . . . , n, is generated from the secret VPSec and
stored in the vendor and Payment gateway terminals respectively. The other
set CISeci (stored in the customer’s device and issuer’s terminal, respectively),
i = 1, . . . , n, is generated from the secret CISec. The last set CVSeck (where
k = 1, . . . , n) is generated from the secret CVSec and are stored in the customers
device and the vendors terminal respectively.
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In order to generate the sets of shared keys, we apply a Hash algorithm with
one-bit cyclic chain function of a master secret each time a session key is gener-
ated [5]. The details are shown as follows:
Generating VPSecj and CVSeck
VPSec1 = h(1-bit-shift-of-VPSec), VPSec2 = h(2-bit-shift-of-VPSec),. . . ,
VPSecn = h(n-bit-shift-of-VPSec)
CVSec1 = h(1-bit-shift-of-CVSec), CVSec2 = h(2-bit-shift-of-CVSec),. . . ,
CVSecn = h(n-bit-shift-of-CVSec))
Generating CISeci
CISec1 = h(1-bit-shift-of-(CDCI,CISec)),
CISec2 = h(2-bit-shift-of-(CDCI,CISec)),. . . ,
CISecn = h(n-bit-shift-of-(CDCI,CISec))
3.4 Detailed Protocols
Our protocol consists of four sub–protocols: Registration, Purchase, Withdrawal
and Deposit. Each sub–protocol has the following main functions:
Registration (C ↔ V,C ↔ I): This sub–protocol involves the customer, the
vendor and the issuer. The process starts when the customer shares her credit-
and/or debit-card information (CDCI) with her issuer. CDCI contains the long-
term secret CISec known only by the customer and her issuer and will be used
as an authentication method by the customer in future withdrawals.
In addition, the secret SSWSec is shared between the customer/issuer and
will be used as watermark value for the watermarking process at the issuer’s
side and as software input at customer’s side to detect its authenticity.
When the ﬁrst purchase takes place, V will detect if the wallet software is
available in the mobile device. If not, V sends a software request to P , which
will forward the request to I. The issuer intends to protect the software against
various types of attacks carried away at any moment, following these steps: 1)
First, choose one of the obfuscation methods proposed by [7] and apply it to
the java code, and 2) Then, apply a watermarking process (proposed by [3])
to the software (using SSWSec as a watermark value and embedded into the
software).
Once the software has been prepared, I will forward it to the P , which will
send it to V , who will ﬁnally send it to C. After C receives the software, she
will install it and check its authenticity using the secret SSWSec. If a prob-
lem occurs, C could abort the registration sub–protocol or start the process
again.
When the software is successfully installed and working, C generates CVSec
and send it to V with IDC and a nonce n encrypted with the session key K,
generated by running AKE protocol with V . Then V sends h(n, CVSec) to C
as a conﬁrmation of customer’s registration. After the sub–protocol has been
completed, C and V can generate a new set of CVSeci by using the same key
generation technique. On the other hand, the vendor registers herself to the
Payment Gateway and share the secret VPSec.
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1) C → V: {IDc, CVSec, n}K
2) V → C: h(n, CVSec)
Purchase (C ↔ V ): This sub–protocol is carried out between C and V over the
wireless channel. The process starts when C sends to V the information necessary
to set up the sub–protocol (step 3). After this information exchange ends, C
builds up the Payment-script Request with OI and TC. Then, C encrypts it
and sends to V where the message is decrypted to retrieve OI.
3) C → V: IDC , i, TIDReq, VIDReq
4) V → C: {TID, IDV }CV Seci
5) C → V: {OI, Price, MAC[(Price, TC, h(OI), IDV ), CISeci]}CV Seci,
MAC[(OI, Price, IDC , IDI), CV Seci+1]
Note that, although V can decrypt the message using CV Seci, she cannot
generate this message since she does not have the necessary CISeci to construct
MAC[(Price, TC, h(OI), IDV ), CISeci]. Thus, any entity of the mobile payment
system can ensure that the message is truly sent from C.
Withdrawal (V ↔ P): Withdrawal sub–protocol occurs between V and P
through a secure wired channel. V decrypts the message received from C (to
retrieve OI), prepares the Withdrawal-script Request (including IDC , IDI , and
the index i used to identify the current session key in the set of CISeci) encrypted
with VPSecj and then sends it to P .
After the script was received by P , she forwards it to I, adding some infor-
mation such her identity (IDP ). Here, this script is called Withdrawal–script
Request and will be processed by I to approve or reject the transaction.
Once the issuer has processed the request and prepared the Withdrawal–script
Response (including Stt), she must send it to P who in turn proceeds to forward
to V . The Deposit sub–protocol is activated by P only when the Withdrawal is
approved. Otherwise, P assigns the value Discarded to Std.
After the Withdrawal and Deposit sub–protocols are completed, P sends the
Withdrawal-script Response to V (including the Deposit-script Response). Then
V prepares the Payment-script Response and sends it to C.
6) V → P: {MAC[(Price, TC, h(OI), IDV ), CISeci], j, IDV ,
h(OI), i, TID, Price, IDC , IDI}V PSecj ,
MAC[(h(OI), i, TID, IDC , IDI), VPSecj+1]
7) P → I: MAC[(Price, TC, h(OI), IDV ), CISeci], i,
h(OI),TID, Price, IDC , IDV , h(VPSecj+1)
8) I → P: Stt, h(Stt, h(OI), h(CISeci)), {h(OI), Stt, h(VPSecj+1)}CISeci
11) P → V: {Stt, {h(OI), h(VPSecj+1)}CISeci,
h(Stt, h(OI), h(CISeci)), Std, h(Std, h(OI))}V PSecj+1
12) V → C: {{h(OI), Stt, h(VPSecj+1)}CISeci}CV Seci+1
Deposit (P ↔ A): This sub–protocol occurs between the P and A trough a
secure wired channel when no problems have found at the Withdrawal sub–
protocol. Here, the Deposit-script Request is prepared by P who sends it to A
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who checks the Price received with the negotiated during the purchase process. If
they are matched, the value Accepted is assigned to Std and the total amount of
the OI is transferred to the vendor’s account. Otherwise, the deposit is refused
(the value Discarded is assigned to Std) and it not represents an excuse for
V to not deliver the good to C because the Withdrawal sub–protocol has been
complete successfully. Then, a dispute occurs between V , P and A.
The Deposit-script Response is prepared by A and then sent to P in order to
complete the deposit sub–protocol.
9) P → A: IDp, Price, TID, Stt, h(OI), IDV , h(VPSecj+1)
10) A → P: IDA, Std, h(Std, h(OI))
After a transaction is completed, each entity of the payment system put in her
revocations list, CVSeci and CISeci to prevent their replay from customer and
vendor. In the following purchases, the registration sub–protocol will not occur
until the customer is notiﬁed to update the secret CVSec. Thus, when become
necessary to renew the secret, the customer runs the Registration sub–protocol
to get a new CVSec. While the secret is not updated, the customer can use other
values in the set of CVSeci to perform transactions. To update the VPSEC, the
Payment Gateway sends the new secret to the vendor by using an AKE protocol.
Finally, to update the CISec, the issuer has to add a message with the new secret
to the Withdrawal-script Response which will be modiﬁed as following:
{h(OI), Stt, h(VPSecj+1), NewSecret, h(NewSecret)}CISeci.
4 Analysis
4.1 Comparison with SAMPP
In this section, we present a comparison between SAMPP and ours in order to
establish the diﬀerences between both protocols.
The major diﬀerence between both protocols relies on the operational envi-
ronment in which they are used. In SAMPP, the mobile device has access to the
Internet which allows the client to communicate with the issuer when needed
whereas our protocol is based on the idea of the consumer not being able to
connect directly to the issuer, in consequence, any information or program that
the issuer wants to send to the client, will have to do it through the vendor.
Another diﬀerence is the distribution method used with the payment software.
While in SAMPP the customer must either download the software from the issuer
or receive it by e-mail, in our proposal the wallet software must be sent from the
issuer to the consumer through the vendor. This has lead us to the inclusion of
security mechanisms (such as code obfuscation and watermarking) that assure
the software against several types of attacks.
The third diﬀerence worth mentioning can be found in the number of sub–
protocols that compose the protocol. SAMPP is composed of two sub–protocols
whereas ours it is made up of four sub–protocols . In our protocol, each sub–
protocol of the payment process is activated when it is needed (like the deposit
806 J.T. Isaac et al.
sub–protocol that is activated when the issuer approves the withdrawal) and un-
necessary steps are avoided (as happens in SAMPP where the Payment Gateway
must send the information to the issuer and the acquirer at the same time even
though the withdrawal has not been approved).
The fourth diﬀerence can be found in the payment modes allowed by both
protocols. In SAMPP, at the moment of the purchase, the client can use only
his credit card whereas in ours, credit- or debit-card transactions are supported.
The last diﬀerence is the exchange of the secret shared between the client and
the issuer (CISec). In the case of SAMPP, at the time of updating the CISec
secret, a protocol AKE is used (among client/issuer) whereas in ours, the new
secret must be sent inserted in the Withdrawal-script Response.
4.2 Performance
As SAMPP was reformulated to ﬁt our needs, in this section we perform a
comparison of both protocols in terms of performance, focusing on the number
of cryptographic operations performed by each one (results of this comparison
are shown in table 1). We can see that although operational models are diﬀerent
and our proposal is an evolution of SAMPP, the performance of our protocol is
the same that of SAMPP.
Table 1. The number of cryptographic operations of SAMPP, and our protocol,
respectively
Cryptographic Operations SAMPP Ours
1. Symmetric-key
encryptions/decryptions
C 4 4
V 5 5
P 2 2
2. Hash functions
C 2 2
V - -
P - -
3. Keyed-hash functions
C 2 2
V 2 2
P 1 1
4. Key generations
C 2 2
V 1 1
P 1 1
5 Conclusions
We have proposed a secure protocol which uses symmetric cryptographic tech-
niques. It is applicable to mobile payment systems where direct communication
between the client and the issuer does not exist. Thus, the client takes advantage
of the infrastructure of the vendor and payment gateway to communicate with
the issuer and purchase securely from her mobile device. Our proposal represents
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an alternative to all mobile payment systems where the connection between the
client and issuer is mandatory, including Visa’s 3-D Secure scheme. Moreover,
our scheme illustrates how a portable device equipped with a short range link
(such Bluetooth, Infrared or Wi-Fi) and low computational power is enough to
interact with a vendor machine in order to buy goods in a secure way
The symmetric cryptographic technique used in our protocol has lower com-
putation requirements at both parties (since no public-key operation is required)
and oﬀers the capability of dealing with protocol failures and disputes among
parties. Moreover, we have shown that our protocol’s performance is about the
same than that of SAMPP, although this protocol is used in diﬀerent operational
models. As a result, we state that our proposed protocol allows mobile users to
have eﬃcient and secure payment systems even if the communication with the
issuer is not possible.
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Abstract
In this paper we present an anonymous protocol for a mobile payment system based on a Kiosk Centric Case Mobile Scenario
where the customer cannot communicate with the issuer due to absence of Internet access with her mobile device and the costs of
implementing other mechanism of communication between both of them are high. Our protocol protects the real identity of the clients
during the purchase and employs a digital signature scheme with message recovery using self-certified public keys that reduces
the public space and the communication cost in comparison with the certificate-based signature schemes. Moreover, our proposed
protocol requires low computational power that makes it suitable for mobile devices. As a result, our proposal illustrates how a
portable device equipped with a short range link (such Bluetooth, Infrared or Wi-Fi) and low computational power should be enough
to interact with a vendor machine in order to buy goods or services in a secure way.
Key words: Anonymous Protocol, Mobile Payment System, Kiosk Centric Model, Digital Signature with message
recovery, Self-certified public keys
1 Introduction
M-commerce refers to any electronic transaction or information conducted using a mobile device and mobile networks.
Its popularity has increased in the last years thanks to advances in the portable devices and the rapid development of
the mobile communication technologies that have allowed people to use mobile telephones or Personal Digital Assistant
(PDA) to access Internet (to read email, browse web pages or purchase goods) anywhere and anytime.
Advances in the portable devices make m-commerce more profitable and promising, nevertheless there is still a
widespread skepticism about buying and paying for them on-line, due to the vulnerability of sensitive information when
transmitted through communication channels. Therefore, it is necessary to develop mobile payment systems capable
of providing safe and trustworthy communications between the customer and on-line mobile services providers. More-
over, these payment systems should overcome the common limitations existing in mobile devices currently available,
which prevent that these devices execute, in an efficient way, operations that require a lot of computing resources. The
common limitations are: 1) poor computational capabilities, 2) limited storage and 3) short battery life.
Different mobile payment systems have emerged in the last years which allow the payment of services/goods from
mobile devices, but the one developed by [16] (called 3-D Secure) has become a standard due to its benefits regarding
security and flexibility in the authentication methods. This scheme allows the authentication of the payer (customer)
when she makes an on-line payment using a debit or credit card.
Despite of the flexibility that 3-D Secure provides to the issuer to choose the authentication method (password, sym-
metric and asymmetric signature, and biometric techniques), the relationship between payer and issuer is quite strict
(although required for Visa’s 3D-Secure scheme) and does not allow the use of schemes in which the communication
among these parties is not possible due to: 1) the impossibility of the client to connect to Internet from the mobile device
and 2) the high costs and / or inconveniences of using the infrastructure necessary to implement other mechanisms of
communication between the client and the issuer (such SMS, phone call, etc).
Most of the mobile payment systems proposed up until now assume the consumer has Internet connectivity through
her mobile device, so the restrictions mentioned previously do not represent an important issue. However, it is quite
common that the client meets situations in which it is not possible to connect to Internet so it becomes necessary to
develop mobile payment systems where the user could use her mobile device as a shopping means, even thought she
may not have Internet access.
Digital Signature can be represented as a secure base in electronic payment system because it provides authentication,
data integrity and non-reputation cryptography services [10]. However, the traditional digital signature schemes are
based on asymmetric techniques which make the signature computation very expensive and not suitable for mobile
devices. Moreover, these schemes suffer from the well-know authentication problem1 which requires the usage of
certificate to avoid it. The public-key certificate must be verified by a Certificate Authority (CA), and that verification
causes an additional information exchange during a transaction.
According to our operational model, the above schemes are not suitable because clients interact only with a vendor
during a purchase and communication with other party (like CA to verify a certificate) is not possible. Therefore, usage
of a non-traditional digital signature scheme is required in order to satisfy our requirements. Digital signature with
message recovery using self-certified public keys [3],[15] provides an authenticated encryption scheme that integrates
the mechanisms of signature and encryption, which enable only the specified receiver to verify and recover the original
message. The authentication of the public key can implicitly be accomplished with the signature verification.
Contributions: In this paper, we present an anonymous protocol (that supports both credit-card and debit-card transac-
tions) for a mobile payment system based on a Kiosk Centric Model (proposed by [4]) which overcomes the limitations
mentioned before and is suitable for mobiles devices with low computational power. Our protocol protects the real
identity of the clients during the purchase and employs a digital signature scheme with message recovery using self-
certified public keys that reduces the public space and the communication cost in comparison with the certificate-based
signature schemes [17]. As a result, our proposal represents an alternative to other mobile payment systems with
restrictions regarding a mandatory connection between the client and the issuer, like Visa’s 3D Secure.
1An imposter may impersonate any innocent user with a valid cryptographic but incorrect public key (because it does not belong to the innocent
user).
2
Outline of this paper: We begin by presenting the motivation for this work (section 2), followed by the related work
that include a description of some known results associated to our research. We then present a brief review of some
preliminaries (section 4). More precisely, we give a comparison between symmetric and asymmetric cryptography
for mobile payment transactions and an overview of digital signature and self-certified public key. Following this, we
present our approach which includes a complete list of notations used in our scheme, the operational model, the initial
assumptions and the proposed protocol. In section 6, a security analysis of the proposed protocol is presented. We
end this paper with the conclusions in section 7.
2 Motivation
In this research, we can distinguish the following objectives: a) eliminate the restriction of those mobile payment systems
(including Visa’s 3-D Secure) about the direct communication between client and issuer for authentication purposes and
b) provide anonymity of data origin to prevent the merchant from associating the client with the messages sent from
her. This anonymity implies the protection of relevant information by third parties but not unrestrained anonymity [1].
Our first objective is greatly inspired by the Kiosk Centric Case mobile Scenario proposed by [4]. This scenario is very
representative of mobile application frameworks where the client device interacts directly with the kiosk, which in turn
connects to the infrastructure. Note that the client’s device never communicates with the infrastructure in a direct way
but has a feasible connection with the vendor (using a short range link such bluetooth, infrared or wi-fi).
In order to solve the problem of buy and payment of goods/services in the aforementioned scenario, in section 5, we
construct a protocol that allows clients to send from their mobile device a message to the issuer through the vendor (who
will not be able to decrypt this message). The proposed protocol (divided in 2 sub–protocols) employs the authentication
encryption scheme proposed by [17] that allows only specified receivers to verify and recover the message, so any other
receiver will not be able to access the information.
According to our second objective, we make sure not to reveal the real identity of the client to a merchant during
the purchase process. In order to achieve this goal, a nickname instead of client’s real identity is used when she
communicates with the merchant. While a client registers to the issuer, several nicknames are assigned to the client
and those nicknames are known only to the client and the issuer. Since the merchant does not know the mapping the
nickname and the true identity of a client, the client’s privacy is protected [8].
3 Related Work
The widespread of m-commerce in recent years has created new security and privacy challenges because of new
technology, novel applications, and increased pervasiveness [4]. Several studies have been conducted to improve the
security of mobile payment systems. Meanwhile, efforts have also been dedicated to unify concepts and scenarios into
frameworks that will be useful to develop new electronic payment systems and to analyze security issues.
Research conducted by [4] is one of those studies that unifies many proposed m–commerce usages into a single
framework. This research intended to revise the possible range of mobility scenarios, identifying the security issues for
each connectivity scenario. As a result, five scenarios were identified and analyzed: Disconnected Interaction, Server
Centric Case, Client Centric Case, Full Connectivity and Kiosk Centric Case. The latest has been considered as the
starting point in the design of our proposal.
The Full Connectivity scenario (where all the entities are directly connected to one another) has been widely used
in most of the mobile payment systems proposed up until now [11],[7],[16] because it allows protocol’s designers to
simplify the protocols and obtain stronger security guarantees than similar applications in the others models.
Most of the protocols proposed in recent years for the Full Connectivity scenario are based on public-key infrastructure
(PKI) [2],[7],[10] whereas the remaining employ symmetric-key operations which is more suitable for wireless networks
[9]. Unfortunately, usage of those protocols within the Kiosk Centric Case mobile scenario is not possible, as it restricts
the communication which allows only interaction between the client and the merchant. However, some protocols could
be reformulated to overcome this restriction, achieving the same security and performance but in a different scenario.
3
For example, Te´llez et al. [14] reformulate the mobile payment protocol proposed by [9] to satisfy the requirements of
their proposal (based on Kiosk Centric Model).
Many signature schemes with message recovery have been proposed in recent years [3],[15],[17]. These schemes
allow a signer’s public key to be simultaneously authenticated in verifying the signature. As the public keys does
not need to be included in a certificate to be authenticated by verifiers (as happens in protocols based on public-key
infrastructure), communication with a Certificate Authority during a transaction to verify the validity of a certificate is
not necessary. Therefore, digital signature schemes with message recovery are suitable for mobile payment systems
based on a kiosk centric model like the one being suggested in this work.
In order to provide limited but practical anonymity by using limited disclosure of information, some proposals have
been suggested in the past [1],[8]. While the cryptography techniques and operational models used in those works are
different from ours, we follow the approach of using nicknames usage instead of the real identity, implemented in [8] to
prevent a merchant from knowing the customer’s identity.
As the payment software (also called wallet software, and that from now on we will assume that is programmed using the
Java language due to the multiplatform capabilities of this language) must be sent to the customer by the issuer through
the vendor, it becomes necessary the usage of techniques to protect the software against reverse engineering and/or
software tampering. To achieve this, we employ the three techniques for obfuscation of program design proposed
by [13]: 1) The class coalescing obfuscation replaces several classes with a single class, 2) In the class splitting
obfuscation, a single class is replaced with multiple classes, each responsible for a part of the functionality of the
original class, and 3) The type hiding obfuscation uses the mechanism of interfaces in java to obscure the type of
objects manipulated by the program.
The experimental results (applying the techniques mentioned before to a medium-size java program) show that the
run-time overhead, in the worst of possible scenario (class splitting obfuscation), is less than 10% of the total running
time of the program.
4 Background
In this section, preliminaries necessary for the remainder of this paper will be introduced.
4.1 Comparison of Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptography for Mobile Payment Transac-
tions
Symmetric and asymmetric cryptography have been widely used for secure communications among engaging par-
ties. In Symmetric cryptography, a secret is shared between two parties (called sender and receiver) that want
to communicate safely without revealing details of the message. This technique provides message confidentiality,
message integrity and party authentication.
On the other hand, asymmetric cryptography employs a pair of cryptographic keys (public/private key) to allow users to
communicate securely without having previous access to a shared secret key. This technique provides all the security
properties that the symmetric cryptography does (confidentiality, message integrity and party authentication),and also
provides non-repudiation, which symmetric cryptographic could not provide and is very important for financial transac-
tions that are relevant to fund transfer and good ordering. Normally, it can be achieved by using digital signatures but
in symmetric-key based protocols, there is no possibility to prove the originator of an encrypted message because the
secret key is shared between two parties [9].
Symmetric-key operations are more suitable for wireless networks than asymmetric ones due to the time required to
be processed and their lower computational requirements. However, key management is complex since shared secret
key must be agreed upon by both parties and any participant has to maintain n number of secret keys, one for each
party she is communicating with. Moreover, authenticity of origin or receipt cannot be proved because the secret key is
shared.
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4.2 Digital Signature and Self-certified public key
Public-key cryptography, introduced in 1976 by Diffie-Hellman to solve the problem of key management, is a class
of cryptography which allows users to communicate securely without having prior access to a shared secret key. In
asymmetric cryptosystems, each user has two keys: the private key that is kept secret by the user and could be
used to produce a signature for a message and the public key which is made public to all users in a public directory
maintained by a system authority (SA) [17]. These systems suffer from well-known authentication problems, being the
most important one that an imposter may impersonate any innocent user with a valid cryptographic but incorrect public
key (because it does not belong to the innocent user). To deal with the problem, the usage of certified for every public
key is applied but this approach puts a high burden on users since they should connect themselves to the SA in order
to verify the certificate before using the corresponding public key [3].
In 1984, an ID-based public key cryptosystem was proposed by [12], where the public key of a user is computed from
her identity(e.g. an email address, and IP address or a complete name). Unfortunately, this approach relies too much
on system authority because the user’s private key is not chosen by the user, but the SA. To deal with both the problem
of verification of public keys without the usage of certificates and the drawbacks on the identity-based cryptography, the
notion of self-certified public keys cryptosystem was first introduced by [5] where each user chooses her private key,
and the user’s public key is derived from the signature of the user’s private key (signed by the system authority using
the system’s secret key) and the user’s identity. The authentication of the public key can implicitly be accomplished with
the signature verification.
5 Our Approach
5.1 Parties and Notations
All the entities involved in our protocol are called parties and communicate through wireless and wired network.
The symbols C, M, PG, I, A are used to denote the names of the parties Client, Merchant, Payment Gateway, Issuer
and Acquirer respectively. The following symbols are used to represent other messages and protocols:
• IDP : the identity of party P that contains the contact information of P.
• NIDC : Client’s nickname, temporary identity.
• KP : party’s K public key.
• KS : party’s K private key.
• EP−P′ (X) : message X signed and encrypted by the user IDP to a specified receiver IDP′ .
• TID: Identity of transaction that includes time and date of the transaction.
• OI: Order information (OI = {TID, OD, h(OD, Price)}) where OD and Price are order descriptions and its amount.
• TC: The type of card used in the purchase process (TC=Credit, Debit).
• Stt: The status of transaction (Stt = {Accepted, Rejected}).
• TIDReq : The request fot TID.
• MIDReq : The resquest for IDM .
• XMReq : The request for xM .
• h(M) : the one-way hash function of the message M.
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5.2 Operational Model
Generally, operational models for m-commerce found in literature involve transaction between two or more entities. Our
operational model is composed of five entities:
1. Client: a user who wants to buy goods or services from the merchant. Particulary, in our proposal, the user has a
mobile device with the following features: a) low computational power (e.g mobile phone, PDA, etc.), b) equipped
with a built-in display, an input method and short range link (such Infrared, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth), c) capability to
execute a java program, and d) not able to access Internet.
2. Merchant: a computational entity that has products or services to offer/sell to the client and with which the user
participates in a transaction. This entity could be a normal web server or an intelligent vending machine which the
user can connect to using a short range link. Moreover, this entity connects with the Payment Gateway through a
secure wired channel allowing the client to communicate with the issuer using this connection. A formal definition
of the merchant may be found in [4].
3. Acquirer: is the merchant’s financial institution. It verifies the validity of the deposited payment instrument and
manages the merchant’s account including fund transfer.
4. Issuer: is the client’s financial institution. It provides electronic payment instruments to the client to use in a
payment and manage the client’s account including fund transfer.
5. Payment Gateway: an additional entity that acts as a medium between acquirer/issuer at banking private network
side and client/merchant at the Internet side for clearing purpose [9].
Figure 1: Operational Model.
In figure 1, we specify the links among the five entities of our scheme. Note that there is no direct connection involving
the client and the issuer. Moreover, the connection between the customer and the vendor (denoted as the dotted arrow)
is set up through a wireless channel.
On the other hand, interaction among the vendor and the payment gateway (depicted as solid arrow in the scheme)
should be reliable and secure against passive and active attacks. Therefore, the connection is supposed to be
established through a secure wired channel by using the well-know security protocol like SSL/TLS [6]. Note that the
issuer, acquirer and payment gateway operates under the banking private network, so the security of the messages
exchanged among them is out of the scope of this paper.
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5.3 Initial Assumptions
The initial assumptions for our proposed protocol can be stated as follows:
1. Client registers herself to an issuer before making payments. The registration can be done either personally at
the issuer’s premises or via the issuer’s website.
2. The Client shares her credit- and/or debit-card information (CDCI) with her issuer (who will not reveal it to any
merchant). q, p′ and q′ secret and publishes N, g and a collision-resistant hash function h(·) to all users
3. The trusted system authority (SA) is responsible for generation system parameters in the system initialization
phase (by the procedure described in [17][15]).
4. Every party of the system Pi (whose identity is IDPi ) choose a number KSi as her secret key and computes xi =
gKSi mod N. Then, Pi sends (xi, IDPi ) to SA. After receiving (xi, IDPi ), the trusted system authority computes and
publishes the public key of Pi as KPi =(xi – IDPi )h
−1(IDPi ) mod N [17]. As the client uses a nickname instead the
real identity to protect her privacy, one KPi must be generated and published for every nickname assigned to the
client.
5. When a client registers to a issuer, several nicknames are assigned to the client and those nicknames are known
only by the client and the issuer [8]. Furthermore, with the assistance of issuer, the client sends her nicknames
and xC to SA and receives all system parameters from the system authority.
6. The client holds CS, IDI , xI and system parameters in her mobile device.
7. The Price and description of the goods and services have been decided by client and merchant.
5.4 Signature with Message Recovery Techniques
In order to a sender Pi (with identity IDPi ) sign and encrypt a message W to a specified receiver Pj (with identity IDPj ),
we follow the generation procedure of signature proposed by [17]. First, Pi chooses a random number y and computes
r1, r2 and s. Afterwards, Pi sends the triple (r1,r2,s) as the signature of message W (from now on, EPi−Pj ) to the verifier
Pj. After receiving (r1,r2,s), the verifier Pj recovers message W and verifies that the signature is valid using the same
procedure described in [17].
5.5 Detailed Protocols
Our protocol consists of two sub–protocols. In the Registration Protocol, a client requests the values IDM and xM
from the merchant. Then, if the client does not have the wallet software, M sends a request for the software to the
issuer, and it will be delivered to the client through the merchant. After the client receives xM and the wallet software is
available in client’s mobile device, the client can start the Payment Protocol. The main functions of both protocols are
shown as follow:
Merchant Registration Protocol
C → M: {NIDC,n,MIDReq,XMReq}w
M → C: {IDM,xM,h(n,xM)}w
C → M: h(IDM,n,xM)
Due the absence of connection between the client and the trusted system authority during a payment, the client can
not access the public value xM used in the signature process. As a consequence, the merchant needs to send this
value to client. First, C sends to M her nickname NIDC, a nonce n for challenge-response, MIDReq and XMReq (the
request for xM), encrypted with a session key w generated by running AKE protocol [2] with C. Then, M confirms C’s
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registration by sending the value XM , merchant’s identity (IDM) and h(n,xM), encrypted with the session key w. Finally,
C sends h(IDM,n,xM) to M as a confirmation to have received xM .
Afterwards, the merchant will detect if the wallet software is available or not in the mobile device. If not, M sends a
software request to PG, which will forward the request to I. The issuer intends to protect the software against various
types of attacks carried away at any moment, preparing the software following these steps:
• Choose one of the obfuscation methods proposed by [13] and apply it to the java code.
• Then, the software is signed using the Authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages proposed by
[3],[17].
Once the software has been prepared, the issuer will forward it to the PG, which will send it to C (through the merchant)
who will install the software after receiving it.
Payment Protocol
1) C → M: NIDC,T IDReq
M → C: EM−C(T ID, IDM)
2) C → M: EC−M(OI,Price,NIDC, IDI ,V SRequest,h(OI,NIDC, IDI))
V SRequest = EC−I(Price,h(OI),TC, IDM)
3) M → PG: EM−PG(VCRequest, IDM)
VCRequest = (V SRequest,h(OI),T ID,Price,NIDC, IDI)
4) Under banking private network,
4.1) PG → I: V SRequest,h(OI),T ID,Price,NIDC, IDM
4.2) PG → A: Price, IDM
4.3) I,A → PG: V SResponse,Stt,h(Stt,h(OI))
V SResponse = EI−C(Stt,h(OI))
5) PG → M: VCResponse
VCResponse = EPG−M(Stt,V SResponse,h(Stt,h(OI)))
6) M → C: PResponse
PResponse = EM−C(V SResponse)
Step 1: The Client C and merchant M exchange the information necessary to start the protocol.
Step 2: C creates a Payment Request (referred to the General Payment Model described in [11],[9]) including C’s
nickname, M’s and I’s identity, Price, OI and Value-Subtraction Request (called VSRequest, which is encrypted to be
recovered only by an issuer I). OI is used to inform M about the goods and prices requested and Payment Request is
encrypted by C to the specific receiver M. Once the Payment Request has been prepared, C sends it to M. Note that
some important fields, such as OI, Price, NIDC, IDI , are hashed in order to check if they are modified or replaced with
others while in transit.
Step 3: M decrypts the message received from C to retrieve OI. The Merchant M prepares the Value-Claim Request
(called VCRequest) and then sends it with the merchant’s identity to PG, encrypted to be recovered only by her in order
to ensure that only the payment gateway is the intended recipient of the message. The Value-Claim Request contains
the forwarded Value-Substraction Request, C’s nickname, I’s identity, order’s amount, identity of transaction and the
hash of the order information.
Step 4: PG decrypts the message received from M to retrieve VSRequest and the others fields included in VCRequest.
Then, PG forwards VSRequest and other important information, namely: h(OI), TID, Price, NIDC, IDI to I who will
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process it to approve or reject the transaction. Also, PG sends IDM and the requested price (Price) to claim to acquirer
A that she is the party whom the requested amount Price will be transferred to. After checking the validity of the client’s
account, the total amount of OI is transferred to the merchant’s account, the issuer I prepares Value-Substraction
Response (called VSResponse) and sends it to PG with the approval result (Stt). Note that VSResponse is encrypted
to be recovered only by an issuer C.
Step 5: PG sends Value-Claim Response (called VCResponse) encrypted to be recovered only by M. VCResponse
includes VSResponse which will be forwarded to C. As M has her own OI, she can compare this field with the received
h(OI) to check whether or not the message is the response of her request. If they are not matched, M sends a message
to the PG pointing the problem. The PG may now start a recovery procedure or resend the message.
Step 6: M encrypts Value-Subtraction Response to be recovered only by C. Then, M sends it to C as Payment
Response (called PResponse). Once C receives the message, decrypts it to retrieve the result of her request.
Once the purchase has been completed, the client does not have to run Merchant Registration Protocol again unless
she wants to perform transaction with a new merchant. Note that, after clients finish all purchases with a merchant, she
will remove the values IDM and xM from her mobile device due to its limited amount of storage.
6 Analysis and Discussions
6.1 Security issues
After each run of the proposed protocol, the achievement of the following goals will ensure the security of the payment
in our mobile payment system.
• Goal 1: Authentication between the client and the issuer
The operational model used in this proposal has a communication restriction: client can not communicate directly
with the issuer. Therefore, in order to allow that issuer authenticates a client, C has to send a message to I
(through the merchant) with the following features: 1) resistant to attacks while in transit, 2) recoverable only by
the issuer, and 3) able to assure that it has been created and sent by C.
Since the authenticated encryption scheme used in our protocol integrates the mechanisms of signature and
encryption, the message VSRequest sent by C to I, satisfies all the requirements mentioned above and can be
used by the issuer to authenticate the client.
• Goal 2: Anonymity
In order to prevent a merchant from knowing the identity of her clients, usage of client’s nickname (NIDC) instead
of her real identity is required during a communication from C to M. Since the C’s nickname is known only by the
client and the issuer, merchant cannot map the nickname and C’s true identity. Thus, client’s privacy is protected
and untraceable.
• Goal 3: Confidentiality
The authentication encryption scheme used in our protocol ensures the encryption of important data of per
transaction while in transit. Moreover, since this scheme allows that only the specified receiver can verify and
recover the message, any other receiver is unable to do it. For example, the VSRequest is created by C and
encrypted to be recovered only by I. Any other party couldn’t decrypt the message because requires the issuer’s
private key which is known only by I.
• Goal 4: Integrity
It is important to protect data from being modified or/and replaced while in transit. To achieve that, usage of
message digest algorithms and/or digital signature are required. In our protocol, the integrity is mainly ensured
by the digital signature with message recover technique. Also, we use a hash function of some information (e.g,
Order Information, Client’s nickname, etc), padded into some message in order to ensure the integrity where the
digital signature is not used (e.g under banking private network).
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using hash value of some important information (e.g, Order Information, Client’s nickname, etc), padded into
some messages.
• Goal 5: Non-repudiation of Origin (NRO)
The Non-repudiation of Origin is ensured since the signature of a message is generated by the signer U using
her private key US (known only by U). Therefore, the signer should not be able to repudiate his signature creation
later.
• Goal 6: Trust Relationships
Generally, in any transaction, a party should not trust others unless they can provide a proof of trustworthiness
[9]. However, as in our protocol the issuer issues a credit- and/or debit-card to the client and she will not reveal it
to any part, we state the trust relationship between the client and the issuer.
7 Conclusions and Further work
This paper proposes a protocol for secure payments in a mobile payment system where direct communication between
client and issuer does not exist. Our protocol uses a digital signature scheme with message recovery using self-certified
public keys. Furthermore, it allows clients to make purchases without disclosing private information and takes advantage
of the infrastructure of the merchant and payment gateway to communicate with the issuer. With this protocol the client
is able to purchase securely from her mobile device in a similar way to that of traditional mobile payment systems.
Our proposal represents an alternative to all mobile payment systems based on the Full Connectivity scenario (including
Visa’s 3-D Secure scheme) where communication between the client and issuer is mandatory. Moreover, we state that
a portable device with a short range link (such Bluetooth, Infrared or Wi-Fi) and low computational capabilities is enough
for interacting with a merchant in order to buy goods or services in a secure way.
As a result, we assert that our proposed protocol allows mobile users to have efficient and secure payment systems
even if the communication with the issuer is not possible.
In the future, as the proposed protocol includes only non-repudiation of origin, it will be valuable to incorporate more
non-repudiation services (such as non-repudiation of receipt, non-repudiation of submission and non-repudiation of
delivery) in order to prevent entities from denying that they have sent or received certain messages.
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Abstract
Recent advances in m-commerce have raised the usage
of scenarios with communication restrictions. These sce-
narios create new security challenges which must be con-
sidered by protocol’s designers in order to achieve the same
security capabilities as in those protocols designed for mo-
bile payment systems based on a ’Full connectivity’ sce-
nario (where all the entities can exchange messages with
each other without intermediaries). In this paper, we pro-
pose an anonymous payment protocol for a Client Centric
Mobile Scenario where the merchant has no direct commu-
nication with the acquirer due to absence of Internet ac-
cess in her infrastructure, and the unaffordability of other
communication technologies due to the inconveniences and
costs associated. The proposed protocol uses symmetric-key
operations which require low computational power and can
be processed much faster than asymetric ones. As a result,
our proposal illustrates how a merchant can sell goods in
a secure way even if she can not directly communicate with
the acquirer.
1. Introduction
During the last years, the importance of mobile com-
merce has increased while becoming an important part of
our daily lifes. Its popularity has increased thanks to ad-
vances in portable devices and the rapid development of
mobile communication technologies, which have allowed
people to use mobile phones and Personal Digital Assistants
(PDAs) to access Internet anywhere and anytime.
In spite of advances in the portable devices which make
m-commerce more profitable and promising, there is still a
widespread skepticism about buying and paying for them
on-line, due to the vulnerability of sensitive information
when transmitted through communication channels. There-
fore, it is necessary to develop mobile payment systems
capable of providing safe and trustworthy communica-
tions between the customer and on-line mobile services
providers. Moreover, these payment systems should over-
come the common limitations existing in mobile devices
currently available, which prevent that these devices exe-
cute, in an efficient way, operations that require a lot of
computing resources.
Several mobile payment systems have emerged in the
last years which allow payments for services and goods
from mobile devices using different kinds of payments:
credit- and/or debit-card payments, micropayments and dig-
ital coins. The relationship between payee and acquirer is
quite strict in most of these mobile payment systems and
does not allow the use of schemes in which the communi-
cation among these parties is not possible due to: 1) the im-
possibility of the merchant to connect to Internet and 2) the
high costs and / or inconveniences of using the infrastruc-
ture necessary to implement other mechanisms of commu-
nication between the merchant and the acquirer (such SMS,
phone call, etc).
The above restrictions do not represent an important is-
sue for the majority of mobile payment systems proposed
up until now because they assume that the merchant has
Internet connectivity through his/her infrastructure. Nev-
ertheless, in the real world there are some situations that
the merchant meets in which it is not possible to connect
to the Internet, so it becomes necessary to develop mobile
payment systems where the payee could sell goods/services
even thought he/she may not have Internet access.
In order to provide authentication in electronic pay-
ment systems (including mobile commerce), the follow-
ing methods are considered: username/password, sym-
metric and asymmetric cryptography, and biometry. As
username/password does not offer enough security for
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m-commerce and biometry is not feasible at present,
symmetric and asymmetric signature are chosen for
authentication[4]. However, traditional asymmetric signa-
ture schemes make the signature computation very expen-
sive and not suitable for mobile devices.
According to our operational model (where merchant
cannot communicates with the acquire in a direct way, for-
mally called Client Centric Model [2]), the above schemes
are not suitable because merchant interacts only with a
client during a purchase and communication with other
party (like CA to verify a certificate) is not possible. There-
fore, usage of symmetric signature scheme is required in
order to satisfies our requirements. Symmetric cryptogra-
phy (which employs a shared key between two parties) pro-
vides, like asymmetric cryptography, message confidential-
ity, message integrity and party authentication, and repre-
sents an alternative in the construction of secure protocols
for mobile payment systems, because symmetric-key op-
erations do not require of a high computational power nor
additional communications steps (as happens in protocols
based on public-key infrastructure where the public-key cer-
tificates have to be verified by a Certificate Authority).
In order to solve the problem of buy and payment of
goods/services in our operational model, in section 3, we
construct a protocol that allows to a merchant to send a
message to acquirer through the client (who will not be able
to decrypt this message). The proposed protocol (divided in
2 sub–protocols) employs symmetric-key operations in all
engaging parties to reduce both, the setup cost for payment
infrastructure and the transaction cost. Moreover, it sup-
ports credit-card and debit-card transactions and protects
the real identity of the clients during the purchase. As a re-
sult, our proposal represents an alternative to other mobile
payment systems with restrictions regarding a mandatory
connection between the merchant and the acquirer.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we
present the related work that include a description of some
known results associated to our research. Following this,
we present our approach which includes a complete list of
notations used in our scheme, the operational model, the
initial assumptions and the proposed protocol. In section
4, a security analysis of the proposed protocol is presented.
We concludes the paper in section 5.
2 Related Work
Several studies have been conducted to unify concepts
and scenarios into frameworks that will be useful to de-
velop new electronic payment systems and to analyze secu-
rity issues. Recently, [2] conducted a research that unifies
many proposed m–commerce usages into a single frame-
work. This research intended to revise the possible range of
mobility scenarios, identifying the security issues for each
connectivity scenario. As a result, five scenarios were iden-
tified and analyzed: Disconnected Interaction, Server Cen-
tric Case, Client Centric Case, Full Connectivity and Kiosk
Centric Case. The latest has been considered as the starting
point in the design of our proposal.
The Full connectivity scenario (where all the entities are
directly connected to one another) has been widely used in
most of the mobile payment systems proposed up until now
[9, 3, 11] because it allows protocol’s designers to simplify
the protocols and obtain stronger security guarantees than
similar applications in the others models.
Most of the protocols proposed in recent years for the
Full Connectivity scenario are based on public-key infras-
tructure (PKI) [1, 3, 7, 10] whereas the remaining employ
symmetric-key operations which is more suitable for wire-
less networks [6]. Unfortunately, usage of those proto-
cols within the Client Centric Case mobile scenario is not
possible, as it restricts the communication and not allows
direct interaction between the merchant and the acquirer.
However, some protocols could be reformulated to over-
come this restriction (achieving the same security and per-
formance levels, but in a different scenario), while being
suitable for mobile payment systems with Restricted Con-
nectivity (like the one being suggested in this work). For
example, Te´llez et al. [5] reformulate the mobile payment
protocol proposed by [6] to satisfy the requirements of their
proposal (based on Kiosk Centric Model).
3 Our Approach
3.1 Operational Model
The m-commerce model employed in our approach is
composed of 4 involved entities: client,merchant, issuer
(client’s financial institution), and acquirer (merchant’s fi-
nancial institution). An additional entity called payment
gateway acts acts as a medium between acquirer/issuer at
banking private network side and client/vendor at the Inter-
net side for clearing purpose [6].
The five entities in our scheme and their links are shown
in Fig. 1. The connection between the client and the mer-
chant (denoted as the dotted arrow) is set up through a wire-
less channel. On the other hand, there is no direct connec-
tion involving the merchant and the acquirer and the con-
nection between the client and the merchant (depicted with
a solid arrow) is supposed to be established through a secure
wireless channel by using the well-know security protocol
likes, as such SSL/TLS. Note that the issuer, acquirer
and payment gateway operates under the banking private
network, so the security of the messages exchanged among
them is out of the scope of this paper.
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Figure 1. Operational Model.
3.2 Initial Assumptions
The initial assumptions for our proposed protocol can be
stated as follows:
1. Client registers herself/himself to an issuer before
making payments. The registration can be done either
personally at the issuer’s premises or via the issuer’s
website.
2. The Client shares her credit- and/or debit-card infor-
mation (CDCI) with her issuer (who will not reveal it
to any merchant). CDCI contains the long-term secret
CISec known only by the client and her issuer.
3. The client registers herself/himself to the Payment
Gateway. Then, Payment Gateway shares the secret
SecC−PG with the client. Besides, the issuer shares
the secret SecC−I with the client. All secrets can
be distributed by using an authenticated-key exchange
(AKE) for wireless networks [8, 1].
4. When a client registers to a issuer, several nicknames
are assigned to the client and those nicknames are
known only by the client and the issuer [4].
3.3 Parties and Notations
All the entities involved in our protocol are called parties
and communicate through wireless and wired network.
The symbols C, M, PG, I, A are used to denote the names
of the parties Client, Merchant, Payment Gateway, Issuer
and Acquirer respectively. The following symbols are used
to represent other messages and protocols:
3.4 Detailed Protocols
Our protocol consists of two sub–protocols. In
MerchantRegistration Protocol, client shares the
values NIDC and the secret SecC−M with the merchant.
- IDP : The identity of party P that contains the contact
information of P .
- NIDC : Client’s nickname, temporary identity.
- TID: Identity of transaction that includes time and date
of the transaction.
- OI: Order information (OI = {TID, OD, h(OD,
Price)}) where OD and Price are order descriptions
and its amount.
- TC: The type of card used in the purchase process
(TC=Credit, Debit).
- Stt: The status of transaction (Stt = {Accepted, Re-
jected}).
- TIDReq: The request for TID.
- MIDReq: The request for IDM .
- SecA−B: The master secret shared between parties A
and B.
- KSA−Bj : The session key shared between parties A
and B, generated applying a hash function with j-
bit cyclic shifting (either left shift or right shift) of
SecA−B. More details about this technique can be
found in [6]
- {M}x: The message M symmetrically encrypted with
the shared key X.
- h(M): The one-way hash function of the message M.
- MAC(X,K): Message Authentication Code (MAC) of
the message X with the key K.
Then, if the client does not have the wallet software (which
contains both key generation and payment software, and
that from now on we will assume that is programmed using
the Java language due to the multiplatform capabilities
of this language), she connects to issuer’s web site to
download it or sends a request to the issuer in order to
receive it by mail. After the merchant receives NIDC ,
SecC−M and the wallet software is available in client’s
mobile device, the client can start the Payment Protocol.
The main functions of both protocols are shown as follow:
Merchant Registration Protocol
C → M: {NIDC , SecC−M , n,MIDReq}w
M → C: {IDM , h(n,NIDC , SecC−M , IDM )}w
C → M: h(IDM , n)
Prior to the information exchange, the client C generates
SecC−M which is to be shared with the merchant. Then,
C sends to M her nickname NIDC , SecC−M , a nonce
n for challenge-response and MIDReq, encrypted with a
session key w generated by running AKE protocol with
C. Then, M confirms C’s registration by sending the mer-
chant’s identity (IDM ) and h(n,NIDC , SecC−M , IDM ),
690
encrypted with the session key w. Finally, C sends
h(IDM , n) to M as a confirmation to have received IDM .
Afterwards, if the wallet software is not available in the
mobile device, the client connects to issuer’s web site to
download it or sends a request to the issuer to receive it by
mail. Once the client has received the software, she will
install it in the mobile device.
Payment Protocol
1) C → M: NIDC , i, T IDReq
M → C: {TID, IDM}KSC−Mi
2) C → M:
{OI, Price,NIDC , IDI , z, V SRequest}KSC−Mi ,
MAC[(Price, h(OI), NIDC , IDC),KSC−Mi+1 ]
V SRequest = MAC[(Price, h(OI), TC, IDM ),
KSC−Iz ]
3) M → C: {V CRequest, h(KSM−PGk+1)}KSC−Mi ,
MAC[(V CRequest),KSM−PGk+1 ]
V CRequest = {V SRequest, h(OI), k, z,
T ID, IDM , P rice,NIDC , IDI}KSM−Pk
4) C → PG: {V CRequest, h(KSM−PGk+1)
MAC[(V CRequest),KSM−PGk+1 ]}KSC−PGj , j
5) Under banking private network,
5.1) PG → I: NIDC , IDM , V SRequest, T ID
h(OI), z, P rice, h(KSM−PGk+1)
5.2) PG → A: Price, IDM
5.3) I,A → PG: V SResponse, Stt, h(Stt, h(OI))
V SResponse = {Stt, h(OI)}KSC−Iz
6) PG → C: PResponse
V CResponse = {Stt, h(Stt, h(OI))}KSM−PGk+1
PResponse = {V SResponse,
V CResponse}KSC−PGj+1
7) C → M: {V CResponse}KSC−Mi+1
Step 1: The client C sends her nickname (NIDC), the
request for the transaction identity (TIDReq) and the index
i (that will be used to generate the session key between the
client and the merchant) to M. Once the request is received
by M, he/she sends his/her identity (IDM ) and TID to C,
encrypted only to be recovered by the client.
Step 2: C creates a Payment Request (referred to the
General Payment Model described in [6]) including I’s
identity, Price, the index z and OI (used to inform M about
the goods and prices requested). It also contains the Value-
Substraction Request (called VSRequest, which is to be for-
warded to the issuer I and includes Price, TC, IDM and
h(OI). The client C encrypts the Payment Request to be
recovered only by M (using the session key KSC−Mi) and
sends it to the merchant. Note that a MAC function is used
in order to check if the message is modified or replaced with
other while in transit.
Step 3: M decrypts the message received from C to
retrieve OI. M prepares the Value-Claim Request (called
VCRequest), encrypted with KSM−PGk in order to ensure
that only the Payment Gateway PG is the intended recipi-
ent of the message. Once VCRequest has been prepared, M
prepares a new message (which includes h(KSM−PGk+1),
VCRequest and its MAC value) and sends it to C, encrypted
with KSC−Mi . The Value-Claim Request contains C’s
nickname, I’s and M’s identity, order’s amount, identity of
transaction, the indexes k and z (used to identify the cur-
rent session keysKSM−Pk andKSC−Iz , respectively), the
hash of the order information and the forwarded VSRequest.
Step 4: Once C receives the message sent by M in step
3 (that includes h(KSM−PGk+1), VCRequest and its MAC
value) , encrypts it with KSC−P j and then sends it to PG
with the index j.
Step 5: PG decrypts the message received from C to
retrieve VSRequest and the others fields included in VCRe-
quest. Then, PG forwards VSRequest, the indez z and other
important information, namely: h(OI), TID, Price, NIDC ,
IDM and h(KSM−PGk+1) to I who will process it to ap-
prove or reject the transaction. Also, PG sends IDM and
the requested price (Price) to claim to acquirer A that she is
the party whom the requested amount Price will be trans-
ferred to. After checking the validity of the client’s ac-
count, the total amount of OI is transferred to the mer-
chant’s account, the issuer I prepares Value-Substraction
Response (called VSResponse and encrypted with KSC−Iz
) and sends it to PG with the approval result (Stt).
Step 6: PG sends Payment Response (called PRe-
sponse) encrypted with KSC−PGj+1 to C. PResponse in-
clude VSResponse and VCResponse (which will be for-
warded to M).
Step 7: After receiving PResponse, C decrypts it to re-
trieve VSResponse and VCReponse. As C has her own OI,
she can compare this field with the received h(OI) to check
whether or not the message is the response of her request. If
they are not matched, C sends a message to the PG pointing
the problem (then, the payment gateway can start a recovery
procedure or resend the message). Otherwise, C encrypts
Value-Claim Response, with KSC−Mi+1 and sends it to the
merchant who in turn proceeds to deliver the goods to the
client.
After a transaction is completed, each entity of the
payment system put in her revocations list, SecC−M
and SecC−I to prevent their replay from the client and
the merchant. In the following purchases, the Merchant
Registration Protocol will not occur until the customer
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is notified to update the secret SecC−M . Thus, when
become necessary to renew the secret, the customer runs
the Merchant Registration Protocol to get a new SecC−M .
While the secret is not updated, the client can use other
values in the set of SecC−Mi to perform transactions. To
update the SecC−I , the Issuer sends the new secret to the
client by using an AKE protocol. Finally, to update the
SecPG−I , the Payment Gateway has to add a message with
the new secret to the VCResponse which will be modified
as following:
{Stt,Newsec, h(Stt,Newsec, h(OI))}KSM−PGk+1
4 Analysis and Discussions
Transaction Security: Our protocol satisfies the fol-
lowing transaction securities: A) Entity authentication is
ensured by symmetric encryption and the secret SecC−I
(which guarantees that the message is originated by the
client), B) Transaction Privacy is ensured by the symmet-
ric encryption, and C) Transaction Integrity is ensured by
MAC.
Anonymity: In order to prevent a merchant from know-
ing the identity of her clients, usage of client’s nickname
(NIDC) instead of her real identity is required during a
communication from C to M . Since the C’s nickname is
known only by the client and the issuer, merchant cannot
map the nickname and C’s true identity. Thus, client’s pri-
vacy is protected and untraceable.
Trust Relationships: Generally, in any transaction, a
party should not trust others unless they can provide a proof
of trustworthiness [6]. However, as in our protocol the is-
suer issues a credit- and/or debit-card to the client and she
will not reveal it to any part, we state the trust relationship
between the client and the issuer.
5 Conclusions and Further work
We have proposed a novel protocol for secure payments
in a mobile payment system where the merchant does not
have direct communication with the acquirer and the mes-
sages among these parties must be done across the client.
Our protocol employs a symmetric cryptographic tech-
niques which have lower computation requirements at both
parties (since no public-key operation is required) and offers
the capability of dealing with protocol failures and disputes
among parties.
Although our proposed protocol was designed for a mo-
bile payment system based on a Client Centric scenario
(where direct communication between the merchant and ac-
quirer is not possible), the security properties are preserved
as if we were working in an scenario with full connectivity
among the different entities.
As a result, we state that our scheme can be easily appli-
cable for restricted connectivity scenarios in m-commerce
due to the low communication and the light computation.
Moreover, our scheme illustrates how a merchant can sell
goods in a secure way even if she can not directly commu-
nicate with the acquirer.
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Abstract-Most of the payment protocols designed in recent
years for mobile payment systems are based on a scenario
where all the entities are directly connected to one another.
This scenario (formally called "Full connectivity scenario")
offers advantages to protocol's designers because it allows
them to simplify the design and development of payment pro-
tocols without losing security guarantees. However, the "Full
connectivity" scenario does not consider those situations in
which the merchant cannot communicate with the acquirer
due to absence of Internet access in his/her infrastructure, and
the use of other communication technologies is unaffordable
due to the inconveniences and costs associated. In order to
overcome this restriction and contribute to the progress of
m-commerce, in this paper we propose a novel anonymous
protocol for a mobile payment system based on a Client Cen-
tric Model that employs a digital signature scheme with mes-
sage recovery using self-certified public keys. As a result, our
proposal illustrates how a merchant can sell goods in a secure
way even if she can not directly communicate with the ac-
quirer.
Index Terms- Anonymous Protocol, Mobile Payment Sys-
tem, Client Centric Model, Digital Signature with message re-
covery, Self-certified public keys.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile commerce (m-commerce) concerns to any busi-
ness transaction conducted electronically between at least
two parties (where one of these use a mobile device) over
mobile networks. Some typical examples of m-commerce
are: a) purchasing airline tickets, b) restaurant booking and
reservation, c) hotel booking and reservation and d) paying
taxis and public transport.
M-commerce's popularity has increased in the last years
thanks to advances in portable devices and the rapid devel-
opment of the mobile communication technologies which
have allowed people to use mobile telephones or Personal
Digital Assistant (PDA) to access Internet (to read email,
browse web pages or purchase goods) anywhere and any-
time.
In spite of advances in the portable devices which make
m-commerce more profitable and promising, there is still a
widespread skepticism about buying and paying for them
on-line, due to the vulnerability of sensitive information
when transmitted through communication channels. There-
fore, it is necessary to develop mobile payment systems ca-
pable of providing safe and trustworthy communications
between the customer and on-line mobile services provid-
ers. Moreover, these payment systems should overcome the
common limitations existing in mobile devices currently
available, which prevent that these devices execute, in an
efficient way, operations that require a lot of computing re-
sources. The common limitations are: 1) poor computa-
tional capabilities, 2) limited storage and 3) short battery
life.
Different mobile payment systems have emerged in the
last years which allow the payment of services/goods from
mobile devices, but the one developed by [17] (called 3-D
Secure) has become a standard due to its benefits regarding
security and flexibility in the authentication methods. How-
ever, the relationship between payee and acquirer is quite
strict (although required for Visa's 3D-Secure scheme) and
does not allow the use of schemes in which the communica-
tion among these parties is not possible due to: 1) the im-
possibility of the merchant to connect to Internet and 2) the
high costs and / or inconveniences of using the infrastruc-
ture necessary to implement other mechanisms of commu-
nication between the merchant and the acquirer (such SMS,
phone call, etc).
Most of the mobile payment systems proposed up until
now assume the merchant has Internet connectivity through
his/her infrastructure, so the restrictions mentioned previ-
ously do not represent an important issue. Nevertheless,
there are some situations that the merchant meets in which
is not possible to connect to Internet so it becomes neces-
sary to develop mobile payment systems where the payee
could sells goods/services even thought she may not have
Internet access.
Digital Signature can be represented as a secure base in
electronic payment system because it provides authentica-
tion, data integrity and non-reputation cryptography ser-
vices [9]. However, the traditional digital signature schemes
are based on asymmetric techniques which make the signa-
ture computation very expensive and not suitable for mobile
devices. Moreover, these schemes suffer from the well-
know authentication problem' which requires the usage of
certificate to avoid it. The public-key certificate must be
verified by a Certificate Authority (CA), and that verifica-
tion causes an additional information exchange during a
transaction.
According to our operational model (where merchant
cannot with the acquire in a direct way, formally called Cli-
ent Centric Model [4]), the above schemes are not suitable
because merchant interacts only with a client during a pur-
1 An imposter may impersonate any innocent user with a valid crypto-
graphic but incorrect public key (because it does not belong to the innocent
user).
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chase and communication with other party (like CA to ver-
ify a certificate) is not possible. Therefore, usage of a non-
traditional digital signature scheme is required in order to
satisfies our requirements. Digital signature with message
recovery using self-certified public keys [6], [15] provides
an authenticated encryption scheme that integrates the
mechanisms of signature and encryption, which enable only
the specified receiver to verify and recover the original
message. The authentication of the public key can implicitly
be accomplished with the signature verification.
In order to solve the problem of buy and payment of
goods/services in our operational model, in section III, we
construct a protocol that allows to a merchant to send a
message to acquirer through the client (who will not be able
to decrypt this message). The proposed protocol (divided in
2 sub--protocols) employs the authentication encryption
scheme proposed by [16] that allows only specified receiv-
ers to verify and recover the message, so any other receiver
will not be able to access the information. Moreover, it sup-
ports both credit-card and debit-card transactions and pro-
tects the real identity of the clients during the purchase. As
a result, our proposal represents an alternative to other mo-
bile payment systems with restrictions regarding a manda-
tory connection between the merchant and the acquirer, like
Visa's 3D Secure.
Outline of this paper: We begin by presenting a descrip-
tion of some known results (related work). Following this,
we present our approach which includes a complete list of
notations used in our scheme, the operational model, the
initial assumptions and the proposed protocol. In section
IV, a security analysis of the proposed protocol is pre-
sented. We end this paper with the conclusions in section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, new security and privacy challenges
have emerged with the widespread of m-commerce. Several
studies have been conducted to unify concepts and scenar-
ios into frameworks that will be useful to develop new elec-
tronic payment systems and to analyze security issues.
Recently, [4] conducted a research that unifies many
proposed m--commerce usages into a single framework.
This research intended to revise the possible range of mo-
bility scenarios, identifying the security issues for each
connectivity scenario. As a result, five scenarios were iden-
tified and analyzed: Disconnected Interaction, Server Cen-
tric Case, Client Centric Case, Full Connectivity and Kiosk
Centric Case. The latest has been considered as the starting
point in the design of our proposal.
Most of the mobile payments systems proposed until
now are based in a scenario where all the entities are di-
rectly connected to one another (formally called "Full Con-
nectivity scenario") [6], [10], [17] because it allows proto-
col's designers to simplify the protocols and obtain stronger
security guarantees than similar applications in the others
models.
Most of the protocols proposed in recent years for the
Full Connectivity scenario are based on public-key infra-
structure (PKI) [2], [6], [9] whereas the remaining employ
symmetric-key operations which is more suitable for wire-
less networks [8]. Unfortunately, usage of those protocols
within the Kiosk Centric Case mobile scenario is not possi-
ble, as it restricts the communication which allows only in-
teraction between the client and the merchant. However,
some protocols could be reformulated to overcome this re-
striction, achieving the same security and performance but
in a different scenario. For example, Tellez et al. [13] re-
formulate the mobile payment protocol proposed by [8] to
satisfy the requirements of their proposal (based on Kiosk
Centric Model).
Many signature schemes with message recovery have
been proposed in recent years [3], [15], [16]. These
schemes allow a signer's public key to be simultaneously
authenticated in verifying the signature. As the public keys
does not need to be included in a certificate to be authenti-
cated by verifiers (as happens in protocols based on public-
key infrastructure), communication with a Certificate Au-
thority during a transaction to verify the validity of a certifi-
cate is not necessary. Therefore, and as shown in [14], digi-
tal signature schemes with message recovery are suitable
for mobile payment systems based on a kiosk centric model
like the one being suggested in this work.
In order to provide limited but practical anonymity by
using limited disclosure of information, some proposals
have been suggested in the past [1], [7]. While the cryptog-
raphy techniques and operational models used in those
works are different from ours, we follow the approach of
using nicknames usage instead of the real identity, imple-
mented in [7] to prevent a merchant from knowing the cus-
tomer's identity.
III. OURAPPROACH
A. Parties and Notations
All the entities involved in our protocol are called parties
and communicate through wireless and wired network.
The symbols C, M, PG, I, A are used to denote the
names of the parties Client, Merchant, Payment Gateway,
Issuer and Acquirer respectively. The following symbols
are used to represent other messages and protocols:
- IDp: the identity of party P that contains the contact
information of P.
- NIDc: Client's nickname, temporary identity.
- Kp: party's K public key.
- Ks: party's K private key.
- Ep-p, (X) : message X signed and encrypted by the user
IDp to a specified receiver IDp,.
- TID : Identity of transaction that includes time and
date of the transaction.
- 01: Order information (01 {TID, OD, h(OD,
Price)}) where OD and Price are order descriptions
and its amount.
- TC : The type of card used in the purchase process
(TC={Credit, Debit}).
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- Stt: The status of transaction (Stt = {Accepted, Re-
jected}).
- TIDReq: The request for TID.
- MIDReq The request for IDM.
- XMReq: The request for xM.
- h(M): g the one-way hash function of the message M.
B. Operational Model
Generally, operational models for m-commerce found in
literature involve transaction between two or more entities.
Our operational model is composed of five entities:
1. Client: a user who wants to buy goods or services
from the merchant. Particulary, in our proposal, the
user has a mobile device with the following features:
a) low computational power (e.g mobile phone,
PDA, etc.), b) equipped with a built-in display, an
input method and short range link (such Infrared,
Wi-Fi or Bluetooth), c) capability to execute a java
program, and d) able to access Internet.
2. Merchant: a computational entity that has products or
services to offer/sell to the client and with which the
user participates in a transaction. This entity could be
a normal web server or an intelligent vending ma-
chine that interacts with the customer using a short
range link. Moreover, this entity connects with the
Payment Gateway through a secure wireless channel
allowing the merchant to communicate with the ac-
quirer using this connection. A formal definition of
the merchant may be found in [4].
3. Acquirer: is the merchant's financial institution. It
verifies the validity of the deposited payment in-
strument and manages the merchant's account includ-
ing fund transfer.
4. Issuer: is the customer's financial institution. It pro-
vides electronic payment instruments to the client to
use in a payment and manage the client's account in-
cluding fund transfer.
5. Payment Gateway: an additional entity that acts as a
medium between acquirer/issuer at banking private
network side and customer/vendor at the Internet
side for clearing purpose [8].
In figure 1, we specify the links among the five entities
of our scheme. Note that there is no direct connection in-
volving the merchant and the acquirer. Moreover, the con-
nection between the customer and the merchant (denoted as
the dotted arrow) is set up through a wireless channel.
On the other hand, interaction among the client and the
payment gateway (depicted as solid arrow in the scheme)
should be reliable and secure against passive and active at-
tacks. Therefore, the connection is supposed to be estab-
lished through a secure wireless channel by using the well-
know security protocol like SSL/TLS. Note that the issuer,
acquirer and payment gateway operates under the banking
private network, so the security of the messages exchanged
among them is out of the scope of this paper.
C.
Fig. 1 Operational Model
C. Initial Assumptions
The initial assumptions for our proposed protocol can be
stated as follows:
1. Client registers herself to an issuer before making
payments. The registration can be done either per-
sonally at the issuer's premises or via the issuer's
website.
2. The Client shares her credit- and/or debit-card infor-
mation (CDCI) with her issuer (who will not reveal it
to any merchant).
3. The trusted system authority (SA) is responsible for
generation system parameters in the system initiali-
zation phase (by the procedure described in [15],
[16]).
4. Every party of the system Pi (whose identity is IDpi)
choose a number Ksi as her secret key and computes
xi= gKsi mod N. Then, Pi sends (xi, IDpi) to SA. After
receiving (xi, IDpi), the trusted system authority
computes and publishes the public key of Pi as Kpi =
( X, - iDp, )1/h (DPi) mod N [16]. As the client uses a
nickname instead the real identity to protect her pri-
vacy, one Kpi must be generated and published for
every nickname assigned to the client.
5. When a client registers to a issuer, several nicknames
are assigned to the client and those nicknames are
known only by the client and the issuer [7].
6. The client holds Cs, ID,, and system parameters in her
mobile device.
7. The Price and description of the goods and services
have been decided by client and merchant.
D. Signature with Message Recovery Technique
In order to a sender Pi (with identity IDpi) sign and en-
crypt a message W to a specified receiver Pj (with identity
IDpj), we follow the generation procedure of signature pro-
posed by [16]. First, Pi chooses a random number y and
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computes rl, r2 and s. Afterwards, Pi sends the triple (rl, r2,
s) as the signature of message W (from now on, Epi-pj) to
the verifier Pj. After receiving (rl, r2, s), the verifier Pj re-
covers message W and verifies that the signature is valid
using the same procedure described in [16].
E. Detailed Protocols
Our protocol consists of two sub--protocols. In Merchant
Registration Protocol, client shares the values NIDc and xc
with the merchant. Then, if the client does not have the
payment software (also called wallet software, and that
from now on we will assume that is programmed using the
Java language due to the multiplatform capabilities of this
language), she connects to issuer's web site to download it
or sends a request to the issuer in order to receive it by mail.
After the merchant receives NIDc, xc and the wallet soft-
ware is available in client's mobile device, the client can
start the Payment Protocol. The main functions of both pro-
tocols are shown as follow:
Merchant Registration Protocol
C i M:
MO C:
C 4 M:
tNIDC, xc, n, MIDReq }
tIDM, h(n, NIDc, xc, IDM) 11
h(IDM, n)
As the merchant can not connect directly with the trusted
system authority during a payment, the merchant will not
be able to access the public value xc used in the signature
process. In consequence, the client needs to send this value
to merchant. First, C sends to M her nickname NIDc, a
nonce n for challenge-response and MIDReq, encrypted
with a session key w generated by running AKE protocol
[2] with C. Then, M confirms C's registration by sending
the merchant's identity (IDM) and h( n, NIDC, xc, IDM), en-
crypted with the session key $w$. Finally, C sends
h(IDM, n) to M as a confirmation to have received IDM.
Afterwards, if the wallet software is not available in the
mobile device, the client connects to issuer's web site to
download it or sends a request to the issuer to receive it by
mail. Once the client has received the software, she will in-
stall it in the mobile device.
The issuer intends to protect the software against various
types of attacks carried away at any moment, preparing the
software following these steps:
* Choose one of the obfuscation methods proposed by
[12] and apply it to the java code.
* Then, the software is signed using the Authenticated
encryption scheme with message linkages proposed by
[3], [16].
Payment Protocol
1) C - M: NIDC, TIDReq
M- C: EM-C(TID, IDM)
2) C - M: ECM(OI, Price, ID,, h(OI, ID,))
3) M - C: EM-C (VCRequest)
VCRequest = EM-PG (h(OI), TID,Price,NIDc,jDj)
4) C * PG: EC-PG (OI, Price, ID,, IDM, TID,
VSRequest, VCRequest,
h(OI, IDm, ID,, TID)), NIDc
VSRequest = EC-, (Price, h(OI), TC, IDM)
5) Under banking private network,
5.1) PG M I: VSRequest, h(OI), TID,
Price, NIDc, IDM
5.2) PG * A: Price, IDM
5.3) I,A - PG: VSResponse, Stt, h(Stt, h(OI))
VSResponse = EI C(Stt, h(OI))
6) PG - C: PResponse
VCResponse =EPG M(Stt, h(Stt,h(OI)))
PResponse =EPGc(VSResponse, VCResponse)
7) C- M: Ec-M (VCResponse)
VCesponse = EM-c (VSResponse)
Step 1: The client C sends her nickname (NIDc) and the
request for the transaction identity (TIDReq) to M. Once the
request is received by M, she sends her identity (IDM) and
TID to C, encrypted only to be recovered by the client.
Step 2: C creates a Payment Request (referred to the
General Payment Model described in [10], [8]) including
I's identity, Price and OI (used to inform M about the
goods and prices requested). The client C encrypts the
Payment Request to be recovered only by M and sends it to
the merchant. Note that some important fields, such as OI,
Price, NIDc, $ID I$, are hashed in order to check if they
are modified or replaced with others while in transit.
Step 3: M decrypts the message received from C to re-
trieve OI. M prepares the Value-Claim Request (called
VCRequest), encrypted to be recovered only by PG in order
to ensure that only the payment gateway is the intended re-
cipient of the message. Once the VCRequest has been pre-
pared, M sends it to C, encrypted to be recovered only by
the client. The Value-Claim Request contains C's nickname,
I's identity, order's amount, identity of transaction and the
hash of the order information.
Step 4: C decrypts the message received from M to re-
cover VCRequest. Then, C prepares the Value-Substraction
Request (called VSRequest, which is encrypted to be recov-
ered only by an issuer I) including Price, TC, IDM and
h(OI). Once the VSResquest has been prepared, the client C
prepares another message (which includes OI, Price, ID1,
TID, VSRequest, the forwarded Value-Claim Request and
some important fields hashed to ensure that they will not be
modified or replaced with others while in transit) encrypted
to the specific receiver PG. The later encrypted message is
sent by the client C to PG with her nickname.
Step 5: PG decrypts the message received from C to re-
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trieve VSRequest and the others fields included in
VCRequest. Then, PG forwards VSRequest and other im-
portant information, namely: h(OI), TID, Price, NIDc, ID,
to I who will process it to approve or reject the transaction.
Also, PG sends IDm and the requested price (Price) to
claim to acquirer A that she is the party whom the requested
amount Price will be transferred to. After checking the va-
lidity of the client's account, the total amount of OI is trans-
ferred to the merchant's account, the issuer I prepares
Value-Substraction Response (called VSResponse) and
sends it to PG with the approval result (Stt). Note that
VSResponse is encrypted to be recovered only by an issuer
C.
Step 6: PG sends Payment Response (called PResponse)
encrypted to be recovered only by C. PResponse include
VSResponse and VCResponse (which will be forwarded to
M).
Step 7: After receiving PResponse, C decrypts it to re-
trieve VSResponse and VCReponse. As C has her own OI,
she can compare this field with the received h(OI) to check
whether or not the message is the response of her request. If
they are not matched, C sends a message to the PG pointing
the problem (then, the payment gateway can start a recovery
procedure or resend the message).
Otherwise, C encrypts Value-Claim Response to be re-
covered only by M and sends it to the merchant who in turn
proceeds to deliver the goods to the client.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
Security issues
Transaction Security
* Authentication between the client and the issuer: The
operational model used in this proposal has a com-
munication restriction: client can not communicates
directly with the issuer. Therefore, in order to allow
that issuer authenticates a client, C has to send a
message to I (through the merchant) with the follow-
ing features: 1) resistant to attacks while in transit, 2)
recoverable only by the issuer, and 3) able to assure
that it has been created and sent by C.
Since the authenticated encryption scheme used in
our protocol integrates the mechanisms of signature
and encryption, the message VSRequest sent by C to
I, satisfies all the requirements mentioned above and
can be used by the issuer to authenticate the client.
* Confidentiali : The authentication encryption
scheme used in our protocol ensures the encryption
of important data of per transaction while in transit.
Moreover, since this scheme allows that only the
specified receiver can verify and recover the mes-
sage, any other receiver is unable to do it. For exam-
ple, the VSRequest is created by C and encrypted to
be recovered only by I. Any other party couldn't de-
crypt the message because requires the issuer's pri-
vate key which is known only by I.
Integrity: It is important to protect data from being
modified or/and replaced while in transit. To achieve
that, usage of message digest algorithms is require.
In our protocol, integrity is ensured by using hash
value of some important information (e.g, Order
Information, Client's nickname, etc), padded into
some messages.
Anonymity: In order to prevent a merchant from knowing
the identity of her clients, usage of client's nickname (NIDc)
instead of her real identity is required during a communica-
tion from C to M. Since the C's nickname is known only by
the client and the issuer, merchant cannot map the nickname
and C's true identity. Thus, client's privacy is protected and
untraceable.
Trust Relationships: Generally, in any transaction, a party
should not trust others unless they can provide a proof of
trustworthiness [8]. However, as in our protocol the issuer
issues a credit- and/or debit-card to the client and she will
not reveal it to any part, we state the trust relationship be-
tween the client and the issuer.
Non-repudiation of Origin (NRO): The Non-repudiation
of Origin is ensured since the signature of a message is gen-
erated by the signer U using her private key Us (known
only by U). Therefore, the signer should not be able to re-
pudiate his signature creation later.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHERWORK
We have proposed a novel protocol for secure payments
in a mobile payment system where the merchant does not
have direct communication with the acquirer and the mes-
sages among these parties must be done across the client.
Our protocol employs a digital signature scheme with mes-
sage recovery using self-certified public keys which allows
to a client to make purchases without disclosing private in-
formation.
Although our proposed protocol was designed for a mo-
bile payment system based on a Client Centric scenario
(where direct communication between the merchant and ac-
quirer is not possible), the security properties are preserved
as if we were working in an scenario with full connectivity
among the different entities.
Our proposal represents an alternative to all mobile
payment systems based on the Full Connectivity scenario
(including Visa's 3-D Secure scheme) where communica-
tion between the merchant and acquirer is mandatory. As a
result, we assert that our proposed protocol illustrates how a
merchant can sell goods in a secure way even if she can not
directly communicate with the acquirer.
As the digital scheme employed in the proposed protocol
includes only non-repudiation of origin, it will be valuable
in the future incorporate more non-repudiation services
(such as non-repudiation of receipt, non-repudiation of
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submission, etc.) in order to prevent entities from denying
that they have sent or received certain messages.
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Abstract. A signiﬁcant number of mobile payment systems have been
proposed in recent years, most of them based on a scenario where all
the entities are directly connected one to another (formally called ”Full
connectivity scenario”). Despite of the advantages that the aforemen-
tioned scenario oﬀers to protocol’s designers, regarding design simpli-
ﬁcation and development of payment protocols without losing security
capabilities, the full connectivity scenario does not consider those
situations in which the client cannot directly communicate with the issuer
(Kiosk Centric Model) or the merchant has no direct communication with
the acquirer (Client Centric Model). In order to overcome this restriction
and contribute to the progress of m-commerce, in this paper we propose
an anonymous protocol that uses a digital signature scheme with mes-
sage recovery using self-certiﬁed public keys that is suitable for both the
Kiosk Centric Model and Client Centric Model. As a result, our proposal
shows that m-commerce is possible in restrictive connectivity scenarios,
achieving the same security capabilities than other protocols designed
for mobile payment systems based on ”Full connectivity scenario”.
Keywords: Payment Protocol, Self-certiﬁed public keys, Digital Signa-
ture with message recovery, Mobile Payment System.
1 Introduction
Several mobile payment systems have emerged in the last years which allow
payments for services and goods from mobile devices using diﬀerent kinds of
payments: credit-card payments, micropayments and digital coins. The relation-
ship between payee and acquirer is quite strict in most of these mobile payment
systems and does not allow the use of schemes in which the communication
among these parties is not possible due to: 1) the impossibility of the merchant
to connect to Internet and 2) the high costs and/or inconveniences of using
the infrastructure necessary to implement other mechanisms of communication
between the merchant and the acquirer (such SMS, phone call, etc.).
G. Psaila and R. Wagner (Eds.): EC-Web 2007, LNCS 4655, pp. 1–10, 2007.
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The above restrictions do not represent an important issue for the majority
of mobile payment systems proposed up until now because they assume that
engaging parties are able to connect to Internet. Nevertheless, in the real world
there are some situations that the merchant meets in which it is not possible
to connect to the Internet, so it becomes necessary to develop mobile payment
systems where the payee could sell goods/services even thought he/she may not
have Internet access.
According to our operationalmodels (where client cannot communicate directly
with issuer, or merchant cannot communicate with the acquirer in a direct way,
the traditional digital signature schemes based on asymmetric techniques are not
suitable because one party (client or merchant, depending on the scenario) has
connectivity restrictions and consequently, communication with others parties (as
a CA, for verifying a certiﬁcate) is not possible during a purchase. Therefore, usage
of a non-traditional digital signature scheme is required in order to satisfy our
requirements.
In order to eliminate the restriction of those mobile payment systems based
on the Full Connectivity Scenario regarding the direct communication between
client and issuer, and among merchant and acquirer for authentication purposes,
in section 3, we design a protocol that allows to a party (A) to send a message
to another peer (B) through a third party (who will not be able to decrypt this
message) in the those scenarios. The proposed protocol employs the authentica-
tion encryption scheme proposed by [13] that allows only speciﬁed receivers to
verify and recover the message, so any other receiver will not be able to access
the information. Moreover, it supports both credit-card and debit-card trans-
actions and protects the real identity of the clients during the purchase. As a
result, our proposal represents an alternative to other mobile payment systems
with restrictions regarding a mandatory connection among two of its parties.
Outline of this paper: We begin by presenting the related work. Then, we present
our approach which includes a complete list of notations, the operational model
and the proposed protocol. In section 4, a security analysis of the proposed
protocol is presented. We end this paper with the conclusions in section 5.
2 Related Work
Recently, [3] conducted a research that uniﬁes many proposed m–commerce
usages into a single framework. This research intended to revise the possible
range of mobility scenarios, identifying the security issues for each connectivity
scenario. As a result, ﬁve scenarios were identiﬁed and analyzed: Disconnected
Interaction, Server Centric Case, Full Connectivity, Kiosk Centric Case and
Client Centric Case. The last two have been considered as the starting point
in the design of our proposal.
Most of the protocols proposed in recent years for the Full Connectivity
scenario are based on public-key infrastructure (PKI) [1,4,8,12] whereas the re-
maining employ symmetric-key operations which is more suitable for wireless
networks [7]. Unfortunately, usage of those protocols is not possible in scenarios
A Secure Payment Protocol for Restricted Connectivity Scenarios 3
where direct interaction among two of its parties is not allowed due to the com-
munication restriction imposed by the model (as happens in Kiosk Centric Model
or Client Centric Model). However, some protocols could be reformulated to over-
come this restriction (achieving the same security and performance levels, but
in a diﬀerent scenario), while being suitable for mobile payment systems with
Restricted Connectivity. For example, Te´llez et al. [9] reformulate the mobile
payment protocol proposed by [7] to satisfy the requirements of their proposal.
A few number of signatures schemes with message recovery have been proposed
in recent years which illustrate how a signer’s public key can be simultaneously
securely authenticated during the signature veriﬁcation, avoiding communication
with a Certiﬁcate Authority during a transaction in order to verify the validity of
a certiﬁcate since the certiﬁcate is embedded in public key itself. Therefore, and as
shown in [10], digital scheme signature schemes with message recovery are suitable
for mobile payment protocols based on a restrictive connectivity scenarios like the
one being suggested in this work.
3 Our Approach
3.1 Parties and Notations
All the entities involved in our protocol are called parties and communicate
through wireless and wired network. The symbols C, M, PG, I, A are used to
denote the names of the parties Client, Merchant, Payment Gateway, Issuer
and Acquirer respectively. The following symbols are used to represent other
messages and protocols:
– IDP : the identity of party P that contains the contact information of P .
– NIDC : Client’s nickname, temporary identity.
– KP : party’s K public key.
– KS : party’s K private key.
– EP−P ′(X) : message X signed and encrypted by IDP to a speciﬁed receiver
IDP ′ , following the generation procedure of signature proposed by [13].
– TID: Identity of transaction that includes time and date of the transaction.
– OI: Order information (OI = {TID, OD, h(OD, Price)}) where OD and Price
are order descriptions and its amount.
– TC: The type of card used in the purchase process (TC={Credit, Debit}).
– TS: The type of scenario used during a payment (TC={Kiosk, Client})
– DCMA : The status of the direct connection between the merchant and
the acquirer (DCMA = {Connected, NO-Connected}). The default value is
NO-Connected.
– DCCI : The status of the direct connection between the client and the issuer
(DCCI = {Connected, NO-Connected}). The default value is NO-Connected.
– Stt: The status of transaction (Stt = {Accepted, Rejected}).
– TIDReq : The request for TID.
– MIDReq : The request for IDM .
– MPReq : The request for MP .
– DCMAReq : The request for DCMA.
– h(M) : the one-way hash function of the message M.
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3.2 Operational Model
Our operational models, Kiosk Centric Model and Client Centric Model (ﬁgure 1
and ﬁgure 2, respectively), are composed of ﬁve entities:
1. Client: a user who wants to buy goods or services from the merchant,
equipped with a short range link (such Infrared, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth). Only
in the Client Centric Model, the client is able to access Internet.
2. Merchant: a computational entity (such an intelligent vending machine)
that oﬀers or sells products or services to the client, and with which the
user participates in a transaction using a short range link. In Kiosk Centric
Model, this entity connects with the Payment Gateway through a secure
channel allowing the merchant to communicate with the acquirer using this
connection whereas in Client Centric Model, direct communication with the
Issuer is not possible so it must take place through the client.
3. Acquirer: is the merchant’s ﬁnancial institution.
4. Issuer: is the customer’s ﬁnancial institution.
5. Payment Gateway: an additional entity that acts as a medium between
acquirer/issuer at banking private network side and client/vendor at the
Internet side for clearing purpose [7].
Fig. 1. Kiosk Centric Model Fig. 2. Client Centric Model
The links among the ﬁve entities of our operational models are speciﬁed in
ﬁgure 1 and 2. Note that, in both operational models, the connection between
the client and the merchant (denoted as the dotted arrow) is setup up through
a wireless channel.
On the other hand, interaction among client and payment gateway or between
merchant and payment gateway (depicted as the solid arrow in any of the
operational models) should be reliable and secure against passive and active
attacks. Note that the issuer, acquirer and payment gateway operates under the
banking private network, so the security of the messages exchanged among them
is out of the scope of this paper.
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3.3 Initial Assumptions
The initial assumptions for our proposed protocol can be stated as follows:
1. Client registers herself to an issuer before making payments. The registration
can be done either personally at the issuer’s premises or via the issuer’s web-
site. During the above process, the client shares her credit- and/or debit-card
information (CDCI) with her issuer (who will not reveal it to any merchant).
On the other hand, the issuer assigns several nicknames to the client and
those nicknames are know only by the client and the issuer [6]. In the Kiosk
Centric Model, the client sends (with the assistance of the issuer) her nick-
names and xC to SA and receives all system parameters from the SA.
2. The system authority (SA) is responsible for generation of the system para-
meters in the system initialization phase (as described in [13][11]).
3. Every party of the system Pi (whose identity is IDPi) choose a number
KSi as her secret key and computes xi = gKSi mod N . Then, Pi sends (xi,
IDPi) to SA. After receiving (xi, IDPi), the SA computes and publishes the
public key of Pi as KPi=(xi –IDPi)h
−1(IDPi ) mod N [13]. As the client uses
a nickname instead the real identity to protect her privacy, one KPi must be
generated and published for every nickname assigned to the client.
4. The client holds CS , IDI , and system parameters in her mobile device. Also,
in Kiosk Centric Model, client holds IP .
3.4 Detailed Protocols
Our Protocol consists of two sub–protocols: the Merchant Registration Protocol
and the Payment Protocol. The main functions of both protocols are shown as
follows:
Merchant Registration Protocol
C → M: {NIDC , n,MIDReq,DCMAReq}w
M → C: {IDM , h(n,NIDC , IDM )}w
C → M: IF (TS = ”Kiosk”) THEN
{n,MPReq}w
ELSE
{n,CP }w
M → C: IF (TS = ”Kiosk”) THEN
{n,MP , h(n,MP )}w
ELSE
{n,CP , h(n,CP )}w
As our protocol is designed to work on two diﬀerent operational models, the
ﬁrst step is to determine in which one them the payment is going to take place.
First, C assigns the value Connected to DCCI if he/she is able to connect to
internet from his/her mobile device. Then, C sends to M her nickname NIDC ,
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a nonce n for challenge-response, MIDReq, DCMAReq and h(n,NIDC , IDM ),
encrypted with a session key w generated by running AKE protocol [1] with C.
After M receives the message, he/she sends the merchant’s identity, DCMA,
encrypted with the session key w. Note that M assigns the value Connected is
she/he has direct communication with the acquirer.
After C receives DCMA, he/she will determine the operational model to be
used by the protocol, comparing DCCI with DCMA and takes the decision
following this rule:
IF (DCCI=”NO-Connected”) AND (DCMA = ”Connected”) THEN
ASSIGN the value ”Kiosk” TO TS
ELSE
ASSIGN the value ”Client” TO TS
Once the operational model to be used has been decided, C prepares a new
message and sends it to M. The message includes a new nonce n for challenge-
response and MPReq (if the value of TS equals ”Kiosk”) or CP (when the value
of TS is ”Client”). After M receives the message, M conﬁrms C’s registration
by sending another message, encrypted with the session key w. This message
includes n, MP and h(n,MP ) when TS has the value ”Client”, or n, CP and
h(n,CP ) if the value of TS equals to ”Kiosk”.
Afterwards, if the wallet software is not available in the mobile device, the
client will obtain it through one of the following methods: 1) Sending a software
request to I, in the Kiosk Centric Model, or 2) Connecting to issuer’s web site to
download it or sending a request to the issuer to receive it by mail. This method
is valid for the Client Centric Model.
Once the client has received the software, she will install it in the mobile
device. Note that, in the Kiosk Centric Model, the software is signed using the
Authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages proposed by [2,13].
Payment Protocol
1) C → M: NIDC , T IDReq
M → C: EM−C(TID, IDM )
2) C → M: EC−M (OI, Price,NIDC , IDI , V SRequest)
V SRequest = EC−I(Price,OI, TC, IDM )
3) Merchant: IF (TS = ”Kiosk”) THEN
M → PG: V CRequest, IDM , TS
ELSE
M → C: EM−C(V CRequest)
V CRequest = EM−PG(V SRequest, h(OI), T ID, Price,NIDC, IDI)
4) Client: IF (TS = ”Client”) THEN
C → PG: EC−PG(V CRequest, IDM , TS), NIDC
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5) Under banking private network,
5.1) PG → I: V SRequest, h(OI), T ID, Price,NIDC, IDM
5.2) PG → A: Price, IDM
5.3) I,A → PG: V SResponse, Stt, h(Stt, h(OI))
V SResponse = EI−C(Stt, h(OI))
6) Payment Gateway: IF (TS = ”Kiosk”) THEN
PG → M: V CResponse
ELSE
PG → C: PResponse
V CResponse = EPG−M (Stt, V SResponse, h(Stt, h(OI))
PResponse = EPG−C(V SResponse, V CResponse)
7) Merchant: IF (TS = ”Kiosk”) THEN
M → PG: EM−C(PResponse)
PResponse = EM−C(V SResponse)
8) Client: IF (TS = ”Client”) THEN
C → M: EC−M (PResponse)
Step 1: The client C and the merchant M exchange the information necessary
to start the protocol.
Step 2: C creates a Payment Request (referred to the General Payment Model
described in [7]) including C’s nickname, I’s identity, Price, OI (used to inform
M about the goods and prices requested) and Value-Substraction Request (called
VSRequest, which is encrypted to be recovered only by an issuer I and includes
Price, TC, IDM and OI). The client C encrypts the Payment Request to be
recovered only by M and sends it to the merchant.
Step 3: M decrypts the message received from C to retrieve OI. M prepares
the Value-Claim Request (called VCRequest, which contains C’s nickname, IDI ,
Price, identity of transaction and order information), encrypted to be recovered
only by PG in order to ensure that only the payment gateway is the intended
recipient of the message. Once the VCRequest has been prepared, if the value
of TS equals ”Kiosk”, M sends it to PG with M’s identity and TS. Otherwise,
M sends VCRequest to C, encrypted to be recovered only by the client.
Step 4: This step occurs only when the value of TS is ”Client”. C decrypts
the message received from M to recover VCRequest. Then, C prepares a new
message (which includes IDM , TS and the forwarded V alue− Claim Request)
encrypted to the speciﬁc receiver PG. The later encrypted message is sent by
the client C to PG with her/his nickname (NIDC).
Step 5: PG decrypts the message received from C to retrieve VSRequest and
the others ﬁelds included in VCRequest. Then, PG forwards VSRequest and
other important information, namely: h(OI), TID, Price, NIDC , IDI to I who
will process it to approve or reject the transaction. Also, PG sends IDM and
the requested price (Price) to claim to acquirer A that she is the party whom
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the requested amount Price will be transferred to. After checking the validity
of the client’s account, the total amount of OI is transferred to the merchant’s
account, the issuer I prepares Value-Substraction Response (called VSResponse)
and sends it to PG with the approval result (Stt). Note that VSResponse is
encrypted to be recovered only by an issuer C.
Step 6: If the value of TS equals ”Kiosk”, the payment gateway (PG) sends
V alue − Claim Response (called V CResponse, that includes V SResponse,
which will be forwarded to C) encrypted to be recovered only by M. Otherwise,
PG sends Payment Response (called PResponse) encrypted to be recovered
only by C. PResponse includes V SResponse and V CResponse (which will be
forwarded to M).
Note that in the Kiosk Centric Model (when the value of TS is ”Kiosk”), as
M has her/his own OI, she/he can compare this ﬁeld with the received h(OI)
to check whether or not the message is the response of her/his request. If they
are not matched, M sends a message to the PG pointing the problem.
Step 7: This step occurs only when the value of TS is ”Kiosk”. M encrypts
V alue − Subtraction Response to be recovered only by C. Then, M sends it
to C as Payment Response (called PResponse). Once C receives the message,
decrypts it to retrieve the result of her/his request.
Step 8: This step is performed only if the value of TS equals ”Client”. After
receiving PResponse, C decrypts it to retrieve V SResponse and V CReponse.
Then, C compares her/his own OI with the received h(OI) to check whether or
not the message is the response of her/his request. If they are not matched, C
sends a message to the PG pointing the problem (then, the payment gateway
can start a recovery procedure or resend the message). Otherwise, C encrypts
V alue−Claim Response to be recovered only by M and sends it to the merchant
who in turn proceeds to deliver the goods to the client.
Once the purchase has been completed, the client does not have to run
Merchant Registration Protocol again unless she wants to perform transaction
with a new merchant. Note that, after client ﬁnish all purchase with a merchant,
she will remove merchant’s information from her mobile device.
4 Analysis and Discussions
4.1 Security Issues
Transaction Security
– Authentication: Each one of the operational models used in this proposal
have a communication restriction. Therefore, in order to allow a party (A) to
authenticate another peer (B), a sender has to send a message to a speciﬁed
receiver through a third party with the following features: 1) resistant to
attacks while in transit, 2) recoverable only by the speciﬁed receiver, and 3)
able to assure that it has been created and sent by the sender.
As the authenticated encryption scheme used in our protocol integrates
the mechanisms for signature and encryption, it satisﬁes all the requirements
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mentioned above and can be used by any party of the system to authenticate
another peer in a secure way.
– Conﬁdentiality: In our protocol, the important data of each transaction is
protected while in transit because the scheme used enables only the speciﬁed
receiver to verify & recover the message transmitted by the sender, while any
other party cannot perform such operations.
– Integrity: Any important data should be protected from being modiﬁed
or/and replaced while in transit. In our protocol, the integrity is ensured by
the digital signature with message recovery technique.
Anonymity: In order to prevent a merchant from knowing the identity of
a client, a nickname NIDC instead of his/her real identity is used during a
communication from C to M. Therefore, as merchant cannot map the nickname
and C’S true identity, client’s privacy is protected and untraceable.
Non-Repudiation of Origin (NRO): As in our protocol, a signer U generates
the signature of a message using his/her private key US (known only by U),
he/she should not be able to repudiate his signature creation later. Therefore,
Non-repudiation of Origin is ensured.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
We have proposed a secure protocol for secure payments in a mobile payment
system where client cannot directly communicate with the issuer or the merchant
has no direct communication with the acquirer. Therefore, the messages among
the parties that can not communicate directly must be done across a third party.
The proposed protocol employs a digital signature scheme with message re-
covery using self-certiﬁed public keys which allows to a client to make purchases
without disclosing private information and using a feasible connection with the
merchant through a short range link.
Our proposal represents an alternative to all mobile payment systems based on
the ”Full Connectivity scenario” where communication among all the engaging
parties is mandatory. As a result, we assert that our proposal shows how m-
commerce is possible in restrictive connectivity scenarios, achieving the same
security capabilities than other protocols designed for mobile payment systems
based on ”Full connectivity scenario”.
As the digital scheme employed in the proposed protocol includes only non-
repudiation of origin, it will be valuable in the future incorporate more non-
repudiation services in order to prevent entities from denying that they have
sent or received certain messages.
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a b s t r a c t
Advances in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have triggered the development of many new attractive
applications such as payment services which require the design of payment systems that satisfy addi-
tional requirements associated with VANETs. The wide range of scenarios (with or without connectivity
restriction) arising from vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside communications have opened up new
security challenges which must be considered by payment systems designers to achieve the same secu-
rity capabilities independently of the scenario where the payment occurs. We propose a payment proto-
col aimed at those scenarios where the client cannot communicate directly with the issuer (client’s
ﬁnancial institution) for authentication purpose. The proposed protocol uses a non-traditional digital sig-
nature scheme that reduces the communication cost (compared to certiﬁcate-based signature schemes),
and increases the efﬁciency of the payment process (due to the low communications costs involved). Our
protocol supports both credit-card and debit-card transactions, and protects the real identity of clients
during the payment and can be used by any portable device.
 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the last decade, we have seen the emergence of different
types of communication technologies that can provide network
connectivity to mobile users. Common examples include infra-
structure-based networks (which includes cellular networks and
IEEE 802.11 [15] (WiFi) networks) and mobile ad hoc networks.
While infrastructure-based networks depend on the existence of
an infrastructure (point of access), mobile ad hoc networks do
not require such previous deployment, and hence promise to be
more ﬂexible and easily deployable [21].
A new type of ad hoc network is emerging, in which vehicles
constitute the mobile nodes in the network. This type of network,
called vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), is a form of mobile ad-hoc
network (MANETs) that aims to provide communications among
nearby vehicles (also known as inter-vehicle communication -
(IVC)-) and between vehicles and nearby roadside base-station
(also referred to as vehicle-to-roadside communication -(VRC)-). Dif-
ferent communication technologies including various versions of
the IEEE 802.11 standards, the 802.20 Mobile Broadband for Wire-
less Access standard, and the 802.16e Mobile WiMAX standard
have been proposed to enable this new generation of sentient vehi-
cles [7].
The application space for vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-road-
side communications is vast and opens tremendous business
opportunities and research challenges with security as an impor-
tant one. Thus, VANETs are envisioned to support the development
of a wide of new attractive applications that can be divided into
two major categories [19,20,25]:
(1) Safety-related applications: Applications in this category
share a common characteristic: the relevance to life-critical
situations where the existence or lack of a service may affect
life-endangering accidents. Hence, the security of this cate-
gory is mandatory. Example applications in this category
include: collision avoidance, cooperative driving, trafﬁc opti-
mization, lane-changing assistance, trafﬁc signs violations
warning, and road conditions warnings.
Applications in this categoryusually requiredirect vehicle-to-
vehicle communication due to stringent delay requirements.
(2) Comfort applications: This type of application improves pas-
senger comfort and trafﬁc efﬁciency and/or optimizes the
route to a given destination. Examples of applications in
the category include: payment services (e.g., toll collection,
parking lot payment), location-based services (e.g., ﬁnding
the closest fuel station) and infotainment (e.g., Internet
Access, music download). Some of these applications will
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be free, while others would require a service subscription or
a one-time payment [8]. Moreover, security is also required
in this application category, especially in the case of pay-
ment services.
The industry and the academia have concentrated their re-
search efforts in the safety-related applications because this is an
important area of the automotive domain. Nevertheless, since the
comfort applications offer great business opportunities, it is ex-
pected that research in this area will continue to attract attention
of researchers and designers to develop a wide range of non-safety
applications.
To enable payments in VANETs, it is necessary to build payment
systems that satisfy the additional requirements associated with
vehicular ad hoc networks. As mentioned previously, both vehi-
cle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside communications open up
new security challenges that must be considered by payment sys-
tem designers to achieve the same security capabilities indepen-
dently of the scenario where payments occur.
For example, the area denoted by a circle in Fig. 1 shows a re-
stricted connectivity scenario where a car (henceforth referred to
as the client), with an on-board unit (OBU) and an application unit
(AU) can only connect to the merchant during a payment transac-
tion due to the lack of Internet access with its AU. This situation
creates a security problem because the client cannot send any kind
of messages directly to the issuer and has to do it through the mer-
chant (who should not be able to change the content of the mes-
sages but must keep evidence of the payment). Note that in our
scheme, the merchant takes an active role in the payment process
because it acts as a proxy to allow the communication between the
client and the issuer.
In the real world, the above situation can be represented by the
following example: a client is on the road and stops at a gas station
to purchase gas or some others goods at the gas station store. In
both cases, if the client is not able to communicate with the issuer
(to authorize the payment) from the application unit (due to the
absence of the infrastructure necessary such road-side units
(RSUs), or a Hotspot HS-), the client should still be able to perform
the payment using the merchant’s infrastructure.
In the context of the electronic payment systems, digital signa-
ture can be re-presented as a secure base because it provides
authentication, data integrity, and non-reputation cryptography
services [17,10]. However, the traditional digital signature
schemes are based on asymmetric techniques which make signa-
ture computations very expensive and make then not suitable for
portable devices (such as the ones typically attached to an OBU
[5]). Moreover, these schemes suffer from the well-known authen-
tication problem1 which requires the usage of certiﬁcates to avoid it
[18]. The public-key certiﬁcate must be veriﬁed by a Certiﬁcate
Authority (CA), and that veriﬁcation causes an additional informa-
tion exchange during a transaction.
In this work, we propose a protocol for the case where we do
not have direct communication between the client and the issuer.
As a result, many of the schemes discussed above are not suitable
because the client has connectivity restrictions, and consequently,
communication with other parties (such a Certiﬁcation Authority,
for verifying a certiﬁcate) is not possible during a payment transac-
tion. Therefore, the use of a non-traditional digital signature
scheme is required to satisfy the requirements of the protocol pro-
posed in this research. Digital signature with message recovery
using self-certiﬁed public keys [6,23], provides an authenticated
encryption scheme that integrates the mechanisms of signature
and encryption, which enable only the speciﬁed receiver to verify
and recover the original message. The authentication of the public
key can implicitly be accomplished with the signature veriﬁcation.
To address the issue of direct communication between the
client and the issuer for authentication purposes, we design a pay-
ment protocol that allows the client to send a message to the issuer
through a merchant (who will not be able to decrypt this message).
The proposed protocol, called Kiosk centric model payment proto-
col for VANETs (henceforth referred to as the KCM-VAN Protocol),
employs the authentication encryption scheme proposed by [26]
that only allows speciﬁed receivers to verify and recover the mes-
sage. This means that, no other receiver will be able to access the
information. Moreover, it supports both credit-card and debit-card
transactions, and protects the real identity of the clients during the
payment and can be used with a AU (including portable device).
Our proposed secure payment protocol supports the following
security requirements [3,24,16]:
(1) User anonymity: During the payment process, neither the
merchant nor the payment gateway need to know the cli-
ent’s real identity.
(2) Non-repudiation: Parties should not be able to claim that the
transaction on their behalf was made without their knowl-
edge. Thus, the merchant prevents the possibility that a cli-
ent denies to have made a purchase. At the same time, the
client puts in place mechanisms to correct account errors
or security breaches.
(3) Integrity: The transaction data has to remain intact during
transmission and cannot be altered by outside parties with-
out the modiﬁcation being noticeable.
(4) Authentication: Any role involved in a transaction (such as
merchant, client, etc.) should not be impersonated by mali-
cious attackers to damage fully or partially the payment
scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces and proposes a payment protocol for vehicle-to-roadside
scenarios in VANETs. We analyze the security and performance
Fig. 1. A restricted connectivity scenario in VANETs.
1 An imposter may impersonate any innocent user with a valid but incorrect public
key (because the key does not belong to the innocent user [6]).
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of the proposed protocol in Section 3. Finally, conclusions are given
in Section 4.
2. Proposed secure payment protocol for vehicle-to-roadside
scenarios in VANETs
2.1. The Kiosk centric model payment protocol for VANETs (KCM-VAN)
Model
Our proposed secure payment protocol uses the following
entities:
(1) Client: a user who wants to purchase goods or services from
the merchant. In our proposed protocol, the client is a user-
side entity equipped with an On-Board Unit (called OBU)
and/or an Application Unit (called AU that may use the
OBU’s communication capabilities). An AU can be an inte-
grated part of a vehicle and be permanently connected to
an OBU or could be a portable device such as a Personal Dig-
ital Assistant (PDA), a mobile phone or a gaming device that
can dynamically attach to and detach from an OBU [5].
(2) Merchant: an entity that has products or services to offer or
sell. This entity could be a computational one (such as a nor-
mal web server, a roadside computing station or an intelli-
gent vending machine) or a physical one (such as a gas
station that makes it possible to pay from within an AU)
which the user can connect to using a short range link (using
wireless technologies such as Wi-ﬁ or Bluetooth). Moreover,
this entity connects with the Payment Gateway (an entity
which provides the necessary infrastructure to allow a mer-
chant to accept credit card and other forms of electronic
payment) through a secure channel allowing the client to
communicate with the issuer using this connection.
(3) Acquirer: is the merchant’s ﬁnancial institution. It veriﬁes
the validity of the deposited payment instrument and man-
ages the merchant’s account including fund transfer.
(4) Issuer: is the client’s ﬁnancial institution. It provides elec-
tronic payment instruments to the client to use in a payment
and manages the client’s account including fund transfer.
(5) Payment gateway: an additional entity that acts as a med-
ium between acquirer/issuer at banking private network
side and client/merchant at the Internet side for clearing
purpose [16].
The ﬁve entities in KCM-VAN and their interactions are shown
in Fig. 2. Note that there is no direct interaction between the client
and the issuer. Moreover, the connection between the client and
the merchant (denoted as the dotted arrow) is set up through a
wireless channel (such as IEEE 802.15.1, Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11a/
b/g).
Interaction between the merchant and the payment gateway
(depicted as solid arrow in the scheme) should be reliable and se-
cure against passive and active attacks. Therefore, the connection
should be established through a secure wired channel using the
well-known security protocol such as secure socket layer/transport
layer security (SSL/TLS). Note that the issuer, the acquirer and the
payment gateway operate under the banking private network, so
the security of the messages exchanged among them is beyond
of the scope of this paper.
Before receiving payment services, the client must register with
an Issuer. Generally, this registration can be done either personally
at the issuer’s premises or via the issuer’s website. During the cli-
ent’s registration, the following steps are performed:
(1) The Client shares his/her credit- and/or debit-card informa-
tion (CDCI) with the issuer (who will not reveal it to any
merchant).
(2) The Issuer assigns several nicknames to the client. Those
nicknames are known only to the client and the issuer [12].
(3) The client (C) sends (with the assistance of the issuer) her
nicknames and xC (a value computed by the client from
his/her private key and used by SA to create client’s public
key) to system authority (SA) who in turn sends all system
parameters to C. Thus, the client holds CS (client’s private
key), IDI (issuer’s id), system parameters and IP (issuer’s pub-
lic key) in her Application Unit (AU).
2.2. Notations
All the entities involved in our protocol are called parties and
communicate through wireless and wired networks.
The symbols C, M, PG, I, A are used to denote the names of the
parties Client, Merchant, Payment Gateway, Issuer and Acquirer,
respectively. The following symbols are used to represent other
messages and protocols:
 IDP: The identity of party P that contains the contact
information of P
 NIDC: Client’s nickname, temporary identity
 KP: Party’s K public key
 KS: Party’s K private key
 TID: Identity of transaction that includes time and date
of the transaction
 EPiPj (M): Message M signed and encrypted by the user IDPi to
a speciﬁed & receiver IDPj
 TSTP: Timestamp generated by P
 Stt: The status of transaction (Stt = {Accepted,
Rejected})
 OI: Order information (OI = {TID, OD, h(OD,Price)})
where OD and Price are order descriptions and its
amount
 TC: The type of card used in the purchase process
(TC = {Credit, Debit})
 TIDReq: The request for TID
 MIDReq: The request for IDM
 MPReq: The request for MP
 h(M): The one-way hash function of the message M
 A? B: A sending message x to B
The signature and encryption of a message M by a sender Pi
(with identity IDPi ) to a speciﬁed receiver Pj (with identity IDPj ),Fig. 2. Operational model for KCM-VAN payment protocol.
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is generated as follows (using the procedure proposed by [26]):
First, Pi chooses a random number y and computes:
r1 ¼ M  ðx
hðIDPj Þ
j þ IDPj ÞyhðMÞ mod N ð1Þ
r2 ¼ M  ðx
hðIDPj Þ
j þ IDPj Þyr1 mod N ð2Þ
s ¼ r1  y KSi  hðr2Þ ð3Þ
Afterwards, Pi sends the triple (r1, r2,s) as the signature of message
M (henceforth referred to as EPiPj (M)) to the veriﬁer Pj. After receiv-
ing (r1,r2,s), the veriﬁer Pj recovers message M and veriﬁes that the
signature is valid using the following procedure (as described in
[26]):
M ¼ r2  ðgs  ðxhðIDPi Þj þ IDPi Þhðr2ÞÞksj mod N ð4Þ
Then, the veriﬁer Pj further veriﬁes the validity of the signature,
computing: ðr1 M1Þr1 mod N ¼ ðr2 M1ÞhðMÞ.
2.3. System initialization and user registration
In our scheme, a system authority (SA) is responsible for gener-
ating system parameters [26,23] (such as p, q, p0, q0, h(), N and g).
To achieve this, the SA chooses:
(1) Same size safe large primes p and q which satisfy p = 2p0 + 1
and q = 2q0 + 1.
(2) A RSA modulus N = p  q.
(3) A generator g of the order p0  q0.
(4) A collision-resistant hash function h() = 2H() + 1 (where
H() is either SHA1 or MD5 hash functions) [11] which
accepts a variant-length input string of bits and produces a
ﬁxed-length output string.
The parameters p, q, p0 and q0, are preserved privately whilst g,
N, and the hash function h() are publicly known. Once the param-
eters have been generated, every user of the system Pi (whose
identity is IDPi ) chooses a number KSi for a secret key and computes
xi ¼ gKSi mod N. Then, Pi sends (xi, IDPi ) to SA. After receiving (xi,
IDPi ), the system authority computes and publishes the public
key of Pi as KPi ¼ ðxi  IDPi ÞhðIDPi Þ
1
mod N [26].
When the user registers as the client (using a nickname instead
the real identity to protect one’s privacy), one KPi must be gener-
ated and published for every nickname assigned to the user by
the issuer.
The transmitted messages between the user and the SA during
the registration process are shown in Fig. 3.
2.4. The proposed Kiosk centric model payment protocol for VANETs
(KCM-VAN)
Before the client can start the KCM-VAN payment protocol, a
wallet software should be installed before the payment protocol
can be executed. The software is prepared by the issuer and
could be installed into the AU with the help of the vehicle
manufacturer or by sending a request (through the merchant
and the payment gateway) to the issuer I. It is worth noting that
in the latter case, we have to take into account other limitations
such as bandwidth, link availability, time required for the instal-
lation, etc. which may make the ‘on-the-ﬂy’ installation of the
software unfeasible.
The main functions of our proposed protocol are as follows:
(1) C?M: NIDC,TIDReq,MIDReq,MPReq
M? C: EMC(TID,IDM,MP)
(2) C?M: ECM(OI,Price, TSTC,NIDC,IDI,VSRequest)
VSRequest = ECI(Price,TSTC,h(OI),TC,IDM)
(3) M? PG: VCRequest,IDM
VCRequest = EMPG(VSRequest,TSTM,h(OI),TID,
Price,NIDC,IDI)
(4) Under banking private network,
(4.1) PG? I: VSRequest,h(OI),TID,Price,NIDC,IDM
(4.2) PG? A: Price,IDM
(4.3) I,A? PG: VSResponse,Stt,h(Stt,h(OI))
VSResponse = EIC(Stt,h(OI))
(5) PG?M: VCResponse
VCResponse = EPGM(Stt,VSResponse,h(Stt,h(OI)))
(6)M? C: PResponse
PResponse = EMC(VSResponse)
Step 1: The client C and merchant M exchange the
information necessary to start the protocol by
performing the following sub-step.
1–1: C sends his/her nickname (NIDC), the request for the
transaction identity (TIDReq), M’s public key
request(MP) and the request for the merchant
identity request (MIDReq) to M.
1–2: M receives the request and sends back its identity
(IDM), TID andMP to C, encrypted only to be recovered
by the client.
Step 2: Client C creates a Payment Request (referred to as the
General Payment Model described in [1,16]) in the
following sub-steps.
2–1: A Value-Subtraction Request (called VSRequest,
encrypted to be recovered only by an issuer I) is
created and it includes Price, TSTC, TC, IDM and h(OI).
2–2: A new message is created which includes C’s
nickname, I’s identity, Price, OI (used to inform M
about the goods and prices requested), VSRequest and
timestamp TSTC read from C’s clock.
2–3: The message created is encrypted by the previous
sub-step (henceforth referred to as the Payment
Request) to be recovered only by M.
2–4: The Payment Request is sent to the merchant.
Step 3: ThemerchantM generates the Value-Claim Request
(calledVCRequest)byperformingthe followingsub-steps.
3–1: The message received from C is decrypted to extract
OI and TSTC.
3–2: The timeliness of the Payment Request is veriﬁed. If
the check is successful, the following sub-steps will
be performed.Fig. 3. Registration of a user.
J.T. Isaac et al. / Computer Communications 31 (2008) 2478–2484 2481
Author's personal copy
3–3: The VCRequest is prepared, and contains the
VSRequest, TSTM, h(OI), identity of transaction, order’s
amount, C’s nickname, and I’s identity.
3–4: The VCRequest (to be recovered by PG) is encrypted in
order to ensure that only the payment gateway is the
intended recipient of the message.
3–5: The encrypted message is sent in sub-steps 3–4 to
the PG with M’s identity (IDM).
Step 4: Using private network of the banking institution, the
Payment Gateway PG performs the following sub-
steps to verify the payment.
4-1: The VCRequest is decrypted to retrieve VSRequest and
the others ﬁelds.
4–2: The timeliness of VCRequest is veriﬁed. If the check is
successful, the following steps are executed.
4–3: The VSRequest and other important, such as: h(OI),
TID, Price, NIDC, IDI are forwarded to I where it is
decided whether to approve or reject the transaction.
4–4: IDM and the requested price (Price) are sent to conﬁrm
to the AcquirerA that the client is the party whom the
requested amount Pricewill be transferred to.
4–5: The approved result (Stt) and value-subtraction-
response (called VSResponse) are received from the
issuer I and encrypted to be recovered only by C. It is
worth noting that the VSResponse is prepared by the
issuer after (a) checking the timeliness of VSRequest
and the validity of the client’s account, and (b) after
transferring the total amount of OI to the merchant’s
account.
Step 5: The Payment Gateway (PG) generates the
Value  Claim Response (called VCResponse) in the
following sub-steps.
5–1: A VCResponse is created that includes Stt, VSResponse
(which will be forwarded to C) and h(Stt,h(OI)).
5–2: The VCResponse is encrypted only to be recovered byM.
5–3: The VCResponse is sent to M.
Step 6: Merchant M performs the following sub-steps.
6–1: The VCResponse is decryoted to retrieve VSResponse
and other ﬁelds.
6–2: The merchant’s own OI is compared with the
received h(OI). If they not match, then the client
performs Sub-step 6-3a, otherwise the client
performs Sub-step 6-3b.
6–3a: A message is sent to the Payment Gateway to
notify it of the response failure. The Payment
Gateway then starts a recovery procedure or
resends the message.
6–3b: The Payment Response (called PResponse and re-
presents the result of the client’s request) is created
and includes the VSResponse.
6–4: The PResponse is encrypted to be recovered by the
client C.
6–5: Send PResponse to C.
Once the client has ﬁnished all purchases with a merchant, the
merchant’s information will be removed from his/her AU because
of its limited amount of storage. Fig. 4 shows the transmitted mes-
sages among the parties of the system during the execution of our
proposed KCM-VAN Payment Protocol.
3. Proposed payment protocol analysis and discussions
3.1. Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our proposed se-
cure Payment Protocol. In the case of the KCM-VAN protocol,
the client uses a nickname NIDC (a temporary identity known
only to the client and the issuer) instead of his/her real identity.
As a result neither the merchant nor the payment gateway can
map the nickname to the client’s true identity. This anonymity
protects relevant information from third parties but not unre-
strained anonymity [2].
Fig. 4. KCM-VAN payment protocol messages ﬂow.
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In the case of our proposed protocol, a signer U generates the
signature of a message using his/her private key US (known only
by U and which cannot be derived by an adversary E from U’s sig-
nature because of the difﬁculty of the discrete logarithm problem
[6,23]). The signer should not be able to repudiate his signature
creation later. Therefore, non-repudiation of origin (NRO) is
ensured.
The Conﬁdentiality of messages transmitted in each transaction
should be protected while in transit, specially in wireless networks
where anybody can eavesdrop the transmitted messages easily. In
our protocol, we protect those conﬁdential messages by employing
an authentication encryption scheme that enables only the speci-
ﬁed receiver to verify and to recover the message transmitted by
the sender. Any other party cannot perform such operations.
Although generally in any transaction a party should not trust
others unless they can provide a proof of trustworthiness [16], in
our protocol we state the trust relationship between the client
and the issuer because the client has a credit- and/or debit-card is-
sued by the issuer who will not reveal it to any party.
The KCM-VAN Protocol prevents direct communication be-
tween the client and issuer. Therefore, to allow a party (A) to
authenticate another peer (B), a sender needs to transmit a mes-
sage to a speciﬁc receiver through a third party with the following
features:
(1) Resistance to attacks while in transit (integrity),
(2) Recoverable only by the speciﬁed receiver,
(3) Authentication assurance (being able to ensure that the
message has been created and sent by the sender).
The authenticated encryption scheme used in our protocol inte-
grates the mechanisms for signature and encryption, our proposed
protocol satisﬁes all the requirements mentioned above and can be
used by any party of the system to authenticate another peer in a
secure way.
In the following paragraphs, we adopt the realistic analysis
method proposed by [4] to discuss two possible attacks against
our proposed protocol.
 Replaying attack: If an intruder E wants to impersonate a legal
user by replaying the user’s transmitting contents, the time-
stamp included in the transmitted message ensure the freshness
of the message and avoids replaying attacks. Thus, our proposed
protocol is secure against replaying attack.
 Impersonating attack: An intruder E tried to impersonate a user
Ui to SA, which results in SA being cheated. Since E does not have
its own valid public key KPI to pass the authentication as a valid
system user, the intruder has to forge a public key but for this to
be possible, the intruder must know p0 and q0 (only known by
SA) to compute hðIDPi Þ1. This is hard to achieve because of
the well-known factoring problem. As a result, impersonating
attacks fail with our protocol.
3.2. Performance analysis
3.2.1. Storage cost
Storage limitations is an important issue in an application unit
(AU) which should be considered in any protocol for vehicular ad
hoc networks. We focus only in the client’s storage requirements
for our proposed protocol because the client is the only party in
our scheme who uses an AU (which could be a portable device with
storage limitations) that interacts with the system.
The total number of bytes required by all the values/parameters
that will be stored into the AU are summarized in the Table 1. It
should be noted that we need to add 71000 bytes required for
the wallet software. Thus the storage’s cost will be 71384 bytes
(70 kbytes). Given the low storage requirements, it is possible for
any AU to store the va-lues/parameters and the wallet software re-
quired by our proposed protocol.
The performance of our proposed secure protocol is discussed in
terms of computation cost and Communication cost which are cru-
cial parameters interests in mobile systems.
Computation cost: Generally, the merchant, the payment gate-
way, the issuer and the acquirer have enough powerful computa-
tional resources to execute several modular multiplications;
hence, we only take into consideration the client’s computational
capability.
The client needs to generate the signature of the message being
sent and authenticates and recovers a message received during
execution of the proposed payment protocol. We focus below on
the time complexity required by the client to perform the above
mentioned procedures.
In Table 2, the notations used for analysing the performance of
the proposed protocol are presented. Note that the time for addi-
tion or subtraction with or without modulo N is relatively small
compared to those of Tm, Tmm and Texp, and have been ignored in
the analysis of the time complexities of the our proposed scheme.
To continue with the performance evaluation, we need to dis-
cuss the length of system parameters. For practical and security
considerations, we adopt the length of the system parameters sug-
gested by Girault [9] as follows: (a) the system authority’s secret
parameters p and q should be with greater than 45 bytes against
the exhaustive search attack, (b) each user Ui chooses a secret
key Usi with 20 bytes and (c) jhj is bounded to 16 bytes [22].
Adopting the time complexity analysis presented in [23], we
can conclude that in our proposed protocol a signer requires
3Texp + 3Th + 2Tmm + 3Tm to generate a digital signature whilst the
time needed by a speciﬁed receiver to authenticate and recover
the message received from the signer is 4Texp + 2Th + 2Tmm. These
computation results are reasonable in that they can be computed
multiple times on an Application Unit with a moderate consump-
tion of power and memory.
Communication cost: Due to the mobile environment of VANET,
messages transmitted across the wireless network require reliable
transmission over the network. In our proposed protocol, we focus
Table 1
Storage’s cost required for the client’s device
Value/parameter to be stored Number of bytes needed
Client’s identity 10
Client’s nicknames 100 (10 bytes per nickname)
Client’s secret key 20
Client’s public key 20
Issuer’s identity 10
Issuer’s public key 28
RSA modulus N 90
Generator g 90
Hash function h() 16
Total 384 bytes
Table 2
Notations used for performance analysis of the proposed secure protocol
Notation Description
Communication
cost
jNj Size of modular N
jhj Output size of a one-way hash function h
Computation Cost Th Time for calculating the adopted one-way
function h
Tm Time for multiplication without modulo N
Tmm Time for multiplication with modulo N
Texp Time for exponentiation with modulo N
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on the communication taking place between the client and the
merchant.
The size of an individual signature jr1j + jr2j + jsj is bounded by
3jNj bytes [13] which is reasonable for all the messages transmit-
ted through the wireless network (compared with the computation
and communication cost of other protocols like the ones presented
in [14]).
4. Conclusions and further work
We have proposed a protocol for secure protocol for on-line
payments in a vehicle-to-roadside Restricted Scenario in VANETs
where the client cannot directly communicate with the issuer. As
a result, messages among those parties must be done through
the merchant who should not be able to change the content of
the messages but keep proof of the payment.
The proposed protocol employs a digital signature scheme with
message recovery using self-certiﬁed public keys which allow cli-
ents to make purchases without disclosing private information
and using a short range link (such as that provided by Bluetooth
or Wi-ﬁ) to communicate with the merchant. Moreover, the chosen
digital signature scheme reduces the communication costs and in-
creases the efﬁciency of the payment process.
Although our proposed protocol was designed for a payment
system based on a restrictive connectivity scenario, the security
properties are preserved for a scenario with full connectivity
among the different entities. Moreover, our proposed secure proto-
col can withstand replay and impersonating attacks. We also argue
that our proposal is efﬁcient and can be deployed for those practi-
cal scenarios of restricted connectivity in VANETs.
In the future, we will explore the possibility to reformulate the
proposed protocol to satisfy the requirements of other restrictive
connectivity scenarios in VANETs (such as a scenario where the
merchant cannot communicate directly with the acquirer).
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Abstract: Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have attracted a lot of attention over the last few years. They have
become a fundamental component of many intelligent transportation systems and VANETs are being used to
improve road safety and enable a wide variety of value-added services. Many forms of attacks against VANETs
have emerged recently that attempt to compromise the security of such networks. Such security attacks on
VANETs may lead to catastrophic results such as the loss of lives or loss of revenue for those value-added
services. Therefore making VANETs secure has become a key objective for VANET designers. To develop and
deploy secure VANET infrastructures remains a signiﬁcant challenge. The authors discuss some of the main
security threats and attacks that can be exploited in VANETs and present the corresponding security solutions
that can be implemented to thwart those attacks.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, transportation systems play an important part in
our daily activities. However, recently, we have also
witnessed several deﬁciencies as well as inefﬁciencies in
many of our transportation systems that have led to the loss
of lives, money and time. There are on-going efforts to
develop and improve transportation systems to make them
more intelligent and such systems are often referred as
intelligent transportation systems (ITSs).
One transportation system that has recently attracted a lot
of attention from both academia and industry is vehicular
ad hoc networks (VANETs). They constitute the basis of
ITS. They enable vehicles to actively communicate with
each other and to better perceive the trafﬁc situation (such
as accidents and trafﬁc jams) in their vicinity. VANETs
enable vehicles to avoid problems either by taking desired
actions or by alerting other drivers. Besides road safety
enhancements, the advent of VANET also opens up
opportunities for many VANET-related applications (such
as internet access from a car) that have great potential in
enhancing our travelling comfort. VANETs do not depend
on ﬁxed infrastructures and their nodes (known as mobile
nodes) and may form networks on the ﬂy for a variety of
environments. Owing to the nature of these kinds of
mobile nodes, VANETs can be challenged with frequent
topology changes as well as physical threats (that create
potential vulnerabilities for potential attackers). A successful
attack on VANETs can have catastrophic results (such as
the loss of lives) or may lead to ﬁnancial losses (for
payment services). Therefore securing VANETs is crucial
to the design, implementation and operation of these networks.
In this work, we discuss some of the major security attacks
that have been reported on VANETs recently. In Section 2,
we present the corresponding security solutions that have
been proposed to thwart those security attacks and
vulnerabilities. The main security areas we focus on in this
section include: anonymity, key management, privacy,
reputation and location. Section 3 presents VANET
security challenges that still need to be addressed by the
research community. Finally, we summarise the major
results and make some concluding remarks in Section 4.
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2 Security attacks and solutions
in VANETs
2.1 Anonymity
Anonymity is a critical concern in VANETs and aims to hide
the physical identity of a node (typically a vehicle).
2.1.1 Malicious Vehicle: One of the most important
security requirements of VANETs is privacy. To avoid
being tracked, the use of randomly changing identities (also
called pseudonym) is suggested. This can lead to a situation
where a malicious vehicle M can easily change its identity
to node N without being punished. To isolate a malicious
vehicle from exploiting the use of pseudonyms in
VANETs, Liu et al. [1] proposed a probabilistic method
which uses Bloom ﬁlters to record both dishonest and
trusted nodes. Moreover, with this approach, the authors
assume that each car has tamper-proof device (TPD)
carrying out secure operations.
In Liu’s proposed scheme, each vehicle periodically
broadcasts feedback messages to neighbours within its
transmission range. At the same time, every feedback
message received is parsed and used to update its credit (a
value that represents an honesty level) by TPD. The
proposed scheme works as follows:
† Feedback structure: Two kinds of feedback messages exist
in Liu’s scheme: positive feedback which indicates that the
identities included in the message are honest whereas
negative feedback means the opposite. However,
considering the communication overhead, the identities
need to be compressed and the authors suggest the use of
Bloom ﬁlters (Fig. 1) to represent n elements to support
membership queries. The basic idea is to allocate an m-bit
vector v, with each bit set to be zero at ﬁrst. Then
k-independent hash functions are chosen, h1(x),
h2(x), . . . , hk(x). As illustrated in Fig. 1, for each member
a of the element, each bit of v is set according to the
results of h1(a), h2(a), . . . , hk(a). When we check whether
element b is a claimed member of the ﬁlter, each bit of v is
compared with the results of h1(b), h2(b), . . . , hk(b). As
long as at least one bit (supposed to be 1) of v is 0, it can
be asserted that b is not a member. However, if an element
is accepted as a member, it may not actually be a real
member (called false positive and represents an erroneous
answers to queries). Fortunately by increasing the number
of k, the allowable fraction of errors can be controlled
below some level.
Once the member vector has been calculated, the vehicle
should hand the data combined with the feedback type over
to the TPD which attaches a timestamp and its own credit
(which represents the value deﬁned in the proposal that refers
to the honest level of a car) to the vector and then signs it.
† Feedback broadcast: With this scheme, each vehicle is
required to maintain two vectors representing the positive
and negative ﬁlters. Once a vehicle has been detected or
trusted, the ﬁlters are then updated according to the Bloom
ﬁlters. Note that it is suggested that the two vectors should
be reset after a certain period of time to take into account
the existence of malfunctioning nodes. The TPD should
guarantee that the feedback broadcasting frequency remains
below a certain value to avoid being abused. Otherwise the
TPD should decline requests or adds them to a waiting list.
† Credit update: After a feedback is received, each vehicle
individually hands it over to its TPD which uses it to
update its securely stored credit value. Vehicle can
maliciously create false negative feedbacks to make other
nodes get bad credits, or may even cooperate to send false
positive feedbacks to beneﬁt each other, the credit is
securely evaluated by a mathematical model used in Liu
et al.’s scheme. The credit calculated is attached to each
message signed by the TPD, which can be used to
determine if the message can be trusted.
2.2 Key management
Key management deals with the secure generation,
distribution and storage of keys. For ad hoc networks, the
current literature reports three main approaches for key
management: key exchange, key agreement and key
management infrastructure [2].
2.2.1 Brute force attack: VANETs extend the familiar
concept of a computer network to vehicles travelling on roads.
Typically, VANETs consist of several key components, the
most important of which is road-side units (RSUs)
positioned on the sides of roads and on-board units
(OBUs) which vehicles are equipped with. The distribution
of safety-related information (such as turn warnings, speed
limit information and so on) is a major application of
VANET. Since safety information may contribute to the
survival of people driving the vehicles participating a
VANET, security is of crucial importance to the system.
A simple solution to secure VANETs is the appropriate
application of cryptographic algorithms and approaches that
are already widely deployed to protect against traditional
threats in computer networks. Since each RSU and OBU is aFigure 1 A bloom ﬁlter with four hash functions Hi(a) [1]
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potential node on the network, the number of keys used on such a
network can be very large and the efﬁcient management of the
keys utilised by these cryptographic algorithms is a signiﬁcant
security challenge that must be addressed.
One key distribution solution was proposed by the vehicle
safety communications consortium [3]. However, this
proposal (called Straw Man) has one major deﬁciency
because it does not provide a way to cryptographically
differentiate OBUs and RSUs. This allows the possibility
for an attacker to compromise the RSU by masquerading
on the network as an RSU.
The above deﬁciency was then addressed by Langley et al.
[4] who proposed a more secure method of authentication
which requires the use of some unique identiﬁcation for
vehicles (required to determine if a given device has been
authorised to use the VANET). However, the usage of a
unique identiﬁer is a potential violation of the privacy that
the system must maintain for users of VANETs.
Since vehicles on the VANET do require privacy, it is
important to devise a method to authenticate these vehicles
while maintaining their anonymity. Vehicle identiﬁcation
number (VIN) can be used to identify vehicles in
VANETs; they are by construction unique to each vehicle.
However, if VIN were used for authentication, an attacker
could eavesdrop on the network and determines the
identity of a vehicle as it attempts to prove its identity to
key distribution mechanisms when joining the network.
Thus, VIN is not a usable, secure solution.
To deal with the VIN shortcoming, Langley et al.’s proposal
generates some large random value and concatenate this value to
the vehicle’s VIN. The resulting value is then hashed using
some hash algorithm (for example, SHA-1). The hashed
value is then used as the vehicle’s unique identiﬁer. This
value, by construction, is unique because of the properties of
secure hash functions and the fact that VIN is unique to every
vehicle. Furthermore, the appending of a random value
provides some security against brute force attacks to
determine the vehicle’s identity. For this type of attack, VINs
can be constructed and continually hashed until a match is
found with the unique identiﬁer used by the target vehicle.
Since the hash input is concatenated with a large random
value, the attacker must also correctly guess this random value
to determine if the correct VIN was generated. This
substantially decreases the probability that an attacker will be
able to compromise the identity of a vehicle.
2.2.2 Misbehaving and faulty nodes: Vehicular
network (VN) nodes (road-side infrastructure units and
vehicles) can participate in network operations if each has a
certiﬁcate issued by a Certiﬁcation Authority (CA).
Nevertheless, the possession of a certiﬁcate does not
guarantee that its holder will provide correct information:
a node can simply inject faulty data (e.g. alerts, warnings,
coordinates) while complying with the implemented protocols.
The eviction of misbehaving nodes can be achieved by a
typical approach: a revocation of a node’s certiﬁcates which
implies that messages from this node will be ignored after
the revocation. However, the lack of an omnipresent road-
side infrastructure, especially in the early deployment
stages, and the large-scale deployment of VANETs prevent
the application of traditional certiﬁcate revocation schemes
[5]. Moreover, unless a node is revoked for administrative
reasons (e.g. the vehicle owner did not renew its
registration), it becomes difﬁcult for the authority to obtain
and validate sufﬁcient evidence that a node is faulty or
compromised. Thus, an additional challenge is the
protection of non-misbehaving nodes until they obtain the
revocation information regarding misbehaving nodes.
To address these problems, Raya et al. [5] proposed the
combination of (i) infrastructure-based revocation protocols
[the revocation of the trusted component (RTC) and
revocation using compressed certiﬁcate revocation lists
(RC2RL)], (ii) a misbehaviour detection system enabling
the neighbours of a misbehaving or faulty node to detect its
deviation from normal behaviour, and initiates (iii) a local
eviction of attackers by voting evaluators (LEAVE)
protocol to safeguard the system operation until the
attacker is revoked by the CA, partially or fully, based on
the evidence LEAVE provides.
Rayas et al.’s scheme consists of the following basic
components: (i) the centralised revocation of a node by the
CA, (ii) the local detection of misbehaviour performed
individually by each node and (iii) a distributed, localised
protocol for the eviction of an attacker by its neighbouring
nodes. The scheme, along with its basic components, are
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Two methods are proposed for misbehaving node
revocation initiated by the CA. The ﬁrst one, RTC
(Fig. 3), leverages on the presence of a TC unit on-board
the vehicle. The CA determines that a vehicle V must be
revoked and, with the help of the road-side infrastructure,
initiates a two-party end-to-end protocol with TCV, the
trusted component of V. The CA instructs the TC to erase
all cryptographic material (e.g. keys) it stores and halts TC
operation upon completion of the protocol.
However, RTC is not robust against a sophisticated
adversary that controls the communication link between the
CA and the TC. If the CA fails while executing RTC
(detected by the lack of an acknowledgment), it will revert
to the distribution of the revocation information, namely, a
CRL, to the VN. This way, the CA invalidates credentials
before the end of their lifetime. But the size of CRLs will
grow with the size of the VN and as a result, this approach
is not scalable. To adapt this approach to the VN scale,
Raya et al. [5] proposed the RC2RL protocol, with
compressed CRLs (C2RLs) (using Bloom ﬁlter
compression) being shorter than traditional CRLs.
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2.3 Privacy
Privacy is a key aspect in VANETs and refers to the ability of
the drivers to protect sensitive information about them
against unauthorised observers.
2.3.1 Malicious user: VNs show great promise in
improving safety and enabling other value-added services.
Security and privacy are two important issues in the
deployment of VNs. Privacy-preserving authentication is a
key technique that addresses these two issues. To address
the privacy problem, Xi et al. [6] proposed a random key-
set-based authentication protocol that preserves user privacy
under the zero-trust policy, in which no central authority is
trusted with the user privacy (users have to rely on OBUs
to provide privacy).
Xi et al.’s protocol takes advantage of symmetric random
key set, in which every key is shared by a set of vehicles.
Thus, when the key is used for authentication, an RSU
cannot uniquely identify the OBU because the key may be
provided by other vehicles who share the same key. The
details of the proposed protocol are as follows (as shown in
Fig. 4): ﬁrst, the RSU announces its service by broadcasting
certiﬁcates signed by the Key Distribution Center (KDC).
When a vehicle decides to access the service, it sends an
authentication request together with a set of key indices
which were assigned from the key pool. The set of
symmetric keys (called KSet) is shared between the vehicle
and the RSU. A time information T1 is appended for
message refreshness. All such information is encrypted by a
session key S. The session key S is encrypted with the RSU’s
public key PubS. This encryption protects the message
integrity and prevents the keys from being disclosed to an
outside observer. A set of keys is used (instead of one key)
for authentication purposes because there is a high
probability for the OBU to have one key shared by a large
number of vehicles, which makes it difﬁcult to identify a
malicious vehicle if the key is reported as invalid.
Upon receipt of the authentication request from the
vehicle, the RSU creates a challenge message by encrypting
Figure 3 RTC and RC2RL [5]
Figure 4 Protocol exchange diagram of privacy-
preserving authentication protocol using symmetric key
set [6]
Figure 2 Detection and eviction scheme overview [5]
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a random secret with the set of keys indicated in the request.
The encryption should use cipher-block chaining mode with
multiple encryption keys. The order to use the set of keys is
the same as that deﬁned in the authentication request. If
the road-side server detects some invalid keys or revoked
keys, the authentication will fail immediately. Otherwise,
the challenge is sent back to the vehicle to verify the actual
possession of those keys by the vehicle.
Once the vehicle has received the challenge message, it
decrypts the message with the chosen keys and creates a
response by encrypting the random secret with the session
key. The response is sent back to the RSU which veriﬁes
the response by comparing the decrypted secret with its
original secret. Upon successful veriﬁcation, the RSU
accepts the session key and the vehicle is authenticated.
The proposed protocol provides a way to link the origin of
the attack to the attacker. This is due to the fact that access to
the network requires authentication. Although the scheme
provides some anonymity, the KDC can still narrow down
the range of candidates for the attacker, especially when
other details about the attacker are also provided.
Generally, an attacker uses random key sets during an
attack to prevent its physical trajectory from being
identiﬁed. However, the attacker has only a limited number
of keys. Consequently, using different keys during the
attack increases the probability of exposing its unique
identity.
2.3.2 Trafﬁc analysis attacks: Considered as one of
the serious threats to privacy in VANETs trafﬁc analysis is
a category of attacks against anonymity of communications
[7]. Techniques to prevent trafﬁc analysis attacks on the
internet have been an active area of research as well. To
address trafﬁc analysis attacks, Cencioni et al. [8] proposed
a vehicle-to-infrastructure communication privacy enforcement
protocol (called VIPER) which is resilient to three kinds of
trafﬁc analysis attacks: message coding attack (if messages
do not change their coding during transmission they can
be linked or traced), message volume attack (the amount
of transmitted data, i.e. the message length, can be
observed. Thus, a global observer is able to associate a
communication relation to a certain client and server) and
timing attack (An opponent can observe the duration of a
speciﬁc communication by linking its possible endpoints
and waiting for a correlation between the creation and/or
release event at each possible endpoint.). The intuition
behind the VIPER protocol is to have vehicles not to send
their messages directly to the RSU, but to have vehicles
acting as mix nodes. The messages are encrypted via a
public key crypto-system that allows reencryption (that is, a
ciphertext can be encrypted again without ﬁrst being
decrypted, while requiring a single decryption on the
recipient side) of messages. The mix is limited to nodes
belonging to the same group, where a group is deﬁned as
the set of vehicles registered with a RSU. The combination
of these techniques is as follows:
† Routing: When a vehicle needs to send a message to the
RSU, it ﬂips a biased coin, where faces are named: forward
(with associated probability pf . 1/2) and send (with
associated probability 12 pf). If the result of the ﬂip is
forward, then VIPER randomly selects another vehicle
(henceforth referred to relay) from the same group it
belongs to, and this vehicle becomes the intended recipient
of the message. However, if the result of the coin ﬂip is
send, the RSU is the recipient. Fig. 5 shows an example of
routing in VIPER.
To prevent the message volume attack, the batch size must
be ﬁxed: VIPER adds some dummy messages to the queue if
the number of queued messages is smaller than the batch size.
However, since it is possible that the number of messages to
be sent could exceed the size of the queue, in these cases the
authors assume that the excess messages are lost.
† Message encryption: To prevent an eavesdropper from
learning the identity of the sender from the sender’s ﬁeld of
the message, every message is encrypted. VIPER uses
universal re-encryption, a public-key crypto-system based
on ElGamal [9] that allows reencryption.
† Group membership notiﬁcation: In VANETs, node
mobility is high, and group membership can change
frequently. To preserve the routing mechanism previously
described, group members have to be notiﬁed about group
changes. In VIPER this task is accomplished by the RSU,
through the periodic dispatch of group notiﬁcation messages
(GNMs). That is, the RSU periodically broadcasts a
message containing the identities of the vehicles currently
belonging to the group (the vehicles currently registered with
that RSU). To prevent an insider adversary (which is
registered within the RSU and can decrypt a GNM) to
learn the identities of the other group members, real
identities have to be replaced with pseudonyms.
† Registration: Owing to the high mobility of the vehicles, it
is possible that a vehicle (say, V ) can leave an area served by
an RSU U and be into an area served by a different RSU U 0.
As a result, V has to register within U 0 to change group.
† RSU replies: As some messages require a reply from the
RSU, the anonymity of V has to be protected not only in
Figure 5 Example of routing in VIPER [8]
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the request sending phase, but also in the reply transmission.
To overcome this problem, Cencioni et al. [8] use hash
message authentication code (HMAC) to allow a vehicle to
determine if it is the recipient of the message without
requiring message decryption. Both the RSU and V share
the secret value SV (they can exchange it secretly during
the registration phase). Thus, every reply from the RSU to
V is then encrypted with the public key of V and
broadcasted together with a random value r and the
HMAC computed over the random value r and the secret
value SV that is, HMAC(SV, r). Upon receiving the triplet:
random value, HMAC, and encrypted message (kr, hmac,
enc_messagel), the vehicle computes the value
hmac! ¼ HMAC(r, SV ). If hmac! ¼ hmac, then it is the
intended recipient of the encrypted message, and can
proceed to decrypt the message, otherwise it will not
undertake this computationally expensive operation, since it
is not the intended recipient.
The re-encryption operated by relay vehicles enables
VIPER to be resilient to the message coding attack. Since
the relay vehicle re-encrypts every relayed message using a
secret encryption factor, the message coding changes at
every relay making the tracking of the message impossible
for the adversary. VIPER is resilient to the message volume
attack because both the message and the batch size are
ﬁxed, while it is resilient to timing attack because of the
mix function carried out by the relay vehicles. By forcing
vehicles to transmit and receive messages at ﬁxed data rates,
it is also impossible for a local eavesdropper to track a
message using different transmission and receiving intervals.
2.4 Reputation
Reputation is usually deﬁned as the amount of trust inspired
by a particular member of a community in a speciﬁc setting or
domain of interest. Reputation systems are used to trust and
encourage trustworthy behaviour. In VANETs, these kinds
of systems can be used to defend against compromised
nodes, and malicious ones.
2.4.1 Malicious nodes: The distribution of information
about local trafﬁc or road conditions is one of the emerging
VANET applications. This can increase trafﬁc safety and
improve mobility. However, one of the main challenges is
to forward event-related messages in such a way that the
information can be trusted by receiving nodes.
One promising solution is the use of reputation system
which can defend against compromised nodes. But
conventional centralised trust establishment approaches are
not suitable for use within distributed networks such as
those envisioned for VANET environments. To address
the above problem, Florian et al. [10] proposed the vehicle
ad hoc reputation system (VARS), a completely distributed
approach based on reputation. This reputation system
makes use of direct and indirect trust as well as opinion
piggybacking (a mechanism to append opinion about the
message trustworthiness to the message by every forwarding
node by which the message is distributed) to enable
conﬁdence decisions on event messages. Opinions on the
trustworthiness of an event message are appended during
message forwarding. Sender-based reputation levels
inﬂuence these opinions.
The term direct trust is used for reputation information
that is derived from experience (e.g. an announced event
can be veriﬁed if recognised by a node) while indirect trust
is transitive second-hand reputation provided by nodes of
which reputation information is already known. Florian
et al. [10] adjust thresholds for the conﬁdence decision in
relation to the relative position of the sender compared to
the position of the deciding node. They distinguish
between situations with respect to availability and quality of
reputation information as well as familiarity of the area.
These levels are called geo-/situation-oriented reputation
levels.
2.4.2 Illusion attack: Illusion attack is a new security
threat on VANET applications where the adversary
intentionally deceives sensors on her/his own vehicle to
produce wrong sensor readings [11]. As a result, the
corresponding system reaction is invoked and incorrect
trafﬁc warning messages are broadcasted to neighbours,
creating an illusion condition on VANET.
Lo et al. [11] argue that an attacker must create a virtual
trafﬁc event to produce an illusion attack. Two prerequisite
conditions must be achieved by the attacker to create the
virtual trafﬁc event. The ﬁrst condition for the attacker is
to realise or create the prerequisite trafﬁc situation on the
road. Second, the false trafﬁc warning messages should be
generated and distributed by the attacker. The main
difference between a fabricated message and an illusion
attack is that the attacker in an illusion attack tries to
achieve the prerequisite trafﬁc situation ﬁrst before
distributing false messages.
The traditional message authentication and integrity check
used in wireless networks are inadequate against the illusion
attack, Lo et al. [11] proposed a new system architecture
called the plausibility validation network (PVN) to check
the raw data from sensors and further evaluate whether the
incoming or generated message is valid or not.
The architecture of PVN (as shown in Fig. 6) uses two
ways to obtain the application system input. One is to
receive incoming messages from the wireless antenna
whereas the other is to detect data reported by sensors.
Input data are categorised by the data-type header.
Detailed data information is stored in element ﬁelds
sequentially after the type ﬁeld in the header.
The PVN model is composed of a plausibility network
(PN) checking module and a rule database. The PVM
model works as follows: once a message is received from
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the antenna or generated from sensors, the system (based on
the type of message) retrieves a predeﬁned rule set (a series of
validation procedures or rules to determine the value of a
speciﬁc element ﬁeld in a given message is reasonable or
not) from the rule database for the PVN. In the PN
checking module, each value in an element ﬁeld of a given
message is cross-veriﬁed with the values of other co-related
element ﬁelds by referencing the predeﬁned rules in rule
set. Thus, a given message is trustworthy to application
systems only if the veriﬁcation processes of all element
ﬁelds are successfully passed. A reasonable or trustworthy
message is a valid message. Otherwise, the message is
identiﬁed as invalid and will be dropped automatically by
applications that implement the PVN model.
2.5 Location
Location refers to vehicle position in a vehicular ad hoc
network (VANET). It is one of the most valuable pieces of
information (used in geographic routing) and is often
readily available through positioning services such as global
positioning system (GPS).
2.5.1 Forging positions and Sybil attacks: The
threat model assumed by Yan et al. [12] includes three
types of attack: the position attack, the Sybil attack and the
combination of the position attack and the Sybil attack.
Position attacks can occur when the line of sight of radars
is blocked. An attacker can launch a position attack by
modifying position packets, replaying bogus position
packets and dropping urgent position packets.
The Sybil attack is a well-known harmful attack in
VANETs whereby a vehicle claims to be several vehicles
either at the same time or in succession. The Sybil attack is
a well-known harmful attack in VANETs whereby a
vehicle claims to be several vehicles either at the same time
or in succession. In addition, a Sybil attack refers to an
attack where the vehicle’s identity masquerades as multiple
simultaneous identities. The Sybil attack is harmful to
network topologies, connections, network bandwidth
consumption, and there are some threats even related to
human life. An example of a Sybil attack is shown in Fig. 7.
To prevent most of the position-related attacks and Sybil
attacks reported until now, Yan et al. [12] proposed a novel
solution that was motivated by the need to provide secure
topology information in VANETs and to build a secure
network for applications such as a congestion alert system.
Based on the adage: ‘Seeing of believing’, the authors use
on-board radar as the virtual eye of a vehicle. Although the
eyesight is limited because of a modest radar transmission
range, a vehicle can see surrounding vehicles and hear
reports of their GPS coordinates. By comparing what is
seen with what has been heard, a vehicle can corroborate
the real position of neighbours and isolate malicious
vehicles to achieve local security.
To prevent some variations of Sybil attacks, Yan et al. [12]
proposed a solution where if a radar works such that it can
detect the physical existence of a vehicle, this physical
information can be used to improve the highly abstract
information about the vehicle. The authors compute
similarity among three kinds of data: radar detections,
oncoming trafﬁc reports and reports from neighbours. To
average these similarities, each similarity has a weight.
When radar works, radar detections are more trustworthy,
Figure 6 Architecture of PVN model [11]
Figure 7 A possible Sybil attack
A obtains C’s position Lc. A claims to victim B that its position is Lc, and that its ID is IDa. B detects a vehicle is at Lc then concludes that it is
the position of A [12]
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therefore radar detections have a larger weight. When the
radar does not work, reports from neighbours have a larger
weight. The average position and velocity will be computed
if the similarity is close. A history of the road map is
maintained by storing these average positions and velocities
over a period of time. When a query according to position
needs to be made, vehicles rebuild the target vehicles map
history virtually and make their decisions based on this map.
2.5.2 Position cheating and false position
disseminating: VANETs have special requirements in
terms of node mobility and position-dependent
applications. These requirements are adequately met by
geographic routing protocols. Geographic routing
approaches are mostly based on the same principles: every
node determines its current position by means of a
positioning system such as a GPSs. The position is
periodically broadcasted in beacon packets so that every
node within the wireless transmission range is able to build
up a table of neighbouring nodes including their positions.
If a node has to forward a packet it selects the next hop
from the neighbour table according to a predeﬁned rule
(e.g. it selects the node closest to the destination).
When a node disseminates wrong position data the routing
process messages through the VANET is affected. Wrong
position information may result from malfunction in the
positioning hardware or may be falsiﬁed intentionally by
attackers to reroute data. Malfunctioning nodes may
degrade the performance of a system to some extent while
rerouting of data through malicious nodes violates basic
security goals such as conﬁdentiality, authenticity, integrity
or accountability.
Recently, Leinmu¨ller et al. [13] addressed the security of
geographic routing by proposing an approach based on the
basic design space for position veriﬁcation in VANETs
(depicted in Fig. 8). Leinmu¨ller et al. [13] focus on
infrastructure-less autonomous position veriﬁcation (subtree
1.2.1 in Fig. 13). With this approach each node judges the
position claims independently of the other nodes. To
perform this judgement, the approach relies entirely on
position information that is transmitted in regular beacon
messages, assuming that every node is able to determine its
own position by using a positioning system (such as GPS
or GALILEO).
Although Leinmuller et al. have developed mechanisms to
detect and mitigate the inﬂuence of falsiﬁed position
information in geographic routing protocols without using
special hardware (to measure signal strengths or time-of-
ﬂight) or preinstalled infrastructure networks, the selected
mechanisms will not prevent malicious nodes entirely from
using falsiﬁed position information because the system
cannot detect all the fake positions because of the
weaknesses of the proposal: the solution uses only hard
thresholds that are not used in some conditions, and the
GPS could be jammed or manipulated so the cars cannot
effectively determine their own position and can send no or
only false beacons.
However, the proposed mechanisms will drastically limit
the choice of fake positions because these positions must lie
within a node’s wireless transmission range. As a result, the
possibilities for attackers using faked positions are
signiﬁcantly reduced.
3 Security challenges in VANETs
Despite the various beneﬁts offered by VANETs, they
introduce several security challenges to the research
community. These security challenges are mostly concerned
with the trade-off between authentication and non-
repudiation versus privacy during communication within
VANET environments. Another security challenge is delay
sensitivity because signiﬁcant delays prohibit the use of
security protocols that have high overheads or rely on
multiple stages of full-duplex communication between
nodes [14, 15].
The use of traditional authentication mechanisms to
address some security threats (such as illusion attacks)
without affecting privacy in VANETs poses a new
challenge for those VANET applications that need to
authenticate nodes in VANETs [6, 11]. The other
challenge is the restriction introduced by the transitory
nature of interactions in a VN to use reputation-based
schemes [16].
Another VANET security challenge is the forwarding of
event-related messages on very large ad hoc networks of
highly mobile nodes in such a way that the information can
be trusted by receiving nodes because by doing so we
improve trafﬁc safety and mobility [10].
All these challenges need to be addressed to provide a
secure VANET infrastructure where nodes (vehicles) can
communicate securely with each other and infrastructure
units.
4 Summary and conclusions of
this work
Securing VANETs is becoming increasingly important given
ubiquitous deployment and adoption by the transportationFigure 8 Position veriﬁcation approaches design space [13]
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Table 1 Summary of security solutions for attacks in VANETs
Attack Description Solution
malicious
vehicle
this attack occurs when a malicious
vehicle M can easily change its identity to
node N without being punished
to isolate a malicious vehicle with the existence of
pseudonym in VANETs, Liu et al. [1] proposed a probabilistic
method which use Bloom ﬁlters to securely evaluate the
honesty of a node itself with the help of TPD
brute force
attacks
in a brute force attack, an attacker works
through all possible vehicle identiﬁcation
number (VIN) in order to determine and
compromise the identity of a vehicle
to deal with the type of attack, Langley et al. [4] proposed a
secure method of authentication which requires use of some
unique identiﬁcation for vehicles concatenated with some
large random value and then hashed using some hash
algorithm
misbehaving
and faulty
nodes
when a node injects faulty data while
complying with the implemented
protocols, we are in presence of a
misbehaving node. A faulty node may
attempt to disrupt the system stopping to
respond, drop messages, or act arbitrarily
Raya et al. [5] proposed a framework for the identiﬁcation
and local containment of these kind of attacks which consists
of the following basic components: (i) the centralised
revocation of a node by the CA, (ii) the local detection of
misbehaviour, performed individually by each node and (iii) a
distributed, localised protocol for the eviction of an attacker
by its neighbouring nodes
malicious users in this type of attack, an attacker uses
random key sets during the attack in
order to prevent his physical trajectory
from being easily identiﬁed
Xi et al. [6] proposed a random keyset-based authentication
protocol that preserves user privacy under the zero-trust
policy, in which no central authority is trusted with the user
privacy (users have to rely on OBUs to provide privacy)
trafﬁc analysis
attacks
in a trafﬁc analysis attack, an attacker
listens and/or compromises certain parts
of the VANET to match a message sender
with the recipient
Cencioni et al. [8] proposed VIPER: a vehicle-to-
infrastructure communication privacy enforcement protocol
which is resilient to trafﬁc analysis attacks. The intuition
behind this protocol is to have vehicles not to send their
messages directly to the RSU, but to have vehicles acting as
mix nodes
malicious nodes this attack redirects network trafﬁc by
altering control message ﬁelds or by
forwarding routing messages with
falsiﬁed values. Also, malicious nodes can
launch denial of service attacks
Florian et al. [4] proposed VARS, a completely distributed
approach based on reputation that make use of direct and
indirect trust as well as opinion piggybacking to enable
conﬁdence decisions on event messages
illusion attacks in this attack, a malicious attacker creates
a speciﬁc trafﬁc situation and sends false
trafﬁc warning messages to decoy other
drivers believe that a trafﬁc event
occurred [11]
to resolve this security threat, Lo et al. [11] proposed a new
system architecture [called the plausibility validation
network (PVN)] to check the raw data from sensors and
further evaluate whether the incoming or generated
message is valid or not
forging
positions and
Sybil attacks
a forging position attack refers to a type
of attack where the attacker misleads
vehicle safety systems to display warnings
to their drivers while the Sybil attack is a
well-known harmful attack whereby a
vehicle claims to be several vehicles
either at the same time or in succession
to prevent these kind of attacks, Yan et al. [12] proposed a
novel solution that uses on-board radar as the virtual ‘eye’ of
a vehicle. Although the ‘eyesight’ is limited because a
modest radar transmission range, a vehicle can see
surrounding vehicles and receive reports of their GPS
coordinates. By comparing what is seen to what has been
heard, a vehicle can corroborate the real position of
neighbours and isolate malicious vehicles
position
cheating and
false position
disseminating
positions cheating refers to an attack
where nodes disseminate false positions
(which falsify their position data) to
modify the geographic routing regarding
both performance and security
Leinmu¨ller et al. [13] addressed the security of geographic
routing by focusing on infrastructure-less autonomous
position veriﬁcation, where each node judges the position
claims independently of others without using special
hardware of preinstalled infrastructure networks
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sector. Many security challenges still remain to be solved to
support and enable a highly secure VANET infrastructure
and secure VANET communications.
In this work, we have analysed the attacks that VANETs
can be subjected to. We have focused on the following
security issues namely: anonymity, key management, privacy,
reputation and location. Table 1 provides a summary of the
security attacks we have identiﬁed that may be launched on
VANETs and the corresponding security solutions reported
in the recent literature to mitigate those attacks. We hope
that this survey will enable VANET designers and
developers to build more secure and robust VANET
architectures, protocols and applications in the future.
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Abstract Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are envisioned to support the devel-
opment of a wide range of attractive applications such as payment services which
require the design of payment systems that satisfy additional requirements associated
with VANETs. The wide range of scenarios (with or without connectivity restriction)
arising from vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside communications have opened
up new security challenges which must be considered by payment system designers
to achieve the same security capabilities independent of the scenario where payment
occurs. We propose and implement a new payment protocol (called KCMS-VAN
protocol) for those scenarios where the client cannot communicate directly with the
credit card issuer (the client’s financial institution) for authentication. Our proposed
protocol uses symmetric-key operations which require low computational power and
can be processed much faster than asymmetric ones. We also present a performance
evaluation of the proposed payment protocol and the results obtained demonstrate
that optimal performance can be achieved with it.
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1 Introduction
Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs) are a form of Mobile Ad hoc NETwork
(MANET) that aims to provide communications among nearby vehicles (also known
as Inter-Vehicle Communication -(IVC)-) and between vehicles and nearby roadside
base-stations (also referred to as Vehicle-to-Roadside Communication -(VRC)-).
The application space for vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside communica-
tions is vast and opens up tremendous business opportunities and research challenges
among which security is an important one. VANETs are envisioned to support the de-
velopment of a wide variety of new attractive applications that can be broadly divided
into two major categories [21, 24, 37]: (1) Safety-related applications, and (2) Com-
fort applications. Although the industry and academia have concentrated their re-
search efforts on safety-related applications due to its importance for the automotive
domain, it is expected that research on Comfort applications (that also offer great
business opportunities) will continue to attract the attention of researchers and de-
signers to develop non-safety VANET-based applications.
To enable payments in VANETs, it is necessary to build payment systems that
satisfy the additional requirements associated with vehicular ad hoc networks. As
mentioned previously, both vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside communica-
tions open up new security challenges that must be considered by payment system
designers to achieve the same security capabilities independent of the scenario where
payments occur.
The above situation can be represented in the real word by the following example:
a client is on the road and stops at a gas station to purchase gas or some others goods
at the gas station store with some payment card. In both cases, if the client is not able
to communicate with the card issuer (to authorize the payment) from the application
unit (because of the absence of the infrastructure necessary such Road-Side Units
(RSUs), or a HotSpot (HS)-), the client should still be able to perform the payment
using the merchant’s infrastructure.
An example of the above situation is the restricted connectivity scenario shown
in Fig. 1 where a car (henceforth referred to as the client), with an On-Board Unit
(OBU) and an Application Unit (AU) can only connect to the merchant during a pay-
ment transaction due to the lack of Internet access with its AU. This situation creates
a potential security problem because the client cannot send any kind of messages di-
rectly to the issuer and has to do it through the merchant (who should not be able to
change the content of the messages but must keep evidence of the payment). Note
that in our scheme, the merchant takes an active role in the payment process because
it acts as a proxy to allow the communication between the client and the card issuer.
Fig. 1 A restricted connectivity scenario in VANETs
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On the other hand, thinking in a VANET scenario with moving vehicles, we can
found the following example in the real world which represents a restricted connec-
tivity scenario: a client is driving on a road and wants to purchase a weather forecast
using some payment card. This situation creates the same potential security prob-
lem than the aforementioned example. However, even in this kind of situations, the
scheme proposed in this paper could be applied (according to the ideas claimed in
the Carlink project, proposed by [26]). However, we can include any experimental
that show that the proposed protocol performs well when the client is on the move
because this study is beyond the scope of this paper.
In order to provide authentication in electronic payment systems (including mobile
commerce), many methods have been considered but symmetric and asymmetric sig-
nature methods are chosen for authentication [10]. However, traditional asymmetric
signature schemes make the signature computations very expensive and are not suit-
able for those portable devices (such as the ones typically attached to an OBU [7])
available in the market not based on the Texas Instruments TMS320C55x processors
family [11].
The protocol we propose in this work is for the case where we do not have direct
communication between the client and the card issuer. As a result, the above schemes
are not suitable because the client has connectivity restrictions, and consequently,
communication with other parties (such a Certification Authority, for verifying a cer-
tificate) is not possible during a payment transaction. Therefore, the use of symmetric
signature scheme is required to satisfy the requirements of the protocol proposed in
this work. Symmetric cryptography (which employs a shared key between two par-
ties) provides (such as asymmetric cryptography) message confidentiality, message
integrity, and party authentication, and represents an alternative in the construction of
secure protocols for mobile payment systems. Symmetric-key operations do not re-
quire high computational power nor do they require additional communications steps
(as in the case of protocols based on public-key infrastructures where public-key cer-
tificates have to be verified by a Certificate Authority).
To address the issue of direct communication between the client and the card issuer
for authentication purposes, we designed and implemented a payment protocol that
allows the client to send a message to the issuer through a merchant (who will not be
able to decrypt the message). The proposed protocol, called the Kiosk Centric Model
payment protocol for VANETs (henceforth referred to as the KCMS-VAN Protocol),
employs symmetric-key operations in all engaging parties to reduce both, the setup
cost for the payment infrastructure and the transaction cost. Furthermore, it supports
both credit-card and debit-card transactions, protects the real identity of the client
during the payment and should be used with a portable device attached to an AU.
We analyze the performance of the KCMS-VAN protocol with actual mobile
phones and PDAs as the implementation platforms. This allows us to further demon-
strate that our client-side application can be installed on multiple heterogeneous
Java™-enabled memory-constrained portable wireless handheld devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents recent related
works related to our research. In Sect. 3, we propose and describe the payment proto-
col for vehicle-to-roadside scenarios in VANETs. Section 4 presents the implemen-
tation of KCMS-VAN in detail. We present performance evaluation results of the
proposed protocol in Sect. 5. Finally, make some concluding remarks in Sect. 6.
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2 Related work
In recent years, several studies have been conducted to improve the security of mo-
bile payment systems. Many of these efforts have also been dedicated to unify con-
cepts and scenarios into frameworks that will be useful in the design of new elec-
tronic payment systems. Many of these studies have considered the following meth-
ods to provide authentication in electronic payment systems (including mobile com-
merce): username/password, symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, smart card,
and biometric methods. Username/password does not offer enough security for m-
commerce. Biometric approaches are not feasible at present and smart card would
require an external device to read the card. Symmetric and asymmetric signature
have been widely used for authentication purposes.
Most of the protocols proposed in recent years are based on the Full Connecti-
vity scenario (where all the entities are directly connected one to another [8]) and
employ asymmetric-key operations [5, 9, 12, 17, 36] whereas the remaining scenar-
ios use symmetric-key operations which is more suitable for wireless networks [15].
Unfortunately, usage of those protocols is not possible in scenarios where direct inter-
action among two of its parties is not allowed due to the communication restriction
imposed by the model (as in the case for the Kiosk Centric Model [8]). As a re-
sult, a new trend has emerged which is to develop mobile payment systems based on
restricted connectivity scenarios, achieving the same security and performance lev-
els as the Full Connectivity Scenario. Protocols proposed by Téllez et al. [27–32]
constitute examples of mobile payment protocols suitable for scenarios with com-
munication restrictions. However, such proposals are theoretical and do not capture
practical performance issues we encounter with real systems. Thus in this work, we
present an implementation of our proposed secure payment protocol and evaluate its
performance.
3 Proposed secure payment protocol for vehicle-to-roadside scenarios in
VANETs
3.1 The kiosk centric model payment protocol for VANETs (KCMS-VAN) model
The KCMS-VAN protocol was designed taking into consideration the model
suggested by Abad-Peiro et al. [1] such that it can be applied by many different
payment methods. Thus, based on the General Payment Model of Abad-Peiro et al.
[1], our proposed secure payment protocol uses the following entities:
1. Client: a user who wants to purchase goods or services from the merchant. In
our proposed protocol, the client is a userside entity equipped with an On-Board
Unit (called OBU) and/or an Application Unit (called AU that may use the OBU’s
communication capabilities). An AU can be an integrated part of a vehicle and be
permanently connected to an OBU or could be a portable device such as a Personal
Digital Assistant (PDA), a mobile phone or a gaming device that can dynamically
attach to and detach from an OBU [7].
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2. Merchant: an entity that has products or services to offer or sell. This entity could
be a computational one (such as a normal web server, a roadside computing sta-
tion or an intelligent vending machine) or a physical one (such as a gas station
that makes it possible to pay from within an AU) which the user can connect to
using a short range link (using wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth).
Moreover, this entity connects with the Payment Gateway (an entity which pro-
vides the necessary infrastructure to allow a merchant to accept credit card and
other forms of electronic payment) through a secure channel allowing the client to
communicate with the issuer using this connection.
3. Acquirer: is the merchant’s financial institution. It verifies the validity of the de-
posited payment instructions and manages the merchant’s account including fund
transfers.
4. Issuer: is the client’s financial institution. It provides electronic payment instruc-
tions to the client to use in a payment and manages the client’s account including
fund transfers.
5. Payment gateway: an additional entity that acts as a medium between acquirer/
issuer on the bank’s private network side and the client/merchant at the Internet
side [15].
The parties of the former model communicate with each other regarding fund
transfers, using the following 3 primitive payment transactions:
– In Payment, the client transfers the value to the merchant.
– In Value Subtraction, the client requests that the payment gateway (on behalf of
issuer) deducts the money from the client’s account.
– In Value Claim, the merchant requests that the payment gateway (on behalf of
acquirer) transfers money to the merchant’s account.
The five entities in KCMS-VAN and their interactions are shown in Fig. 2. Note
that there is no direct interaction between the client and the issuer. Moreover, the
connection between the client and the merchant (denoted as the dotted arrow) is set
up through a wireless channel (such as IEEE 802.15.1, Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11a/b/g).
Interaction between the merchant and the payment gateway (depicted as solid ar-
row in Fig. 2) should be reliable and secure against passive and active attacks. There-
fore, the connection should be established through a secure wired channel using a
well-known security protocol such as secure socket layer/transport layer security
(SSL/TLS). Note that the issuer, the acquirer and the payment gateway operate in
the bank private network. The security of the messages exchanged among them is
beyond of the scope of this paper.
Before receiving payment services, the client must register with an Issuer. Gener-
ally, this registration can be done either personally at the issuer’s premises or via the
issuer’s website. During the client’s registration, the following steps are performed:
1. The Client shares his/her credit- and/or debit-card information (CDCI) with the
issuer (who will not reveal it to any merchant).
2. The Issuer assigns several nicknames to the client. Those nicknames are known
only to the client and the issuer [10].
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Fig. 2 KCMS-VAN architecture
3.2 Notations
All the entities involved in our proposed payment protocol are called parties and com-
municate through wireless and wired networks. The symbols C, M, PG, I, A are used
to denote the names of the parties Client, Merchant, Payment Gateway, Issuer and
Acquirer, respectively. The following symbols are used to represent other messages
and protocols:
• IDP : The identity of party P that contains the contact information of P .
• NIDC: Client’s nickname, temporary identity.
• TID: Identity of transaction that includes time and date of the
transaction.
• TSTP : Timestamp generated by P .
• Stt: The status of transaction (Stt = {Accepted, Rejected}).
• OI: Order information (OI = {TID, OD, h(OD,Price)}) where OD and
Price are order descriptions and its amount.
• TC: The type of card used in the purchase process (TC = {Credit,
Debit}).
• TIDReq: The request for TID.
• MIDReq: The request for IDM .
• SECA−B : The master secret shared between parties A and B.
• {M}x: The message M symmetrically encrypted with the shared key X.
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Table 1 Details of key generating technique
Generating KSC−Mi KSC−M1 = h(1-bit-shift-of-KSC−M ),
KSC−M2 = h(2-bit-shift-of-KSC−M ), . . . ,
KSC−Mn = h(n-bit-shift-of-KSC−M )
Generating KSM−PGk KSM−PG1 = h(1-bit-shift-of-KSM−PG),
KSM−PG2 = h(2-bit-shift-of-KSM−PG), . . . ,
KSM−PGn = h(n-bit-shift-of-KSM−PG)
Generating KSC−Iz KSC−I1 = h(1-bit-shift-of-(CDCI,KSC−I )),
KSC−I2 = h(2-bit-shift-of-(CDCI,KSC−I )), . . . ,
KSC−In = h(n-bit-shift-of-(CDCI,KSC−I ))
• h(M): The one-way hash function of the message M .
• MAC(X,K): Message Authentication Code of the message X with the key K .
• KSA−Bt : The session key shared between parties A and B, generated
applying a hash function with t-bit cyclic shifting (either left shift
or right shift) of KSA−B . More details about this technique is given
in the next section.
3.3 Session key generation technique
Two efficient key generation techniques are employed in KCMS-VAN to generate the
sets of session keys used in transactions. In both of them, the main idea is to apply a
hashing algorithm with one-bit cyclic shift of a master secret each time a session key
is generated [16]. As a result, the performance of the protocol is increased due to the
reduced frequency of the key update processes.
The key set KSC−Mi (with i = {1, . . . , n}), is generated from the secret key KSC−M
and stored in the client’s device and merchant’s terminal. The set KSM−PGk (with
k = {1, . . . , n}), is generated from the secret key KSM−PG and stored both in the
merchant and Payment gateway terminals. The set KSC−Iz (with z = {1, . . . , n}), is
generated from the key secret KSC−I and is stored in the client’s device and the
issuer’s terminals.
The details of the generation of the different sets of session keys are shown in
Table 1.
3.4 Our proposed kiosk centric model payment protocol for VANETs
(KCMS-VAN)
The KCMS-VAN Protocol is composed by two sub-protocols: the KCMS-VAN Mer-
chant Registration Protocol (MRP) and the KCMS-VAN Payment Protocol (PP).
For the KCMS-VAN Merchant Registration Protocol, the client has to register with
the merchant to send the master key KSC−M . The protocol has to be executed every
time the client wants to perform transactions with a merchant. The details of the
protocol are shown as follows:
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Fig. 3 Merchant registration
protocol message exchange
C → M: {NIDC,n,MIDReq,KSC−M}w
M → C: {IDM,h(n,NIDC, IDM,KSC−M)}w
Client C generates KSC−M which is to be shared with the merchant and sends it
with her/his nickname NIDC , a nonce n for challenge-response and MIDReq to M.
After the merchant M receives the message, she/he sends h(n,NIDC, IDM,KSC−M)
and the merchant’s identity (IDM ). Note that both messages (from the client to the
merchant and viceversa) are encrypted with the session key w. The transmitted mes-
sages between the client and the merchant during the Merchant Registration Protocol
are shown in Fig. 3.
Once C and M have exchanged the necessary information, they can generate a
new set of KSC−Mi using the same key generation technique. The client may then
start the KCMS-VAN Payment Protocol.
For the KCMS-VAN Payment Protocol, the client purchases goods from the mer-
chant and pays for them using her/his credit-card or debit-card. This protocol is
formalized as follows:
(1) C → M: NIDC, i,TIDReq
M → C: {TID, IDM}KSC−Mi
(2) C → M: {OI,Price,NIDC, IDI ,TSTC, z,h(KSC−Iz ),
VSRequest}KSC−Mi ,MAC[(OI,Price,NIDC, IDI ,
TSTC, z),KSC−Mi+1].
VSRequest = (MAC[(Price, h(OI),TSTC,TC, IDM),KSC−Iz ],
TC,TSTC)
(3) M → PG: {VCRequest, IDM,z}KSM−PGk , k,
MAC[(IDM,k, z,VCRequest),KSM−PGk+1 ]
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VCRequest = (VSRequest,TSTM,h(OI),TID,Price,NIDC, IDI )
(4) Under banking private network,
(4.1) PG → I: NIDC, IDM,VSRequest,TID, h(OI), z,
Price, h(KSM−PGk+1)
(4.2) PG → A: Price, IDM
(4.3) I,A → PG: VSResponse,Stt, h(Stt, h(OI))
VSResponse = {Stt, h(OI)}KSC−Iz
(5) PG → M: VCResponse
VCResponse = {Stt,VSResponse, h(Stt, h(OI), h(KSC−Iz ))}KSM−PGk+1
(6) M → C: PResponse
PResponse = {VSResponse}KSC−Mi+1
Step 1: The client C and merchant M exchange the information necessary to
start the protocol by performing the following sub-step.
1-1: C sends his/her nickname (NIDC), the index i (that will be used to
generate the session key between the client and the merchant) and the
request for the transaction identity (TIDReq) to M.
1-2: M receives the request and sends back its identity (IDM ) and TID to C,
encrypted with KSC−Mi .
Step 2: Client C creates a Payment Request (referred to as the General Payment
Model as described in [1, 15]) in the following sub-steps.
2-1: A Value-Subtraction Request (called VSRequest) is created and it
includes MAC[(Price, h(OI),TSTC,TC, IDM),KSC−Iz ], TSTC and TC.
2-2: A new message is created which includes C′s nickname, I ′s identity,
Price, OI (used to inform M about the goods and prices requested),
VSRequest, the index z, timestamp TSTC read from C′s clock and
h(KSC−Iz ) (used to prevent the payment from modifying the approval
result in Step 4-5).
2-3: The message created in the previous sub-step (henceforth referred to as
the Payment Request) is encrypted with the session key KSC−Mi .
2-4: The Payment Request is sent to the merchant.
Step 3: The merchant M generates the Value-Claim Request (called VCRequest)
by performing the following sub-steps.
3-1: The message received from C is decrypted to extract OI and TSTC .
3-2: The timeliness of the Payment Request is verified. If the check is
successful, the following sub-steps will be performed.
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3-3: The VCRequest is prepared, and contains the VSRequest, TSTM , h(OI),
identity of transaction, order’s amount, C′s nickname, and I ′s identity.
3-4: The VCRequest, the M ′s identity and the index z, are encrypted with
KSM−PGK .
3-5: The encrypted message is sent in sub-steps 3-4 to PG with k.
Step 4: Using the private network of the banking institution, the Payment
Gateway (PG) performs the following sub-steps to verify the payment.
4-1: The VCRequest is decrypted to retrieve VSRequest and the others
fields.
4-2: The timeliness of VCRequest is verified. If the check is successful, the
following steps are executed.
4-3: The VSRequest and other important, such as: h(OI), TID, IDM , Price,
z and h(KSM−PGk+1) are forwarded to the issuer (I) where it is
decided whether to approve or reject the transaction.
4-4: IDM and the requested price Price are sent to confirm to the
Acquirer A that the client is the party to whom the requested amount
Price will be transferred to.
4-5: The approved result (Stt) and Value-subtraction Response (called
VSResponse and encrypted with KSC−Iz ) are received from the
issuer I. It is worth noting that the VSResponse is prepared by the
issuer after (a) checking the timeliness of VSRequest and the validity
of the client’s account, and (b) after transferring the total amount of OI
to the merchant’s account.
Step 5: The Payment Gateway PG generates the Value-Claim Response (called
VCResponse) in the following sub-steps.
5-1: A VCResponse is created that includes Stt, VSResponse (which will be
forwarded to the client C) and h(Stt, h(OI), h(KC−I z )).
5-2: The VCResponse is encrypted with KSM−PGk+1 and sent to M.
Step 6: Merchant M performs the following sub-steps.
6-1: The VCResponse is decrypted to retrieve VSResponse and other fields.
6-2: The merchant’s own OI is compared with the received h(OI). If they do
not match, then the client performs Sub-step 6-3a, otherwise the client
performs Sub-step 6-3b.
6-3a: A message is sent to the Payment Gateway to notify it of the response
failure. The Payment Gateway then starts a recovery procedure or
resends the message.
6-3b: The Payment Response (called PResponse and represents the result of
the client’s request) is created and includes the VSResponse.
6-4: The PResponse is encrypted with KSC−Mi+1 and sent to C.
3.5 Security analysis
We analyze the security of our proposed secure Payment Protocol in this section. In
the case of the KCMS-VAN protocol, the client uses a nickname NIDC (a temporary
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Fig. 4 KCMS-VAN payment protocol message exchanges
identity known only to the client and the issuer) instead of his/her real identity. As
a result neither the merchant nor the payment gateway can map the nickname to the
client’s true identity. This anonymity protects relevant information from third parties
but not unrestrained anonymity [2].
The Confidentiality of messages transmitted in each transaction should be pro-
tected while in transit, specially in wireless networks where anybody can easily eaves-
drop the transmitted messages. In our protocol, we protect those confidential mes-
sages by employing symmetric cryptography which uses a secret shared between two
parties (called sender and receiver) that wish to communicate safely without reveal-
ing details of the message. Moreover, the encryption key allows receiver and sender
to authenticate each other. We also use the Message Authentication Code (MAC) to
maintain the integrity of important messages. The proposed scheme provides integrity
and identity authentication.
Although, generally, in any transaction a party should not trust others unless they
can provide a proof of trustworthiness [15], in our protocol we assume the trust re-
lationship between the client and the issuer because the client has a credit- and/or
debit-card issued by the issuer who will not reveal it to any other party.
Since KSC−IZ could be generated only by the client or issuer but not by merchant,
she/he is able to provide a non-repudiable evidence to prove to other parties that
client has sent a message or requested merchant to perform transaction. Thus, Non-
repudiation of transaction is ensured by KSC−IZ in the proposed protocol.
In the following paragraphs, we adopt the realistic analysis method proposed by
[3] to discuss two possible attacks against our proposed protocol:
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– Replaying attack: If an intruder E wants to impersonate a legal user by replaying
the user’s transmitting contents, the timestamp included in the transmitted mes-
sage ensure the freshness of the message and avoids replaying attacks. Thus, our
proposed protocol is secure against replaying attack.
– Key guessing attack: It is very difficult for any intruder E to get information re-
lated to the secret key through analyzing intercepted data because the authentica-
tion key is dynamic (exploiting, on each transaction, different session keys based
on the same master secrets). Then, our proposed protocol is secure against the key
guessing attack.
4 System design and implementation of KCMS-VAN protocol
4.1 Environment settings
The various applications (client, merchant, payment gateway and issuer) in our
KCMS-VAN implementation have been developed in Java [34], using JavaME [35]
for the implementation of the client in mobile devices. Since the JaveME Mobile In-
formation Device Profile (MIDP) version 2.0 does not have the necessary security
support, we have used security APIs from [33], a light-weight API suitable for use in
any environment (including the newly released JavaME).
In Table 2 we show the hardware configuration of the devices used to run and
benchmark all the applications.
4.2 Chosen cryptographic operations
Security and computational requirements are two important aspects which should be
considered in order to choose suitable algorithms for encryption and hash functions
Table 2 Hardware specifications of system used for performance evaluation
Protocol Party Device Features
Client Nokia™ N95 - 332 MHz Texas Instruments
OMAP 2420 (ARM11-based).
- 160 MB of RAM.
- Symbian OS 9.2, S60 rel. 3.1.
Palm™ T|X - Intel 312 MHZ ARM-based
processor.
- 100 MB of RAM.
- Palm OS® Garnet 5.4.
- IBM’s Java Virtual Machine.
Merchant - Intel Core 2 Duo (2 GHz).
Payment Gateway Sony™ Vaio VGN-SZ450N - 2 GB of RAM.
Issuer - Windows Vista Business.
Acquirer - Sun’s Java Virtual Machine.
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in our application. From past results discussed in [23] and [22], computational re-
quirement is directly related to energy consumption of operating devices in that the
higher computation the algorithm requires, the higher energy it consumes.
We present and discuss the cryptographic algorithms we used for our implemen-
tation bellow:
– Symmetric-key algorithm: The results presented in [23] and [22] shows that the
Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm (called AES [20, 25]) requires less en-
ergy consumption and computation compared to the Triple Data Encryption Stan-
dard algorithm (called 3DES [18, 19]). Therefore, AES is more suitable to operate
on power-constrained mobile devices. But, comparing both algorithms in terms
of security, 3DES with 112-bit key length provides the equivalent security of RSA
public-key algorithm with 2,048-bit key length, while AES with 128-bit key length
provides the security equivalent to RSA public-key algorithm with 3,072-bit key
length [6].
We deployed the AES algorithm (with 128-bit key) as the symmetric-key en-
cryption algorithm for our implementation because it provides higher security,
faster operation, and lower energy consumption compared to 3DES.
– Hash function: In our implementation, we chose MD5 algorithm [18] because
it requires less computation and consumes less energy than Secure Hash Algo-
rithm version 1 (Called SHA-1 [18]) as shown in citeravi2002 and [22]. Moreover,
MD5 can produce the same length of output to the length of an AES key (128 bits).
– Keyed-hash function: The Hashed Message Authentication Code with Message
Digest 5 algorithm (called HMAC-MD5 [14]) is used in our application to per-
form keyed-hash operation because the key length of HMAC-MD5 is equivalent
to the length of each session key. Moreover, HMAC-MD5 is considered a se-
cure keyed-hash algorithm available for wireless networks since no attacks have
emerged on HMAC even when it is implemented with hash functions that are not
weak collision-resistance [4].
4.3 The KCMS-VAN software at the client side
The KCMS-VAN protocol requires a software (henceforth referred to as the KCMS-
VAN Wallet) at the client’s side for purchase transactions. The client can obtain the
above application by connecting to the issuer’s web site to download it or sending a
request to the issuer to receive it by mail. After the client has downloaded or received
the KCMS-VAN wallet, she/he should install it on her/his mobile device. Note that
during the installation process, the client is requested to set up her/his own password
(henceforth referred to as KWP password) to protects unauthorized users to: a) open
the program, b) authorize the payment transaction, or c) access client’s information
and key file. Figure 5 illustrates snapshots of the main screen and main menu of
KCMS-VAN wallet on both Nokia™ N95 (top) and Palm™ T|X devices (bottom).
The left screen shows the main screen of KCMS-VAN wallet whereas the right screen
shows the main menu.
The KCMS-VAN wallet provides the following functionalities:
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Fig. 5 Snapshots of main
screen and main menu of the
KCMS-VAN wallet on both
Nokia N95 and Palm T|X
devices
– Personal Details: The Client’s personal information is used in both Merchant Reg-
istration and the Payment Fulfillment. To prevent the client from being prompted
for her/his information in both phases, the KCMS-VAN wallet allows client to store
in a file (protected by the KCMS Wallet Password -KWP-) his/her personal infor-
mation (such as name, contact information, issuer ID and credit-and/or debit-card
information) for further uses. To achieve that, the KCMS-VAN wallet prompts the
user to enter the above information and store it at the client’s mobile device. Fig-
ure 6 illustrates the KCMS-VAN wallet prompting for the client to enter her/his
details on both Nokia™ N95 and Palm™ T|X devices.
– Key Generation: To generate a new session key from the master key, the KCMS-
VAN wallet call generateItemofSet() with two values: a master key and a random
number j. Upon receiving the master key, its BigInteger representation is created
and the number of zeros according to the value of j is added to the right to the
master key, using the shiftleft() to perform the left-cyclic. Then, the new value will
be put through a MD5 has function to produce a new 128-bit session key. The java
code for generateItemofSet() is shown in Listing 1.
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Fig. 6 Snapshots of KCMS
wallet personal details form on
both Nokia N95 (top) and Palm
T|X (bottom) devices
p u b l i c S t r i n g g e n e r a t e I t e m o f S e t ( byte [ ] s e c r e t , i n t i n d e x )
{
S t r i n g key_Base = new S t r i n g ( s e c r e t ) ;
S t r i n g c a d r = " " , r e s u l = " " ;
B i g I n t e g e r cadb ;
long v a l c a r ;
char [ ] c h a r a c t e r s = key_Base . t o C h a r A r r a y ( ) ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < c h a r a c t e r s . l e n g t h ; i ++)
{
v a l c a r = c h a r a c t e r s [ i ] ;
c a d r = c a d r + Long . t o S t r i n g ( v a l c a r , 2 ) ;
}
cadb = new B i g I n t e g e r ( cadr , 2 ) ;
cadb = cadb . s h i f t L e f t ( i n d e x ) ;
c a d r = cadb . t o S t r i n g ( 1 6 ) ;
r e s u l = new S t r i n g ( t h i s . h a s h f u n c ( cadb . t o S t r i n g ( 1 6 ) , "MD5" ) ) ;
re turn ( r e s u l ) ;
}
Listing 1 Java code for generateItemofSet().
The above key generation technique can be directly applied to generate the sets
of session keys KSC−Mi and KSM−PGk from the key KSC−M and KSM−PG, res-
pectively. To generate the set of session keys KSC−Iz , the credit- and/or debit-card
information (CDCI) is treated as the BigInteger and added to the value of KSC−I
before doing the shiftleft() operation. Figure 7 shows an example of the proposed
session key generation technique.
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Fig. 7 Example of the KCMS wallet key generation technique
p u b l i c S t r i n g genera teAESkey ( i n t skey )
{
byte [ ] AESkey = t h i s . g e n e r a t e B y t e s ( skey ) ;
re turn ( new S t r i n g ( Base64 . encode ( AESkey ) ) ) ;
}
Listing 2 Java code for generateAESKey().
– Merchant Registration: In order to make payments to a merchant, the client has
to run the Merchant Registration Protocol to register with the merchant to share the
master key KSC−M . First, the client is prompted to introduce the KWP password to
retrieve her/his personal information (such as name, address, contact number and
email address) stored on the client’s device. The KCMS-VAN wallet then generates
the secret KSC−M and the session key by using generateAESKey() [13]. The java
code used for generateAESKey() is presented in Listing 2.
After the keys have been generated, the KCMS-VAN wallet encrypts the client’s
personal information, the secret KSC−M , a nonce and a request for the merchant’s
identity. All these data are encrypted with the session key w using AESEnc(), be-
fore being sent to the merchant to register the client. The format of the client reg-
istration message is shown in Table 3 whereas the java code of AESEnc() is shown
in Listing 3.
Upon receipt of the message, the merchant decrypts it using the AESDec() op-
eration (see the java code in Listing 4) to retrieve the client’s information including
the secret KSC−M . The merchant then encrypts, with the session key w and using
AESEnc(), her/his identity and h(n,NIDC, IDM,KSC−M). The encrypted message
is sent to the client to confirm the registration.
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Table 3 Client registration
message format Fields Size (bits)
Client Data Variable (Max. 1064)
KSC−M 128
Nonce 128
MIDReq 48
p u b l i c S t r i n g AESEnc ( S t r i n g mkey , S t r i n g StToEnc )
{
S t r i n g r e s u l = n u l l ;
byte [ ] key = Base64 . decode ( mkey . g e t B y t e s ( ) ) ;
byte [ ] i n p u t = StToEnc . g e t B y t e s ( ) ;
B lockCiphe r engineAES = new AESLightEngine ( ) ;
B u f f e r e d B l o c k C i p h e r cipherAES =
new PaddedBlockCipher ( new CBCBlockCipher ( engineAES ) ) ;
c ipherAES . i n i t ( true , new KeyParamete r ( key ) ) ;
byte [ ] c i p h e r T e x t =
new byte [ c ipherAES . g e t O u t p u t S i z e ( i n p u t . l e n g t h ) ] ;
i n t o u t p u t L e n =
cipherAES . p r o c e s s B y t e s ( i n p u t , 0 , i n p u t . l e n g t h , c i p h e r T e x t , 0 ) ;
t r y
{
cipherAES . d o F i n a l ( c i p h e r T e x t , o u t p u t L e n ) ;
r e s u l = new S t r i n g ( Base64 . encode ( c i p h e r T e x t ) ) ;
}
ca tch ( C r y p t o E x c e p t i o n ce )
{
r e s u l = " " ;
}
re turn ( r e s u l ) ;
}
Listing 3 Java code for AESEnc().
At the client side, the client retrieves the confirmation of her/his registration by
decrypting the message using AESDec(). Then, the KCMS-VAN wallet stores the
secret KSC−M in a key file protected with the KWP password. Once the registration
is done, the merchant stores on her/his device the client’s information together with
the secret KSC−M and the key KSC−Mi (generated from KSC−M ).
Figure 8 illustrates the KCMS-VAN wallet during the Merchant Registration
phase on both Nokia™ N95 (top) and Palm™ T|X devices (bottom). On the left
screen, the KCMS wallet shows the client’s details whereas the right screen shows
the successful registration.
– Payment Execution: To make a payment to the merchant, the client is first
prompted to enter the Order Description, the Product ID, the Price and the Type of
Card to use (Debit or Credit). After filling the information, the KCMS-VAN wallet
application generates the keys KSC−Mi and KSC−Iz based on the random num-
bers i and z, respectively. Then, the client sends his/her nickname, the index i, and
the transaction ID request (TIDReq). Upon receipt of the message, the merchant
generates KSC−Mi (based on the i value) and sends his/her identity IDM ) and the
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p u b l i c S t r i n g AESDec ( S t r i n g mkey , S t r i n g StToDec )
{
S t r i n g r e s u l = n u l l ;
byte [ ] key = Base64 . decode ( mkey . g e t B y t e s ( ) ) ;
byte [ ] i n p u t = Base64 . decode ( StToDec . g e t B y t e s ( ) ) ;
B lockCiphe r engineAES = new AESLightEngine ( ) ;
B u f f e r e d B l o c k C i p h e r cipherAES = new
PaddedBlockCipher ( new CBCBlockCipher ( engineAES ) ) ;
c ipherAES . i n i t ( f a l s e , new KeyParamete r ( key ) ) ;
byte [ ] c i p h e r T e x t =
new byte [ c ipherAES . g e t O u t p u t S i z e ( i n p u t . l e n g t h ) ] ;
i n t o u t p u t L e n =
cipherAES . p r o c e s s B y t e s ( i n p u t , 0 , i n p u t . l e n g t h , c i p h e r T e x t , 0 ) ;
t r y
{
cipherAES . d o F i n a l ( c i p h e r T e x t , o u t p u t L e n ) ;
r e s u l = new S t r i n g ( c i p h e r T e x t ) ;
}
ca tch ( C r y p t o E x c e p t i o n ce )
{
r e s u l = " " ;
}
re turn ( r e s u l ) ;
}
Listing 4 Java code for AESDec().
p u b l i c S t r i n g HmacMD5( S t r i n g kyeenc , S t r i n g s t )
{
S t r i n g r e s u l = " " ;
HMac hmac ;
hmac = new HMac( new MD5Digest ( ) ) ;
byte [ ] macValue = new byte [ hmac . ge tMacSize ( ) ] ;
byte [ ] s t b y t = s t . g e t B y t e s ( ) ;
hmac . i n i t ( new KeyParameter ( Base64 . decode ( kyeenc ) ) ) ;
hmac . u p d a t e ( s t b y t , 0 , s t b y t . l e n g t h ) ;
hmac . d o F i n a l ( macValue , 0 ) ;
hmac . r e s e t ( ) ;
r e s u l = new S t r i n g ( Base64 . encode ( macValue ) ) ;
re turn r e s u l ;
}
Listing 5 Java code for HmacMD5().
transaction ID (TID) to the client, encrypted with the session key KSC−Mi using
AESEnc().
The client then creates the Value-Subtraction Request (VSRequest) to be sent to
the issuer. An authenticated hash of this message is computed using HMAC-MD5
algorithm with the key KSC−Iz by using the HmacMD5(). Note that the merchant
will not able to decrypt or create the request since the merchant does not have the
key KSC−I which is known only by the client and the issuer. The java code used
for the HmacMD5() is presented Listing 5.
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Fig. 8 Screenshots of KCMS-VAN wallet during the execution of the merchant registration protocol phase
on both Nokia™ N95 and ™ T|X devices
Once the VSRequest has been created, the client prepares the Payment Order-
ing request (called PRequest) to be sent to the merchant. This message includes
VSRequest, the order information (OI), price, client nickname (NIDC ) and issuer
identity (IDI ). The encryption of PRequest with KSC−Mi using AESEnc() ensures
its confidentiality.
Upon receipt of the request from the client, the merchant (who has the KSC−M )
decrypts the message using AESDec(). The merchant then combines the VSRequest
received from the client and the amount payable by the client with the necessary
information to create the VCRequest. This message is encrypted with KSM−PGk
before being sent to the Payment Gateway.
The Payment Gateway (PG) decrypts the message received using AESDec().
Then, PG sends the VSRequest to the issuer and the VCRequest to the acquirer.
Upon receipt of the approval response, the PG prepares VCResponse (which in-
cludes VSResponse encrypted with KSC−Iz ) and encrypts it with KSM−PGk using
AESEnc(). The Payment Gateway then sends VCResponse to the merchant which
in turn sends it to the client, encrypting KSC−Mi+1 using AESEnc(). The message
sent from the merchant to the client represents the Payment Ordering Response
(PResponse). Note that although the flow information between the payment gate-
way, the issuer and the acquirer (step 4 of KCMS-VAN protocol) exists within
a private banking network (beyond the scope of KCMS-VAN Protocol). We im-
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Table 4 Format of payment
primitive transactions:
PRequest, VSRequest,
VCRequest, VCResponse and
VSResponse
Primitive Fields Size (bits)
OI
Variable
Price
Payment Request Client Data
(PRequest) Issuer Data
Timestamp
hmac(VSRequest) 128
Value-Subtraction Price
Variable
Request (VSRequest) Merchant Data
h(OI) 128
Value-Subtraction h(OI) 128
Response (VSResponse) Response (Yes/No) Variable
Value-Claim VSRquest
Variable
Request (VCRequest) Price
Value-Claim h(OI) 128
Response (VCResponse) Response (Yes/No) Variable
plement the issuer and acquirer to have a better idea of the performance of the
whole payment system even if it could be assumed that all transactions relevant to
acquirer and issuer are successful within a limited time.
When the client receives the message, it retrieves the Payment Ordering Res-
ponse using AESDec() to decrypt the message. The format of PRequest, VSRe-
quest, VSResponse, VCRequest and VCResponse are shown in Table 4.
Figure 9 illustrates the KCMS-VAN wallet during the Payment phase on both
Nokia™ N95 (top) and Palm™ T|X devices (bottom). On the left screen, the
KCMS-VAN wallet shows the Order description whereas the right screen shows
the successful payment.
5 Performance evaluation
5.1 Discussions of empirical results
5.1.1 Execution time of merchant registration protocol
In this section, we report on the empirical results obtained for our implementation
of the KCMS-VAN protocol. In particular, we focus on the time taken to perform
various parts of the KCMS-VAN protocol and the overall time taken to complete a
payment transaction. The results were collected by performing 10 executions with
different sets of data and the timings taken were done using the getTime method in
the Date class of J2SE.
The average times required by the client and the merchant to perform the Merchant
Registration Protocol are shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Note that the time
taken by the client to input the data has not been included into the time taken by
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Fig. 9 Screenshots of the
payment phase on both Nokia™
N95 and Palm™ T|X devices
Table 5 Time (ms) Taken at
Client to perform the Merchant
Registration Protocol (TCRP)
Processes Device
Nokia N95 Palm T|X
AESGenw 39.90 1.00
AESGen KSc−m 28.80 1.00
AESEnc Data 81.90 5.10
AESDec Data 50.10 2.00
TCRP 1118.50 727.10
Table 6 Time (ms) Taken at
Merchant to perform the
Merchant Registration Protocol
(TMRP)
Processes Client’s Device
Nokia N95 Palm T|X
AESEnc Data < 1 < 1
AESDec Data 6.40 5.90
TMRP 34.70 43.40
the application to perform the Merchant Registration Protocol. Moreover, when we
tested our implementation by entering the maximum number of characters allowed
into each individual field, we found that the maximum times taken by the client (1196
milliseconds for Nokia N95 and 740 milliseconds for the Palm T|X) and the merchant
(35 milliseconds for Nokia N95 and 76 milliseconds for the Palm T|X) to perform
the Merchant Registration Protocol are not much different from the average times
calculated in Table 5 and Table 6.
J.I. Téllez et al.
Table 7 Time (ms) taken at client (Nokia N95), merchant, payment gateway, and issuer on performing
Payment Protocol (TPP)
Processes Nokia N95 Merchant PG Issuer
KSC−Mi generation 253.90 6.70 – –
KSC−Mi+1 generation 29.90 < 1 – –
KSC−Iz generation 15.00 – – < 1
KSM−PGk generation – – 6.80 –
VSRequest creation 145.30 – – –
PRequest creation 522.00 – – –
PRequest decryption 880.00 – – –
VCRequest creation 2.10 – – –
VCRequest decryption – – < 1 –
VSResponse creation – – – 4.80
TPP 6842.20 2742.10 322.50 12.80
Table 8 Time (ms) taken at client (Palm T|X), merchant, payment gateway, and issuer on performing
Payment Protocol (TPP)
Processes Palm T|X Merchant PG Issuer
KSC−Mi generation 66.00 5.70 – –
KSC−Mi+1 generation – < 1 – –
KSC−Iz generation – – – < 1
KSM−PGk generation – – 6.00 –
VSRequest creation 15.00 – – –
PRequest creation 653.00 – – –
PRequest decryption 1145.00 – – –
VCRequest creation 2.10 2.40 – –
VCRequest decryption – – < 1 –
VSResponse creation – – – 4.70
TPP 5657.00 2461.90 310.80 12.80
5.1.2 Execution time of payment protocol
The average total time that the client has spent on performing the first transaction
with the merchant (both the Merchant Registration Protocol and the Payment Pro-
tocol) was 7.96 seconds (1.12 + 6.84 = 7.96 seconds) using the Nokia N95 device
compared to 6.39 seconds (0.73+5.66 = 6.39 seconds) when the palm t|x device was
used. In next payment transactions, the total average time to complete each transac-
tion will reduce to only 6.84 seconds on Nokia N95 device and 5.66 seconds on palm
t|x device because the client does not have to execute the Merchant Registration Pro-
tocol. This minimal amount of time to complete a transaction reveals the potential of
KCMS-VAN protocol to execute payment transactions in wireless environments with
minimal delays.
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Table 9 KCMS-VAN wallet software size and its memory usage
Device Internal memory Application size % Memory used
Nokia™ N95 mobile phone 163840 kb 68 kb 0.042 %
Palm™ T|X handheld 131072 kb 132 kb 0.100 %
5.1.3 Application size
as mobile devices have limited memory space, application size is an important issue
which should be considered when developing applications for such devices. We focus
our proposed payment protocol on the client’s side because it is the only party in our
scheme that uses a mobile device that interacts with the system.
Table 9 shows the KCMS-VAN wallet software size and its memory usage in the
mobile devices used during our performance evaluation measurements.
6 Conclusions and further work
A protocol for secure on-line payments in a vehicle-to-roadside Restricted Scena-
rio in VANETs (where the client cannot directly communicate with the issuer) was
proposed in this research. Our protocol employs symmetric cryptographic techniques
which allow clients to make purchases without disclosing private information and
using a short range link (such as that provided by Bluetooth or Wi-Fi) to communicate
with the merchant. Moreover, the chosen cryptography scheme has low computation
requirements at both parties (since no public-key operation is required).
The empirical results from the performance evaluation results on the implementa-
tion have proven that payment transactions over a wireless network can be conducted
by our proposed KCMS-VAN protocol. The chosen lightweight, secure cryptographic
algorithms are suitable for our VANET application. Deploying such algorithms in
KCMS-VAN results in the reduction of messages exchanged and computation costs
at the client’s mobile device. As we have seen from the implementation, a payment
transaction by KCMS-VAN can be completed within average of 6.84 second using a
Nokia N95 device and 5.66 second using palm T|X device.
The Client’s KCMS-VAN wallet has a small size which makes it very suitable for
memory-constrained mobile devices. The KCMS-VAN requires only 68 Kilobytes to
be stored on a Nokia mobile phone and 123 kilobytes on a Palm Pilot 123 kb to be
stored on a Palm Pilot.
In the future, we will explore the possibility to accommodate other cryptographic
algorithms (such as elliptic-curve cryptography, digital signature scheme with mes-
sage recovery using self-certified public keys) to our system. We also plain to re-
formulate and implement the proposed protocol into other restrictive connectivity
scenarios in VANETs (such as a scenario where the merchant cannot communicate
directly with the acquirer).
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